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Across many high- and middle-income countries, fertility rates have declined to
unsustainably low levels. This phenomenon is particularly acute in Taiwan, where
fertility has been below the “lowest-low” level of 1.3 births per woman since 2003
and hit the extremely low level of 0.895 in 2010. These trends may lead to
long-term social and economic problems due to the narrowing of the working-age
population and increases in old-age dependency ratios, and women are having
fewer children than they desire. Ultimately, the persistence of below-replacement
fertility will lead to population decline.
On the academic side, theorists have attempted to explain low fertility in
Taiwan in terms of gender inequity, arguing that gender-equitable career ambi-
tions and gender-inequitable family expectations have placed a double burden
on women who want to have children. On the policy side, the Taiwanese gov-
ernment has attempted to increase fertility through pro-natal policies, the most
expensive of which has been the Parental Leave Allowance (PLA) introduced in
2009. There is heretofore no micro-level statistical evidence that traditional fa-
milial and domestic obligations reduce women’s fertility in Taiwan. There is also
no research attempting to evaluate the causal impact of the PLA or any other
national pro-natal policy on fertility in Taiwan. Moreover, the wider academic
literature is unclear on whether parental leave impacts fertility, and is method-
ologically unclear on how to identify the effect of leave policies on fertility.
In this thesis, we aim to find out whether gender inequity is a cause of low
fertility in Taiwan, and whether parental leave policies have an impact on fertility.
This thesis is structured around three research papers: an empirical evaluation
of the effect of housework division on realised fertility; a systematic review of
the effects of parental leave policies on fertility; and an empirical evaluation of
the causal impact of the PLA on fertility. In the first and third papers, we use
econometric methods to predict next births based on housework division and PLA
eligibility respectively. In the second paper, we use systematic review methods
to find and synthesise all the best available evidence of the causal impact of leave
on fertility.
In the first paper, we find that the division of housework between married
couples of parity 1 or higher has a large impact on subsequent fertility, with
more equal divisions being associated with higher fertility. In the second paper,
we develop a new conceptual and methodological framework to decompose the
different impacts of leave policies on fertility. We also argue that certain types of
effects are more informative to pro-natal policy-makers than others. Surveying
the available evidence in terms of our novel framework, we find that studies
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identifying a broad class of effects consistently report positive relationships, and
those reporting null relationships are only identifying a narrow class of effects
of marginal interest to policy-makers. However, the findings are restricted to
the Western countries in which these studies have been conducted. In the third
paper we use our framework to evaluate the causal impact of the PLA on fertility.
Contrary to our findings in Western settings, we find that the PLA did not
increase fertility for women who were always working, but may have increased
second births among women who had been in and out of work since marriage.
Our findings make several contributions to research on low fertility, both glob-
ally and in Taiwan. Firstly, we empirically confirm the validity of gender equity
theory as an explanation of low fertility in Taiwan. Secondly, we provide an
intelligible framework for analysing the effects of pro-natal policies on fertility,
that reflects the imperatives of policy-makers. Thirdly, we show that parental
leave policies have a consistently positive impact on fertility in Western societies,
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Demography concerns itself with phenomena central to the human experience,
such as birth, death, sex, ageing, gender, sexuality, family, relationships, and
migration. My focus has always been on fertility, which at the highest level can
be seen as part of an unbroken chain of reproduction stretching back to the first
lifeforms on Earth. At the macro level, demography examines abstract collec-
tions of people – bounded politically, geographically, ethnically, or otherwise –
called “populations.” Populations persist through time even after all of its cur-
rent members have died, through reproduction. The subjects and abstractions of
demography can make the discipline very engaging to researchers with a philo-
sophical inclination.
This PhD project began under the heading, “Why has fertility declined to a
very low level in Taiwan?” Prior to the PhD, my masters thesis had focussed on
an opposite question: why is fertility in sub-Saharan Africa (still) so high? Both
questions are seemingly straightforward, but actually contain deep assumptions
about the levels of aggregate fertility to be expected from different types of soci-
eties. Moreover, the political and economic contexts in which these questions are
asked pose additional, normative assumptions about what levels of fertility are
desirable. Usually, such normative assumptions are associated with restrictive
moral prescriptions for sexual and reproductive behaviours, and particularly for
women.
In most of social science, our aim is to describe or explain social phenomena
free of any personal judgements or normative prescriptions. However, the subject
matter of demography can make it very difficult – and even undesirable – to disen-
tangle normative considerations from analysis. Historically and into the present,
fears about demographic phenomena have provided the animus for innumerable
violations of human rights and even atrocities, such as eugenics programmes,
forced sterilisations, and ethnic cleansing. In some low fertility countries today,
governments have begun to introduce authoritarian and traditionalist family poli-
cies aiming to reverse gender equality, and to encourage women to remain at home
in order to have children. This is the moral universe in which demographers of
low fertility conduct their research, and it is naive to discuss policies aiming to
increase fertility without considering these normative factors.
A thorough exploration of the normative and foundational assumptions un-
derlying analyses of fertility is beyond the scope of this thesis, and outside my
expertise. Nonetheless, our analysis has to begin by making some defensible nor-
mative assumptions. This thesis begins with the assumptions that the continued
existence of Taiwanese society is a desirable thing, and that governments should
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only try to increase fertility by removing barriers to childbearing (rather than
by coercing the behaviour of women). Along with the assumption that ageing
and death will continue to deplete the population, I will argue that the first
assumption implies that at some point, fertility will have to come back to near re-
placement level. Some commentators characterise discourses around low fertility
as alarmist, and that the putative economic consequences of population ageing
are dubious. But this begs the question: if fertility does not need to increase
now, then when should it increase? Similarly, many commentators – including
myself – criticise the inegalitarianism of some existing policies seeking to increase
fertility. But again, this begs the question: what policies should we be using?
Ultimately, the big question posed by Taiwan (and other low fertility countries) is
this: how can post-transitional populations begin to manage their fertility levels
in a way that will be sustainable in the long run?
The first epigraph of this thesis is an (admittedly emotive) evocation of the
despair felt in a society that has ceased to reproduce itself. Clearly, Taiwan
today is quite far from the apocalyptic situation depicted in Children of Men.
However, that despair is not too different from the “emptiness” felt by those in
the depopulating hinterlands of contemporary Eastern Europe (Dzenovska 2020).
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Across many high- and middle-income countries, men and women are not having
enough children to replace themselves. More specifically, countries in Eastern,
Southern, and Central Europe, and in East Asia, have experienced Total Fertility
Rates (TFRs) below 1.7 for some decades now (Rindfuss et al. 2016; UN 2019).
Fertility is particularly low in Taiwan, where in 2010, the TFR fell to 0.895 births
per woman, the lowest fertility rate of any major country in history (UN 2019).
Taiwan has had a TFR below the “lowest-low” level of 1.3 since 2003. Taiwan’s
fertility trend is comparable to other societies in East Asia, specifically South
Korea, Japan, Singapore, and Hong Kong, societies which share a Confucian
culture and comparable development trajectories (UN 2019). Taiwan’s fertility
trend can therefore be framed in a national or regional context (Lin and Kamo
2015).
1.2 Is low fertility a problem?
Broadly, there are three main clusters of arguments that low fertility either causes
or represents negative social, economic, and demographic phenomena. The first
two sets of arguments concern consequences of low fertility, and centre around
population ageing and population decline respectively. The third set of arguments
centre around people having fewer children than they would ideally like to have,
and therefore conceptualises low fertility as representing a failure of childbearing
aspirations. Some academics have been highly critical of much of this discourse,
with notable critiques found in Gietel-Basten 2019, Coleman and Rowthorn 2011
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and Kravdal 2010. Gietel-Basten 2019 takes a particularly firm stance against
the idea that low fertility in East Asia even is a problem, arguing that we should
conceptualise low fertility as simply the outcome of institutional malfunctions.
In this section we explore these theories and debates, and make the argument
that – contra Gietel-Basten – low fertility is a problem in and of itself (or at least
lowest-low fertility is). We will make this argument on the basis of population
decline and existential concerns.
In terms of population ageing, low fertility means that the absolute size of
successive generations will decrease, reducing the size of the future labour force
(Bloom et al. 2010; Poston and Zhang 2014; Sanchez-Romero 2013). The pro-
portional decrease in the working-age population will increase the old-age de-
pendency ratio, thereby increasing aggregate consumption relative to investment
and obstructing long-term economic development (Bloom et al. 2011, 2010). In
terms of population decline, long-term low fertility builds a negative momentum
into the population structure due to the shrinking of childbearing-age cohorts,
making long-term population decline likely (Feeney 2003). In the very long-term
societies must find ways to enable people to sustain replacement-level fertility, or
else face an existential threat.
At the individual level, low fertility often indicates that people are having
fewer children then they would ideally like to have, representing a failure of child-
bearing aspirations (Basten and Verropoulou 2015; Brinton et al. 2018; Gietel-
Basten 2019). Social surveys across low fertility countries in East Asia consis-
tently find that most parity 0 women capable of childbearing aspire to have two
children, and yet period and cohort fertility remain much lower than these as-
pirations (Casterline and Gietel-Basten 2018; Gietel-Basten 2019). Moreover,
between 20-25% of women exit their childbearing years without having any chil-
dren, numbers which are much higher than the percentage of women at the start
of their childbearing years who say that want no children (Gietel-Basten 2018). In
this way, the failure to realise childbearing aspirations can be seen as a problem
for reproductive rights and life-fulfilment.
There are several counterarguments to the theories laid out above. As a coun-
terpoint to fears about population ageing, the theory of the “Second Demographic
Dividend” argues that an ageing population may increase savings rates, due to
savings from (relatively large) cohorts born during the period of the demographic
transition (Abío et al. 2017; Cai 2020; Mason and Lee 2006). In terms of the
natural environment, Reher 2007 points out that population decline will likely
have a positive impact on ecological systems. In a review of arguments on this
topic, Kravdal 2010 argues that migration may be a lever for offsetting population
declines in low fertility areas. Going even further, Gietel-Basten 2019 argues that
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the whole conceptualisation of low fertility as a “problem” is mistaken. Rather,
he argues that low fertility is the outcome of individuals being unable to meet
their childbearing aspirations due to institutional factors, such as overwork, the
cost of childrearing, and gender inequity. In this way, low fertility is simply a
consequence of “upstream” problems in institutional arrangements. To support
the argument, Gietel-Basten uses survey data to show that ideal family sizes are
consistently higher than realised fertility across East Asia. Gietel-Basten also
notes that the public conversation around low fertility has become toxic, with
different generations and sexes all blaming each other. As an alternative, he ar-
gues for a rights-based approach to low fertility, which seeks to remove barriers to
childbearing in order to allow individuals to meet their childbearing aspirations.
Despite the critiques of Gietel-Basten and others, we contend that lowest-low
fertility is a problem in and of itself. To rehearse the arguments so far: concerns
about population ageing, decline, and failures to realise childbearing aspirations
are all used to conceptualise lowest-low fertility as a “problem.” However, many
commentators dispute the theories of the supposed negative socioeconomic con-
sequences of lowest-low fertility, and even argue that we should regard lowest-low
fertility merely as an outcome of other social problems. Here we make a minimal
argument: that fertility in Taiwan has to increase at some point, otherwise the
population will decline quite rapidly and eventually disappear. Assuming that
death will continue to be a feature of human societies (and there is no reason
to believe this isn’t the case), it is simply a mathematical fact that if fertility
rates in Taiwan are sustained at their present levels, the size of the population
will decline dramatically in the long term. This is a very simple observation, and
has no theoretical content – but this simplicity does not mean it isn’t true. As a
comparison, Gietel-Basten 2019 rightly highlights similarities between discourses
of low fertility with popular (and often hysterical) fears of high fertility in the
1960s and 1970s. However, a very similar argument can be made about mid-
century or historical transitional fertility declines: those fertility declines had to
have occurred at some stage, assuming that mortality would remain low. Again,
this argument has no theoretical content, but it is nonetheless a mathematical
fact that populations cannot sustain large positive or negative growth rates in
the long run. To paraphrase the Ha-Joon Chang quote in the epigraph: social
phenomena are not inherently complex, and social explanations do not need to
be complex to be accurate.
We can motivate our argument by examining projected changes in the Tai-
wanese population, assuming that fertility rates remain at contemporary levels.
In order to illustrate the effect of population momentum, we focus on the popula-
tion size of childbearing-aged women, i.e. women aged 15-50. The 2019 UNWorld
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Population Projections forecast that with a constant fertility rate, the population
of women aged 15-50 will decline from 6.672 million in 2020 to 2.208 million in
2100. We can use these numbers to calculate the factor by which this age group
changes across successive generations:
6672 · r80/35 = 2208
⇔ r = 0.6165.
This means that the size of successive cohorts of women aged 15-50 will change
by a factor of 0.6165, i.e. decline by about a third. Note that built into this
number are assumptions about mortality and migration made by the UN, and
cannot be used to calculate a strict fertility rate; however, multiplying the number
by 2 (to give 1.233) is a rough estimate of the cohort fertility rate. Here we term
the number 1.233 as the “generational replacement rate,” i.e. the number of
people in the next generation of men and women that will replace a couple in
the present generation (assuming a constant sex ratio of 0.5). We can use this
number to project forward to 2300, as shown in Table 1.1. Note that population
projections to 2300 are not rare in demography (e.g. Basten et al. 2013; Population
Council 2004); moreover, similar long-run climate projections (e.g. Horton et al.
2020) are frequently used to motivate concerns about what kind of world will
be inherited by our descendants (e.g. Abnett 2021). Table 1.1 shows that by
2300, the number of women aged 15-50 will have declined to 2% of its present
population.
Table 1.1: Projected numbers of women aged 15-50 in Taiwan 2020-2300, assum-





Percentage of women aged
15-50 in 2020
2020 0 6,672 100
2055 1 4,113 62
2090 2 2,536 38
2125 3 1,563 23
2160 4 964 14
2195 5 594 9
2230 6 366 5
2265 7 226 3
2300 8 139 2
Notes: This projection assumes a constant generational replacement rate of 1.233, and an
equal sex ratio at birth. The size of the population aged 15-50 therefore changes by a factor of
1.233/2 across successive generations.
Source: Own calculations, using figures taken or calculated from the projections of
UN 2019.
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Reher 2007 and others argue that population decline may not be a negative
experience for anyone living during such a period, and that a general global pop-
ulation decline may even be desirable. But even if that were true, the question
remains: when should fertility increase? If not in 2020, then in 2090? Or 2300?
Certainly before 2657, when there will be no women aged 15-50 left. Addition-
ally, there is reason to believe that the lives of those living into the next century
would not be particularly positive, given that they would live in the ruins of a
built environment designed to accommodate three times as many people. The an-
thropological “Emptiness” project (https://emptiness.eu/) aims to measure and
understand the lives and experiences of the remaining populations in the depop-
ulating rural areas of post-socialist Eastern Europe. As suggested by its name
and associated research papers (e.g. Dzenovska 2011, 2018, 2020), the experience
of living in these places is characterised by a distinct lack of expectation of a
positive future.
As a final note on why low fertility itself is a problem, it is important to
recognise the uniqueness of post-transitional fertility in human history (Reher
2007). Prior to the demographic transition – and most likely stretching back to
the start of human populations – average fertility rates remained at a high level.
The equilibrium between births and deaths ensured that populations could persist
for millions of years. In the (so far) very brief moment of the post-transitional era,
it is unclear whether or how a similar equilibrium can be established, and what
social systems might evolve to sustain that equilibrium. The uniqueness of our
historical moment is part of what makes persistent below-replacement fertility a
problem: no society in history as has sustained a low vital-rate equilibrium for
more than a few decades, and from that perspective it seems important to treat
long-term fertility as a serious issue.
To summarise, we have argued that low fertility is a problem in and of itself,
because sooner or later it will have to increase in order for the population to
persist. It remains true that much of the discourse around low fertility has be-
come toxic and recriminatory, that many of the putative short- and medium-term
negative consequences may be overstated, and that it is important to conceptu-
alise low fertility as the outcome of institutional malfunctioning. It may also be
true that slight population decline in the short term will be a positive experience
for those living through it, and that the contemporary panic about low fertility
is more harmful than useful. However, it is also imperative to recognise that
aggregate fertility levels cannot persist at a low level in the long run.
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1.3 Addressing low fertility through public pol-
icy
In order to increase fertility from low levels, governments in Taiwan and elsewhere
have turned to family policies such as baby bonuses, parental leave, and subsidised
childcare (Caldwell et al. 2002; McDonald 2002). However, the role of such policy
– as well as the descriptor “pro-natal” that is often used to describe them –
remains contested by feminist scholars. In Taiwan, some critics have described
such policies as a “sort of instrumentalization of women’s body, taking women’s
body as an instrument to fulfill nation’s target goal” (Lee 2009). Here we explore
feminist critiques of pro-natal policy, and give a precise working definition of
“pro-natal policies” that will be used throughout the remainder of the thesis.
At the 1994 International Conference on Population and Development in
Cairo, governments and other agencies reached a consensus on the appropriate
balance between sexual and reproductive health, anti-natal programs, and gen-
der equality (PDR 2019). The consensus specified that government population
policies needed to be formulated in such a way as to protect the rights of women.
Despite this consensus, critics have characterised pro-natal policies in some East
Asian countries as intrusive interventions into the private lives of women (e.g.
Hiroko 2005; Sun 2012). Moreover, some pro-natal policies in countries such as
Singapore have been couched in implicitly racist terms by government authorities,
who seek to promote births among high-income and well-educated Singaporeans
and reduce births among immigrants (Song et al. 2013). In South Korea, mem-
bers of the 4B feminist movement have even go so far as to not only explicitly
reject the pro-natal stance of the state, but also romance and sexual relationships
(Lee and Jeong 2021). Hur 2013 argues that the South Korean state has under-
taken a “long, deep, and continuous mobilization of women’s biological reproduc-
tion,” and calls for the deconstruction of developmental hegemony as it applies
to women’s reproduction. In this way, the existence of formal reproductive rights
can be seen as insufficient for allowing truly free reproductive decision-making.
Pro-natal policy interventions in East Asia can therefore be criticised both in
terms of possible violations of sexual and reproductive rights, and in terms of not
allowing for uninfluenced childbearing decisions.
In light of feminist criticisms of pro-natalism, we aim to arrive at a definition
of this term which can allow for freedom in reproductive decision-making. We
therefore define “pro-natal policies” as government policies which aim to increase
fertility rates by reducing the costs of various aspects of childbearing and chil-
drearing. These costs could be direct costs – such as payments for childcare –
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or indirect costs, such as the burden of domestic labour shouldered by mothers
(Gietel-Basten 2018). Under this definition, pro-natal policies have a large over-
lap with family policies. However, there are policies that could be considered a
pro-natal policy but not a family policy, such as an attempt to promote egali-
tarian domestic gender norms by changing the curriculum (e.g. Shih and Wang
2021). The looseness of our definition hangs on the word “aim,” in that singular
policies (such as extending parental leave) will usually have multiple purposes
and be drawn up by a range of groups with different interests. As such, many
different policies relating to families, employment, and education can be seen
through a pro-natal lens. However, unless otherwise stated, we will take “pro-
natal policies” to be limited to the expansion of various entitlements through
family policies. For an indicative range of family policies, see the OECD family
database: https://www.oecd.org/els/family/database.htm#public_policy.
Given the discussion in Section 1.2 that low fertility is a problem in and
of itself, we believe that the Taiwanese government ought to be mindful of the
long-term consequences of low fertility. However, if reproduction is to be con-
ceptualised in terms of societies rather than individuals, then there are two con-
sequences for policy. Firstly, if childbearing is a social good, then the cost of
childrearing – potentially the entire cost – should be borne by the whole of so-
ciety (Burggraf 1993; Li et al. 2019). Secondly, pro-natal policy efforts need to
account for heterogeneous preferences across the population. It would be an in-
verted ecological fallacy to assume that any specific individual or group of people
need to have children themselves – the only thing that matters in the long run is
whether society reproduces, not whether individuals reproduce.
Beyond these issues, the evidence of the efficacy of pro-natal policies is un-
clear (e.g. Gauthier 2007; Rindfuss et al. 2016; Stropnik and Šircelj 2008). It is
not known which policies have positive impacts on fertility, and if so, which poli-
cies. Moreover, evaluations of pro-natal policies face idiosyncratic methodological
problems, largely due to the fact that incentives supplied by those policies (e.g.
parental leave) are only provided after the outcome of interest (i.e. having a
child) occurs (Neyer and Andersson 2008).
1.4 Gaps in the literature and thesis aims
Low fertility in Taiwan has largely been explained in terms of social institutions
and gender, though there is a lack of empirical support for this theory. Taiwan
experienced rapid social and economic development since 1949, but traditional
attitudes about familial gender roles persist in large parts of the population (Mc-
Donald 2000a; Raymo et al. 2015; Tu et al. 2017). Women in Taiwan experi-
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ence gender-equitable social institutions in education and employment, but also
face gender-inequitable domestic expectations after marriage. Aggregate fertil-
ity is theorised to have declined as a consequence, since increasing proportions
of women are unable or unwilling to undertake the dual burden of career ambi-
tions and domestic obligations (McDonald 2013). The role of gender inequity has
shown to be a cause of low fertility in other countries (e.g. Cooke 2009; Dommer-
muth et al. 2017; Nagase and Brinton 2017), but there is currently no evidence
confirming this theory in Taiwan. We therefore aim to evaluate the validity of
gender equity theory in Taiwan.
One government policy that can alter the gendered distribution of formal
and domestic labour – and therefore increase fertility – is parental leave, though
there is a lack of evidence on this connection. A central problem with evalu-
ating the causal impact of leave policies (as well as other pro-natal policies) is
that incentives provided by those policies are provided after the event of inter-
est occurs. This makes it difficult to evaluate leave policies using the standard
statistical methods for causal inference in the social sciences (e.g. Shadish et al.
2002). Empirical evaluations of the impact of parental leave on fertility gener-
ally do not explicitly state the precise effects they are able to identify, nor do
they attempt to interpret the meaning of those effects in terms of the policy goal
of pro-natalism (Ang 2015; Dahl et al. 2013; Lappegård 2010). Therefore it is
currently not possible to meaningfully synthesise the available evidence of the
effect of leave on fertility, without first building an appropriate conceptual and
methodological framework. We therefore aim to investigate whether it is possible
to develop such a framework, and whether this framework reveals anything about
the effect of leave on fertility.
In Taiwan the government has been pursuing a pro-natal policy agenda since
the mid-2000s, but it is not known whether this has had any impact on fertility.
The most costly policy implemented over this period has been the Parental Leave
Allowance (PLA), introduced in 2009, which entitles parents to 6 months paid
leave at 60% of their salary. We therefore aim to evaluate whether the PLA had
any effect on fertility, and if so, for whom.
In terms of analytical scope, this thesis focuses on fertility within marriages,
mostly because most childbearing continues to occur within the context of mar-
riage (as discussed in the Background chapter) and partly because some of the
main social survey data does not contain information on extramarital childbear-
ing. Some authors have argued that the low fertility rates experienced across
East Asia are largely due to a retreat from marriage and declining nuptiality
(e.g. Cheng 2014; Cheng and Yang 2021; Tai et al. 2019). It also remains true
that children born to unmarried mothers are likely to stigmatised, and that mar-
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riage continues to be seen as a prerequisite of fertility (Esteve et al. 2020; Lee
et al. 2007; Yu and Liu 2014). Unmarried women are less likely to be targeted by
pro-natal policy efforts, and the impact of this on fertility is unclear. However, it
remains true that the vast majority of births are had by married women, and so
in order to evaluate the determinants of childbearing the main sample of interest
is married women. This narrows the scope of our research in that we can only
paint a partial picture of Taiwanese childbearing; however, we are still able to
capture over 95% of all childbearing in Taiwan.
1.5 Data sources and methods
Social survey data in Taiwan are generally provided by the Survey Research Data
Archive of Academia Sinica (https://srda.sinica.edu.tw/index_en.php), and the
data used to evaluate gender equity theory and the PLA are both sourced from
there. In order to empirically evaluate gender equity theory, we need micro-
level data that record the balance of domestic labour within a couple, as well as
subsequent childbearing behaviour. The only data source meeting this criteria is
the Panel Survey of Family Dynamics, which has been recording data on family
behaviours since 1999. In order to evaluate the impact of the PLA, we need
either panel or repeated cross-sectional data on married women’s employment
and childbearing, before and after 2009. The Women’s Marriage, Employment
and Fertility Surveys fulfil these criteria, as well as having large sample sizes
(about 20,000 respondents per survey). In terms of methods, we use logistic
regression models to predict birth events in both cases.
In our review of the literature on the effect of leave policies on fertility, we
can use access to academic literature through university subscriptions. We use
standardised systematic review methods, and particularly guidelines issued by
the Campbell Collaboration (Campbell Collaboration 2019).
1.6 Structure of the thesis
We address our research aims in three research papers, which have been submitted
to academic journals over the course of the PhD. As shorthand, we refer to these
as Paper 1, Paper 2, and Paper 3. Paper 1 investigates whether gender equity
is a valid explanation of low fertility in Taiwan, by evaluating the relationship
between husband’s share of housework and subsequent fertility. Paper 2 is a
systematic review of the effect of parental leave on fertility, in which we build a
conceptual and methodological framework to decompose different types of effects,
as well as synthesise the best available evidence on that question. Paper 3 is an
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empirical study of the effect of the PLA on the fertility of women eligible for
benefits, using the framework proposed in Paper 2. Since each of these papers
are stand-alone pieces in their own right, there is partial repetition of introductory
and background material between them. Before our three papers is a background
chapter, which discusses the Taiwanese context, academic research on low fertility
and pro-natal policies both globally and in Taiwan, and states our research aims.
After the three papers, our conclusion rehearses the key findings of our research,






Trends in low fertility at the aggregate level in Taiwan have been well documented
by government statistics; by contrast, our understanding of the causes of low fer-
tility in Taiwan – and whether pro-natal policies are increasing fertility – remains
patchy. A body of sociocultural theory has long identified a central cause of
low fertility in Taiwan to be the incompatibility of women’s demand for gender-
equitable social participation with the persistence of traditionally gendered social
expectations for women’s home life. However, there is no direct evidence that this
incompatibility has decreased fertility. If this theory is valid, it would imply that
policies that can facilitate women’s labour force participation and encourage men
to adopt gender equitable domestic roles – policies such as parental leave – would
be an appropriate pro-natal strategy for the Taiwanese government. Indeed, the
government introduced a major parental leave policy in 2009. However, the wider
literature claims that the evidence for the effect of leave policies on fertility is
mixed, and that evaluations of pro-natal policies generally face conceptual and
methodological problems. Therefore it is difficult to predict the effect of parental
leave on fertility in Taiwan without a clear conceptual framework and method,
and by evaluating what the evidence globally shows.
This chapter provides background information on various topics relating to
fertility, parental leave, and Taiwan. The purpose of this chapter is to arrive at
a set of research aims, aims which are addressed by the research papers in the
subsequent three chapters. We arrive at our research aims through reviewing the
academic literature, and by identifying any gaps in that literature.
We draw on four distinct sources of information in this chapter. The first
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source is the academic research literature on low fertility and Taiwan. The second
source is the mostly non-academic literature on aspects of the history, economy,
politics, and society of Taiwan. The third source is statistical data on aggregate
trends in Taiwan, such as the TFR and total population. This data is mostly
provided by the Department of Household Registration, Ministry of the Interior.
The fourth source is legal documentation on pro-natal policies in Taiwan, which
is also provided by the Taiwanese government.
This chapter is structured as follows. Firstly we summarise the Taiwanese
context, in terms of Taiwan’s political and economic history, aggregate statistical
indicators of fertility, and the evolution of pro-natal policy efforts. Secondly
we review the academic literature on several topics: low fertility in general, low
fertility in Taiwan, gender equity theory, the effect of pro-natal policies on fertility,
and low fertility in East Asia. We then use the contextual information and
literature review to establish gaps in our understanding of low fertility in Taiwan
and the effect of pro-natal policy on fertility. We use these gaps to generate a
set of research aims, and then outline how our three papers seek to meet these
research aims.
2.2 The Taiwanese context
2.2.1 Political and economic history
The history of contemporary Taiwan can be dated to 1949, when, at the culmina-
tion of the Chinese Civil War, the government and army of the Republic of China
(ROC) – controlled by the nationalist Kuomintang party (KMT) – ceded main-
land China to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and retreated to the island
of Taiwan (Metzler 2017). This division has been maintained to the present day,
with mainland China being officially known as the People’s Republic of China
(PRC), and Taiwan being officially known as the ROC. After 1949, Taiwan under
the KMT pursued a program of rapid industrialisation and socioeconomic devel-
opment. Over the second half of the 20th century Taiwan was transformed from a
peripheral agrarian society to a highly-educated, developed society with a pivotal
role in the global economy, particularly in the production of semiconductors. The
socioeconomic transformation of Taiwan is known as the “Taiwan Miracle,” and
has been compared to similar transformations in South Korea, Hong Kong and
Singapore over the same period (Wade 2004).
Taiwan remained under martial law from 1949 to 1987, under the KMT. The
ROC during this period has been characterised as “state capitalist” and right-
wing authoritarian, meaning that the government worked closely with private
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capital to promote the development of a domestic industrial base, geared towards
exporting to Western markets (Brett 2009; Wade 2004). Civil freedoms and union
activity were suppressed, although average incomes, living standards and levels of
education rose dramatically. Democratic and constitutional reforms were initiated
in the late 1980s and continued through the 1990s, with the first democratically
elected president – Lee Teng-hui of the KMT – being elected in 1996.
Since the 1990s, Taiwanese politics has been dominated by two factions: the
Pan-Blue coalition, headed by the KMT, and the Pan-Green coalition, headed by
the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) (Metzler 2017). The Pan-Blue coalition
tends to favour eventual reunification with mainland China, and is more socially
conservative. The Pan-Green coalition tends to favour complete independence
from the mainland, and is more socially liberal. Control of the presidency and
the unicameral Legislative Yuan has oscillated between these two coalitions since
democratisation. The Executive Yuan, responsible for conducting government
affairs, is headed by a Premier who is chosen directly by the President.
2.2.2 Social and demographic transformations
Taiwan’s economic modernisation was accompanied by a complete transforma-
tion of Taiwanese society. Moreover, the developmental orientation of the state
meant that the government intervened in various social processes in order to pro-
duce a highly educated and disciplined workforce (Esping-Andersen and Billari
2015). Key social changes include the proletarianisation of the rural peasantry,
urbanisation, mass education, the widespread provision of healthcare, and the
development of the middle class (Metzler 2017). Changes that took centuries in
Europe and North America were compressed into 50 years in Taiwan. A typical
Taiwanese person born in 1930 would have started life as an agricultural labourer
under a local landlord, and received little to no education (Wickberg 1975). By
contrast, their grandchild born in 1990 would live in city, receive a university ed-
ucation, and use smartphones and computers with processor chips manufactured
in Taiwan.
The population grew from 10 million in 1958 to 24 million by 2019, as shown
in Figure 2.1. Population growth was driven by the demographic transition in
Taiwan, as shown by the imbalance between births and deaths shown in Figure
2.2. The contemporary age structure of the population is illustrated by the pop-
ulation pyramid in Figure 2.3. The narrowing towards the base of the pyramid
indicates that cohorts aged 30-50 have not been having enough children to replace
themselves. In 30 years there will be far fewer individuals of childbearing age,
meaning that future population growth will have a negative momentum.
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Figure 2.1: Total population of Taiwan, 1958-2019.
Source: Department of Household Registration, Ministry of the Interior (MOI). Available at
https://www.ris.gov.tw/app/en/3911. Accessed on 02/01/2020.
Figure 2.2: Numbers of births and deaths in Taiwan, 1958-2019.
Notes: Solid grey vertical lines indicate Years of the Tiger, and dashed grey vertical lines
indicate Years of the Dragon.
Source: Department of Household Registration, Ministry of the Interior (MOI). Avail-
able at https://www.ris.gov.tw/app/en/3911. Accessed on 02/01/2020.
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Figure 2.3: Population pyramid for Taiwan, 2015.
Notes: The population for each age category is in thousands. Graphic produced using the
‘pyramid’ R package (Nakazawa 2019).
Source: R package ‘wpp2019,’ containing estimates and projections from the UN World
Population Prospects 2019 (UNPD 2020).
One important recent social change for fertility has been the ‘massification’ of
higher education since the mid-90s (Chan and Lin 2015; Cheng and Jacob 2012).
Following a policy of opening new universities and relaxing entry requirements,
the percentage of high-school leavers going on to tertiary education increased
from 57% in 1995, to 96% in 2015.1
2.2.3 Trends in fertility
The Total Fertility Rate (TFR) in Taiwan from 1949 to 2019 is illustrated in
Figure 2.4. From a high of 7.04 births per woman in 1951, the TFR declined past
the replacement level of 2.1 in 1984, indicating the completion of the demographic
transition in Taiwan. The TFR remained roughly stable from the mid-80s to the
late 90s, before resuming its decline in 1998. In 2003 the TFR passed the “lowest-
low” threshold of 1.3 births per woman, and sank to just 0.895 births per woman
in 2010. Since 2010 the decline in the TFR seems to have stopped, although it has
remained below 1.3. In Figure 2.4 and in some subsequent Figures, the solid grey
vertical lines indicate Years of the Tiger, and the dashed vertical lines indicate
Years of the Dragon. In Taiwan it is considered unlucky to have a child in a Year
of the Tiger, and lucky to have a child in a Year of the Dragon; numbers of births
therefore tend to drop in Tiger years, and spike in Dragon years (Freedman et al.
1https://english.moe.gov.tw/cp-86-18943-e698b-1.html
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Figure 2.4: Total Fertility Rate, 1949-2019.
Notes: Solid grey vertical lines indicate Years of the Tiger, and dashed grey vertical lines
indicate Years of the Dragon. The two dashed horizontal lines indicate TFR values of 2.1
(replacement level fertility) and 1.3 (threshold for lowest-low fertility).
Source: Department of Household Registration, Ministry of the Interior (MOI). Avail-
able at https://www.ris.gov.tw/app/en/3911. Accessed on 02/01/2020.
1994b; Goodkind 1991, 1993).
Trends in Age-Specific Fertility Rates (ASFRs) by 5-year age group are shown
in Figure 2.5. From 1950 to the mid-70s the fertility of all women over 20 declined
significantly, with the fertility of women in their 30s declining the sharpest. From
the mid-70s to the present, fertility decline was driven by declining fertility for
women in their 20s; the fertility of women in their 30s has broadly increased since
the the mid-80s. Since 2009, ASFRs for women aged 30-39 have been higher than
ASFRs for women aged 20-29. Women postponing their births from their 20s to
their 30s in this period is also indicated by Figure 2.6, which shows trends in
the average age of women giving birth and the average age of women having
their first birth. Figure 2.5 also shows that fertility rates for women in their 40s
have remained negligible since 1980, and fertility for women aged 15-19 declined
steadily across the entire period.
Overall these trends indicate that post-transitional fertility in Taiwan has
been characterised by women postponing their childbearing from their 20s to
their 30s. However, increases in fertility at older ages has been smaller than
declines in younger ages, indicating reduced fertility quantum.
2.2.4 Marriage and fertility
The vast majority of births in Taiwan are had by married women. Figure 2.7
shows the trend in the proportion of births that are given by married women, out
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Figure 2.5: Age-Specific Fertility Rates, 1949-2019.
Notes: Solid grey vertical lines indicate Years of the Tiger, and dashed grey vertical lines
indicate Years of the Dragon.
Source: Department of Household Registration, Ministry of the Interior (MOI). Avail-
able at https://www.ris.gov.tw/app/en/3911. Accessed on 02/01/2020.
Figure 2.6: Average Ages of Mothers, 1975-2019.
Notes: The “Average age of mothers” trend line refers to the average age of all women giving
birth in that year. The “Average age of mother at first birth” trend line refers to the average
age of all women having their first birth in that year.
Source: Department of Household Registration, Ministry of the Interior (MOI). Avail-
able at https://www.ris.gov.tw/app/en/3911. Accessed on 02/01/2020.
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Figure 2.7: Proportion of all births had by married women, 1992-2020.
Source: Ministry of the Interior (MOI). Available at https://www.moi.gov.tw/stat/english/
node.aspx?sn=7132. Accessed on 02/01/2020.
of all births. Since at least 1992 this proportion has remained between 0.95 and
0.98, and stood at 0.96 in 2020. Marriage is therefore a de facto prerequisite for
childbearing in Taiwan, and so trends in marriage are likely to be important for
understanding fertility.
The proportion of women who have ever been married by each age has been
consistently declining across successive birth cohorts. This phenomenon is illus-
trated in Figure 2.8, which shows that among women aged 60-64 in 2016, 70%
were married by the age of 25; by contrast, only 11% of women aged 25-29 were
married by 25. Though younger cohorts do appear to still have large proportions
getting married between 25-35 (indicated by the steep gradients between the ages
of 25 and 30), the proportion ever married by all ages is lower in each successive
cohort, suggesting that lower proportions of women in younger cohorts will have
ever been married by age 50. Furthermore, the mean age at first marriage has
been increasing steadily over time, as shown in Figure 2.9. The mean age at first
marriage increased from 22 in 1971 to 30 in 2016 for women, and from 28 to 33
for men over the same time interval.
According to Yip and Chen (2016), fertility decline pre-1983 was primarily
driven by declining marital fertility, while fertility decline after 1983 was largely
due to declining nuptiality rates. Yip and Chen’s conclusion is echoed by Chang
(2006), who finds that after 1980 almost all of the decline in the crude birth rate
(CBR) was accounted for by declining nuptiality. Decomposition analysis reveals
that fertility decline between 1995 and 2005 for women aged 20-24 was driven
entirely by falling nuptiality, and that marital fertility in fact increased by 44%
(Lee 2009). Both marital fertility and nuptiality continued to decline for women
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Figure 2.8: Proportion of women ever married by different ages, by age cohort in
2016.
Notes: Each curve represents a different birth cohort; for example, the solid black line
represents women aged 50-54 in 2016. For a given birth cohort, a data point indicates the
proportion of women that had ever been married by that age. For example, about 50% of
women aged 50-54 in 2016 had been married by the age of 25. Data for this plot are from
a sample survey, and are therefore not necessarily representative of the entire population.
N=16,669.
Source: Women’s Marriage, Employment and Fertility Survey (WMFES) 2016. Own
calculations. Data available via application from the Survey Research Data Archive, Academia
Sinica: https://srda.sinica.edu.tw/index_en.php.
Figure 2.9: Mean age at first marriage for men and women, 1971-2019.
Source: Department of Household Registration, Ministry of the Interior (MOI). Available at
https://www.ris.gov.tw/app/en/3911. Accessed on 02/01/2020.
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aged 25-29 in 1995-2005, reversing the slight increase in marital fertility observed
in 1985-1995.
Overall, these trends in marriage and fertility point to a society in which
women are marrying later and less, postponing childbirth from their twenties to
their thirties, and having smaller families (Chen and Chen 2014; Jones 2007). Low
fertility can be understood in terms of declining marriage, since childbearing in
Taiwan still occurs almost totally within marriages. While there is some evidence
that marital fertility has increased for some age groups since the mid-90s, this
has been insufficient to prevent a fall in the TFR.
2.2.5 Pro-natal policies
The Taiwanese government has increasingly sought to increase fertility since 2006
– the key government documents describing pro-natal policy efforts are the ROC
Population Policy Guidelines, the Population Policy White Paper, and the Pop-
ulation Policy Data Collection (MOI 2013, 2014, 2020).2 For a timeline of the
development of pro-natal policy up to 2014, see Lee and Lin 2016.
In 2006, the national Guideline for Population Policy was revised to make
pro-natalism a part of government policy; in the same year, the government also
unveiled the Mega Warmth Social Welfare Program (MWSWP), which included
provisions for extending maternity leave, providing paternity leave, childcare sub-
sidies, and the provision of early childhood education and care (ECEC) (Chen
2012; Lee 2009; Lin and Yang 2009; MOI 2014). However, these new policies
did not immediately translate into the provision of extra money and entitlements
for parents: for example, the new Parental Leave Allowance (PLA) only became
funded and available to parents in 2009, and the provision of ECEC had to wait
for the passing of the ECEC Act in 2010 (Tsai 2012). In 2008 the government
introduced the Population White Paper, which specified further policies for in-
creasing fertility, as well as those in the Guideline for Population Policy (Lee and
Lin 2016; MOI 2013). The Population White Paper was revised in 2012 and 2013,
with the 2013 version specifying a goal of 180,000 births per year over the follow-
ing decade (MOI 2013). In 2018 the government approved the Countermeasures
Against the Declining Birthrate in Taiwan, which was further amended in 2019
(MOI 2020). These countermeasures include the expansion of public pre-schools,
and providing publicly-subsidised placed at private pre-schools (MOI 2020).




In this section we review the academic literature on three topics: low fertility in
developed countries generally, low fertility in Taiwan, and low fertility in East
Asia. The purpose of this section is to summarise the limits of what is currently
known about low fertility in Taiwan, contextualised in terms of the literature
on fertility in developed societies and East Asia generally. This summary will
enable us to identify gaps in the literature. In our review of the literature on low
fertility internationally, we focus on the socioeconomic and gender determinants
of fertility, such as employment status and the gendered distribution of household
labour. We chose to focus on these factors because our review of low fertility in
Taiwan indicates them to be prominent factors. Therefore our review in Section
2.3.1 anticipates our discussion of low fertility in Taiwan in Sections 2.3.2. We also
review the international literature on the effects of pro-natal policies on fertility;
similarly, we review this literature because we later show that there has been a
lack of evidence of the effects of pro-natal policies on fertility in Taiwan.
2.3.1 Research on fertility in developed societies
2.3.1.1 Trends and conceptual frameworks
At the macro-level, contemporary fertility in many high- and middle-income coun-
tries is understood through a range of conceptual and theoretical frameworks
(Balbo et al. 2013). Here we discuss two such frameworks: the Second Demo-
graphic Transition (SDT), and social institutions.
Researchers have broadly understood fertility in contemporary Western so-
cieties through the framework of the Second Demographic Transition (SDT)
(Lesthaeghe and van de Kaa 1986; Lesthaeghe 2020). After fertility declined
to replacement levels or below due to the first demographic transition, rising
levels of cohabitation, increases in ages at first marriage, and rising levels of
extra-marital childbearing became distinguishing features of fertility in devel-
oped societies (e.g. Lesthaeghe and Neels 2002; Ogden and Hall 2004; Raley and
Raley 2001). These changes in childbearing patterns have been driven by the lib-
eralisation of social values, particularly regarding extramarital cohabitation and
childbearing (Lesthaeghe 2020). Evidence for the SDT in Western societies has
been broadly supportive (e.g. Ogden and Hall 2004). However, evidence sup-
porting the SDT in East Asia is more mixed – though individuals are marrying
later and less, cohabitation and extra-marital childbearing have not increased sig-
nificantly (Lesthaeghe 2010; Matsuda 2019; Ochiai 2011; Ravaneral et al. 1999;
Raymo et al. 2015).
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A major development in global fertility since 2000 has been the bifurcation
of fertility rates between Northern and Western Europe, and the Anglosphere
(higher fertility), and Southern, Central and Eastern Europe, and East Asia
(lower fertility) (Rindfuss et al. 2016). In 2012, the first set of countries had an
average TFR of 1.9, whereas the second set of countries had an average TFR of
1.3 (Rindfuss et al. 2016). Theorists have attributed this divergence to differ-
ences in institutional arrangements and policies between the two groups, despite
within-group heterogeneities in terms of institutional arrangements and policies
(Rindfuss and Choe 2016; Rindfuss et al. 2016, 2003). Institutional arrangements
in this context refers to social norms in education, labour, family, and gender re-
lations, and policies to government laws and regulations concerning the family
(Esping-Andersen 1990). Overall, countries with more traditionally gendered in-
stitutions appear to have lower fertility (Brinton and Lee 2016; McDonald 2000a;
Rindfuss and Choe 2016).
2.3.1.2 Determinants of fertility
Many factors have been identified as determinants of fertility in developed soci-
eties; for reviews, see Balbo et al. (2013) and Schleutker (2014). Here we focus
on microeconomic and institutional factors, and in the next section we discuss
the role of gender equity.
A range of microeconomic factors have been identified as contributors to fertil-
ity decline and its persistence in modern societies, including income, education,
and employment (Balbo et al. 2013). Income level can restrict fertility when
parents seek to raise higher-quality (i.e. more expensive) children, and childbear-
ing represents an income loss for women, which acts as a disincentive (Becker
1973, 1974; Becker et al. 1990; Kravdal 1992). Relatedly, women’s education and
employment aspirations increase the opportunity cost of having children, with
highly educated women likely to postpone or forgo childbearing due to the high
opportunity cost that this may represent for their future career development. On
the other hand, highly educated women are more likely to partner with highly
educated men (Oppenheimer 1994), which may reduce the household economic
cost of having a child. Moreover, women who experience job displacement have
been shown to have fewer children (Del Bono et al. 2015). Empirical evidence
indicates that highly educated women at parity 1 or higher are likelier to have a
child (Mencarini and Tanturri 2006; Mills et al. 2008; Wood et al. 2020). Also,
highly educated women are likely to achieve comparable earnings to their partners
(Behrman and Rosenzweig 2002), affording them bargaining power in relation to
a more equal division of domestic labour. Together, these factors describe a
situation in which women seek to balance their childbearing aspirations against
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competing income and career demands, and particularly for professionals (Begall
and Mills 2012; Miller 2011; Van Bavel 2010). In Western countries, a swathe of
recent studies have demonstrated women’s career planning to be a central factor
explaining birth postponement (Amuedo-Dorantes and Kimmel 2005; Gustafs-
son 2005; Kneale and Joshi 2008; Miller 2011; Rondinelli et al. 2010). However,
a meta-analysis of studies on the effect of women’s employment status on fer-
tility found institutional arrangements to be an important factor in explaining
variations in effects across different societies (Matysiak and Vignoli 2008).
Institutional factors have become increasingly prominent in explanations of
low fertility in developed societies – for an recent collection of essays on this
topic, see Rindfuss et al. (2016). “Institutions” in this literature has at least four
distinct (though related) meanings: social norms and expectations (such as the
expectation that married women do the majority of housework); the availability
of services and organisational arrangements (such as the availability of cheap
childcare); prevailing macroeconomic conditions (such as the labour market being
characterised by high unemployment); and family policies (such as the provision
of parental leave). All meanings refer to factors which are external to particular
individuals, couples and families, and which constitute the social environment in
which childbearing decisions are made. Institutions relating to gender equity will
be discussed in Section 2.3.1.3, and family policies in Section 2.3.1.4, and so here
we indicate other institutional factors.
The literature on the effects of institutions focusses on factors such as the
cost and availability of childcare (e.g. D’Albis et al. 2017; Wood and Neels 2019;
Wood et al. 2016), female labour-force participation (e.g. Brinton and Lee 2016;
Ma 2016; Matysiak and Vignoli 2008; Wood et al. 2016), and family support
environments (e.g. Harknett et al. 2014; Pailhe et al. 2019; Yoon 2017). Each
of these factors are highly country-specific, and so the particular configuration
of institutional arrangements in each country are idiosyncratic; nonetheless, gen-
eralisations about which configurations promote fertility are possible (Rindfuss
et al. 2016). Specifically, countries in which early-years childcare is widely avail-
able and socially acceptable, and in which mother’s labour-force participation is
facilitated by prevailing employment practices, are associated with higher levels
of fertility. Ultimately, these institutional factors all concern the extent to which
societies enable mothers to work and have children under terms equitable with
fathers.
2.3.1.3 Gender equity and low fertility
As suggested by the preceding discussion on the role of institutions in deter-
mining contemporary fertility, over the past decade the academic literature has
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become increasingly focussed on the importance of gender (in)equity in causing
low fertility, and particularly in East Asia (e.g. Esping-Andersen and Billari 2015;
Kato et al. 2018; Kim 2017; Li et al. 2020; Toulemon 2011). This literature is
founded on “gender equity theory” as developed by McDonald (e.g. McDonald
2000a,b, 2009, 2013). Though researchers have proposed alternative theoretical
frameworks – such as the “gender revolution” (Goldscheider et al. 2015; Raybould
and Sear 2020) – we focus on McDonald’s theory here for simplicity.
Gender equity theory argues that low fertility within a society is caused by in-
coherence between how different institutions regard the family. Institutions such
as the labour market, education, family policies, and the family itself, implic-
itly assume men and women to have certain roles within the family. Taking the
education system as a first example, in most developed societies it is socially ex-
pected that men and women participate in education on equal terms: both sexes
can attend school and university, and there are no barriers to education uniquely
placed on women. The education system therefore assumes a “gender equity”
model of the family, in which gender does not determine a particular social or
familial role (McDonald 2000a). As a second example of an institution, prevailing
social norms about the family in some developed societies – such as in East Asia –
dictate that families should ideally consist of husband who does not do housework
or childcare, and a mother who does do housework and childcare. Therefore the
social institution of the family assumes a traditional, “male breadwinner” model,
in which domestic roles are highly gendered (McDonald 2000a). McDonald ar-
gues that in low fertility societies, education and labour markets tend to assume
a gender equity model of the family, and that the institution of the family itself
tends to assume a male breadwinner model (McDonald 2013). Women in low
fertility societies therefore experience conflicting expectations about their roles in
society: they are expected to receive an education and pursue a career, but also
to stay at home and do all the housework and childcare. This incoherence makes
it difficult for women to reconcile childbearing and work, and so fertility falls as a
result. Gender equity theory implies that fertility in low fertility societies can be
raised through the diffusion of gender egalitarian social norms (Esping-Andersen
and Billari 2015), and that the promotion of such norms may be a viable pro-natal
policy strategy in low fertility countries (Toulemon 2011).
Researchers have quantified gender equity in terms of gender roles and gender
ideology, the division of domestic labour, and female labour force participation
(e.g. Brinton and Lee 2016; Cooke 2009; Kato et al. 2018; Kim 2017; Li et al. 2020;
Mills et al. 2008; Yoon 2016). Empirical studies have been mostly supportive of
the validity of gender equity theory as an explanation of low fertility. A recent
systematic review by Raybould and Sear (2020) synthesises 42 studies on the
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impact of the gendered distribution of labour on realised fertility, and finds that
more equal distributions of housework tend to be associated with higher fertility,
both at the micro and macro levels. At the micro-level, domestic labour is most
commonly quantified using one or more of three metrics: hours of housework,
hours of childcare, and spouses’ proportional share of these activities (e.g. Cooke
2009; Dommermuth et al. 2017; Nagase and Brinton 2017). The extent of the
effect of household labour on fertility varies across countries, possibly due to
policy measures aimed at increasing gender equity. In particular, increasing the
provision of paternity leave could encourage fathers to take on a greater share of
childcare and housework (Oláh 2003).
Micro-level empirical analyses of the effect of gender equity on realised fertility
have tended to focus on second births, i.e. on having an additional child, for three
key reasons. Firstly, second births are qualitatively different from births of first
order, since two-child families are normative in modern societies, and so second
births represent family building rather than family formation (Torr and Short
2004; Yoon 2016). Secondly, second and higher order births have declined as a
proportion of total births, and this reduction is identified as a main driver of low
fertility; therefore transitions to second and higher order births merit analysis
for understanding trends in aggregate fertility (Cooke 2009; Goldscheider et al.
2013; Nagase and Brinton 2017). Thirdly, having a child introduces new forms
of required domestic labour (e.g. childcare and child specific housework). The
additional burden means the division of household labour for those with one child
is likely to have a stronger effect on the likelihood of a next birth, compared to
the division of household labour for those with no children (Cooke 2009; Nagase
and Brinton 2017).
2.3.1.4 Efficacy of pro-natal policies
Pro-natal policies are government or local government family policies that can
help individuals have children.3 Family policies can lower the costs of financial
childbearing and childrearing, enable parents to take time off work, or otherwise
provide services (such as free school places for children above a certain age)
that facilitate childcare. Family policies can be divided into child-related cash
transfers, childcare subsidies, or financial support through the tax system (OECD
2019a). There is a broad empirical literature which attempts to evaluate the
effects of specific pro-natal policies on fertility – for a non-systematic review,
3There are other, non-family policies that governments might pursue in order to en-
courage individuals to have children, such as encouraging marriages; for example, see
the government of Singapore’s promotion of marriage: https://www.msf.gov.sg/policies/
Strong-and-Stable-Families/Pages/Promoting-Marriages.aspx. However, for our purposes we
take pro-natal policies to refer exclusively to family policies.
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see (Gauthier 2007). Overall, most commentators evaluate the evidence in this
literature to be “mixed” (e.g. Bergsvik et al. 2020; Gauthier 2007; Hong and
Sullivan 2016; Lappegård 2010; Matysiak and Szalma 2014), and so whether and
how family policies impact fertility remain a matter of debate (Balbo et al. 2013;
Hoem 2008; Olivetti and Petrongolo 2017). However, researchers have cautioned
about certain conceptual, theoretical and methodological problems which may
inhibit statistical identification of the causal effects of pro-natal policies (Gauthier
2008; Neyer and Andersson 2008; Ní Bhrolcháin and Dyson 2007).
Evaluating the fertility effects of pro-natal policies face certain idiosyncratic
conceptual difficulties, which can lead to misleading policy implications if not
properly addressed. In almost all cases, benefits provided by family policies are
provided at or after the birth of a child – for example, individuals can only
receive child benefits if they have already had a child. If we want to evaluate
the effect of a policy on fertility, we therefore encounter a conceptual difficulty in
that we are trying to identify the effect of something that is only realised through
childbearing, on childbearing itself. By contrast, evaluating the effect of a medical
intervention of subsequent health is much more straightforward: the intervention
is given to some patients suffering from a illness, and then their health afterwards
is recorded. This conceptual difficulty is not widely acknowledged in the literature
evaluating the effects of pro-natal policies, though an exception is Lalive and
Zweimüller (2009). There are some demographic papers that discuss theoretical,
conceptual and methodological problems in evaluating the effects of pro-natal
policies, such as Gauthier and Neyer and Andersson, as well as causal inference
(Ní Bhrolcháin and Dyson 2007); however, none of these papers analyse the
specific conceptual issue we raise. This conceptual issue matters because without
carefully considering the precise effects being statistically identified within a given
study design, researchers may reach misleading conclusions – and therefore give
misleading advice to policymakers – about the effects of pro-natal policies. As a
motivating example, Duvander et al. (2016) aim to evaluate the fertility effects of
a parental leave reform in Sweden. Their study attempts to identify the effect of
the policy by comparing the subsequent fertility on women giving birth shortly
before the reform with women giving birth shortly after the reform. They have a
strong study design which generates a clear difference between the two groups of
women. However, the effect that their study design statistically identifies is the
effect of having the new policy available for a child that a woman has had anyway,
on a child she may decide to have at some time in the future. We contend that this
effect is slightly dubious: generally speaking, when researchers and policymakers
are interested in “the effect of a policy on fertility,” what they really mean is the
effect of the knowledge of having leave available for a theoretical future child,
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on a woman’s decision to have that child. There are many studies that identify
effects in the same way as Duvander et al. (2016) (e.g. Cools et al. 2015; Farré and
González 2019; Hart et al. 2019), which mostly find either no effect or very small
effects. These papers collectively contribute to the conclusion in the literature
that pro-natal policies may not impact fertility. However, that this conclusion
has been reached without a clear demarcation of the different types of effects a
policy might have on fertility, what study designs identify which effect, and what
effects are of most importance for pro-natal purposes.
2.3.2 Research on fertility in Taiwan
This section explores research on fertility in Taiwan. In the first section, we
explore research on the history of Taiwanese fertility, specifically the era of fertility
decline and its immediate aftermath. Next, we provide an descriptive overview
of the academic writing on Taiwanese fertility across a range of social scientific
disciplines. In the following two sections we analyse parts of that literature in
more detail, across two axes: gender roles in public and domestic life, and fertility
intentions.
2.3.2.1 History of fertility in Taiwan
Having examined the literature on low fertility across developed societies gen-
erally, we now turn to the specific case of Taiwan. In this section we explore
the literature on the history of Taiwan’s fertility, as a prelude to a discussion
of contemporary low fertility in the following section. A final section situates
Taiwanese fertility within the regional context of East Asia.
There is a large body of literature which explores Taiwanese fertility through
the period of fertility decline associated with the demographic transition, as well
as post-transitional fertility before the onset of lowest-low fertility. As illustrated
in Figure 2.4 transitional fertility decline began at some time between the late
1950s and early 1960s, with the TFR passing below 2 in the mid-1980s. For the
purposes of this discussion, we will take the period 1960-1985 as representing tran-
sitional fertility decline, the period 1985-2003 as representing post-transitional
stability, and 2003 to the present as lowest-low fertility.
Researchers have argued that the rapid fertility decline in the transitional
period can be understood in terms of the successful family planning programmes
and socioeconomic transformations engendered by the developmental state (e.g.
Cernada et al. 2007; Freedman et al. 1994a). More broadly, transitional fertil-
ity decline has been understood as a component of the demographic transition
in Taiwan (e.g. Freedman et al. 1964; Zhang 2011). Transitional fertility de-
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cline was reported closely in the English-language academic literature as it hap-
pened, by a group of researchers including Ronald Freedman, Albert Hermalin,
Te-Hsiung Sun, and Lolagene Coombs (Avery and Freedman 1970; Collver et al.
1967; Freedman 1965; Freedman et al. 1972; Freedman and Muller 1967; Freed-
man et al. 1963; Freedman and Takeshita 1964). This research programme was
closely aligned with the developmental imperatives of the state, which aimed to
reduce fertility in order to promote economic growth (Cernada et al. 2007).
A range of structural determinants of transitional fertility decline have been
evaluated in the empirical literature, both during the transition and afterwards.
For an early synthesis of these determinants, Hermalin 1974. Much of this liter-
ature – mostly published from 1970-1990 – focusses on the role of contraception
and family planning, and sought to evaluate which specific family planning pol-
icy interventions were successful and potentially applicable to other high fertility
settings (e.g. Chang et al. 1981; Chow 1965; Freedman et al. 1971; Montgomery
and Casterline 1993; Sullivan et al. 1976; Sun et al. 1978; Sun and Ting 1989). In
terms of structural changes in the society and economy, salient determinants of
fertility decline include the fall in child mortality (Rutstein 1974), mass education
(Freedman et al. 1977; Liu 1983), and changes in consumption, costs and bene-
fits (Freedman 1975; Jejeebhoy 1978, 1979). Other factors such as secularisation
(Schoonheim and Huelsken 2011) and agricultural reform (Hermalin and Lavely
1979) have been highlighted.
At the level of individuals and families, researchers have understood transi-
tional fertility decline in terms of preferences for smaller families, declining birth
intentions, and the influence of parental and extended families on childbearing
decisions. Hermalin et al. 1979 and Freedman et al. 1975 show that declining
birth desires and intentions strongly predicted lower rates of childbearing from
1967-1974 (see also Coombs 1979; Freedman et al. 1974; Sun et al. 1978; Ya-
manaka et al. 1982). However, though preferences for large families continued
to decline into the early 1980s, fertility decline began to level off by that stage
(Chang et al. 1981). Despite the weakening over the course of socioeconomic
development, parental and familial ties persisted to some extent in influencing
childbearing decisions (Chang et al. 1981; Coombs and Sun 1981; Yen et al.
1989).
Although the TFR remained stable in the post-transitional period of 1985
to 2003, fertility in Taiwan continued to experience various changes, as well as
important continuities. As indicated by Figures 2.5, 2.6, and 2.9 in Section 2.2,
both first marriage and childbearing continued to be postponed to older ages
(Leete 1994). This period also saw the weakening of son preference and rise of
gender indifference among Taiwanese couples (Lin 2009). Despite these changes,
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strong family bonds and filial piety remained a feature of Taiwanese families, as
illustrated by the significant remittances that adult children continued to send to
their parents (Lee et al. 1994), and the persistence of grandparental co-residence
(Chi and Hsin 1996).
Overall, transitional fertility decline in Taiwan can be seen as driven primar-
ily through the developmental orientation of the state (Wade 2004). The state-
directed development of the economy engendered rapid socioeconomic transfor-
mations which acted to reduce fertility, as did the provision of an extensive family
planning programme aiming to reduce fertility. However, modernisation of the
economy and public life were not accompanied by similar changes in the family,
towards which traditional attitudes persisted beyond the transitional period.
2.3.2.2 Taiwanese fertility across social science
The literature on Taiwanese fertility can be roughly divided into several overlap-
ping categories, which by and large follow disciplinary cleavages. Firstly, there
are demographic papers that describe trends in fertility and nuptiality, as well
as detailing changes in other potentially relevant quantitative variables such as
ideal family size at different parities, mean age at first marriage, the divorce rate,
and non-marital fertility rates. This set also includes papers that use statistical
methods to explain demographic trends, that analyse trends in family planning,
and that examine fertility in relation to mortality and migration. Secondly, there
is the sociocultural anthropology and gender literature, which focuses on the
changes and continuities in Taiwanese families, kinship, culture, and gender roles.
Relatedly, there is a more nebulously grouped set of articles with a sociological
or political-economic focus, which consider the effects of (amongst other things)
economic modernisation, rising levels of education and aspiration, increased mi-
gration, and government policy, on fertility. Lastly, there are a set of articles
that consider the microeconomic dimension of childbearing and childrearing, and
have a particular emphasis on the cost of housing.
By far the largest of the four, the demographic subcategory has a much larger
descriptive element than those of other disciplines, which documents various
quantifiable aspects of Taiwanese fertility decline, including the age-distributional
course of fertility decline (Freedman et al. 1994a), changes in parity-progression
ratios (Feeney 1991), the fall in family size preferences and fertility intentions
(Basten and Verropoulou 2015; Guttmacher 1975; Hermalin et al. 1979; Nair and
Chow 1980), increases in ages at first marriage (Chang 1982; Wu 1970), changes
in fertility due to immigration and cross-border marriages (Chang 1980; Chen
2008), and the spread of family planning (Chang 1982; Chang et al. 1981; Sun
et al. 1978; Trewinnard 1998; Yen and Wang 1973). Articles that analyse the
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determinants of fertility are divided between those that consider fertility per se
(e.g. Lin and Yang 2009; Narayan 2006), those that cover marriage (e.g. Jones
and Gubhaju 2009), and those that cover family planning. A segment of this
literature is also dedicated to producing population projections for Taiwan (e.g.
Kuo and Yue 2008).
An early notable article in the anthropological category is “Fertility as Mo-
bility: Sinic Transitions,” in which Susan Greenhalgh argues that fertility decline
was driven by a combination of a continuing traditional economic culture within
the family, and changing costs and benefits of children in the face of increas-
ing education provision and declining infant mortality (Greenhalgh 1988). This
theme of familial continuity and socio-economic change is picked up elsewhere,
for example in Raymo et al. 2015, which discusses the continuation of “patriar-
chal, patrimonial, patrilineal, and patrilocal organization of East Asian families”
in terms of Peter McDonald’s gender equity theory of fertility, arguing that the
disjunction between rapid socio-economic changes and familial and marital con-
tinuity have driven down fertility. This is because while economic and social
opportunities for women have broadened significantly (due to factors such as ac-
cess to better education), labour within marriage has remained highly gendered,
which has led to a high opportunity cost for marriage and therefore low marriage
and fertility rates. Other interesting aspects of fertility discussed in this article
include the tightening of marriage markets (an absence of suitable husbands) due
to a combination of improved female education and a traditional culture of female
hypergamy (women marrying men of higher social standing), and whether rising
rates of cohabitation and extramarital fertility could drive increases in the TFR
(Raymo et al. 2015).
The sociological/political-economic literature is closely related to the anthro-
pological literature, but has been separated from it here due to the latter’s explicit
focus on the family. In accordance with the wide body of theoretical and empir-
ical research connecting improvements in female education with falling fertility
in developing countries (Jejeebhoy 1995), much of this literature aims to spec-
ify this relationship for the Taiwanese experience (Anderson 1975; Cheng and
Nwachukwu 1997; Freedman et al. 1977; Huang 2001; Liu 1983; Yang 2000). An-
other strand considers the effects of long-term socioeconomic development more
broadly (Hsing 2003; Jia 1991; Poston 2000; Robey 1991; Sun 1984; Thangkasem-
vathana 1990), or considers the potential of further socioeconomic development
to increase fertility (Chen and Liu 2007). Other topics included in this category
consider the effects of changes in female employment (Chang et al. 1981; Chuang
and Lin 2006; Jao and Li 2011; Li and Yang 2004; Stokes and Hsieh 1983; Yang
1981), the role of mass media and social networks in the diffusion of contraceptive
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knowledge and fertility behaviour (Cheng 2011), and policy responses (potential
or actual) to falling fertility (Freedman 1986; Frejka et al. 2010; Greenspan 1994).
A notable recent paper in this last segment (which might equally be considered
part of the microeconomic literature) considers the effects of education subsidies
on fertility, arguing that were the government to extend the subsidies for public-
sector workers to private-sector workers, the general fertility rate would increase
by 20% (Keng and Sheu 2011).
Finally, the microeconomic literature evaluates the effect of changes in the
costs and benefits of children on fertility. Topics covered in this category include
the cost of housing and homeownership (Chen 2013; Lo 2012), unemployment
and labour market structure (Cheng 2004; Huang 2003), the role of individual
costs or benefits such as college tuition (Huang et al. 2006), financial support
from children (Hermalin and Yang 2004; Lai 2011), and personal tax exemption
(Huang 2002), as well as more general overviews of the economic dimension of
childbearing (Liu and Hsu 2004; Mueller and Cohn 1977; Wang 1985).
2.3.2.3 Gender roles in public and domestic life
Theorists have attributed low fertility in Taiwan to a tension between family life
and public life. In the family, traditionally gendered childcare and housework
roles have persisted, while roles in education, labour, and politics have become
much more gender equal (Frejka et al. 2010; McDonald 2009; Raymo et al. 2015;
Tu et al. 2017). A key change has been the expansion of female higher educa-
tion since the mid-1990s, reflecting a shift in women’s opportunities for career
progression (Cheng and Loichinger 2017), and a postponement of marriage and
childbearing (Chen and Chen 2014). The share of 18-21 year-old women enrolled
in tertiary education increased from 40% in 1995 to over 85% in 2006, and to
89% in 2017 (Chen et al. 2013; Chen 2016; MOE 2018). Evidence shows that
increasing maternal education represents an important factor in contemporary
fertility decline, by encouraging career aspirations for a greater proportion of
women (Chen 2016).
In contrast, traditional family values and expectations have been slow in
adapting to the changing aspirations of women in Taiwan (Raymo et al. 2015).
Comparing gender-role attitudes, Yang (2016) finds that Taiwanese nationals are
more likely than Chinese citizens to feel that women should remain at home,
despite also expressing more gender-equitable attitudes towards education, polit-
ical leadership, and economic leadership (Yang 2016). Furthermore, traditional
values have been linked with upholding traditionally gendered domestic roles and
behaviour even in an era of education and employment equality. Wives continue
to bear most of the housework in Taiwan, which is explained by the hypothesis of
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“gender display” (Hu and Kamo 2007; Kim 2013; Yu and Xie 2011). The gender
display hypothesis argues that women who outperform their husbands in terms
of their career seek to affirm their gender by doing more housework. In turn,
doing more housework could dissuade women from having any or more children,
since they would not want to add further to their already demanding domestic
workload.
Together, these domestic continuities and broader contextual changes are ar-
gued to have led to persistently low fertility rates in Taiwan. Increasing career
aspirations seem to have resulted in the postponement or renouncement of hav-
ing children given a greater expected share of domestic workload on Taiwanese
women, compared to men (Hori 2017; Qian and Sayer 2016).
2.3.2.4 Fertility intentions
Although aggregate fertility has stagnated at a low level since 2003, the evidence
on fertility intentions, preferences and ideals presents a more nuanced picture.
As a brief distinction between these variables: intentions correspond to planned
future childbearing behaviour; ideals represent the number of children someone
would like to have, absent any circumstantial barriers such as cost or physiolog-
ical incapability; and preferences correspond to a set of childbearing outcomes,
ordered in terms of how desired they are (Hin et al. 2011). Consequently, an indi-
vidual’s ideal family size is the same as their most preferred family size. However,
these definitions and distinctions are not used consistently across the literature.
For a recent overview of fertility intentions, preferences and ideals in Taiwan,
see Gietel-Basten 2018. In Taiwan, the two main data sources for fertility ideals
and intentions come from the Taiwan Fertility and Family Surveys (TFFS) (de-
rived from surveys initiated for the purposes of informing and evaluating Taiwan’s
family planning programme during fertility decline), and the Women’s Marriage,
Fertility and Employment Surveys (WMFES) (Gietel-Basten and Verropoulou
2018; Lee and Lin 2016). Using the TFFS data, Lee and Lin 2016 show that
ideal family size has remained higher than actual fertility since the late 1990s,
levelling out at 2.04 births per woman in 2012. This would seem to suggest that
aggregate fertility could return to replacement level if barriers to childbearing
were removed. However, the use of fertility ideals as a metric has been criticised
by Basten and Verropoulou 2015, who argue that fertility intentions are a more
reliable ‘barometer’ for childbearing attitudes. Their study decomposes fertility
intentions for women at different parities, using WMFES data from 2006 and
2010. They find that most parity 0 women intend to have two children; however,
a majority of parity 1 women do not intend to have another child, and 95% of
parity 2 women do not intend to have another child. Supplementing the findings
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of Basten and Verropoulou 2015, Freeman et al. 2018 conducted a series of in-
depth interviews with childbearing-aged parents on their birth intentions. They
find that parity 1 women who were expected to shoulder most of the childcare
were reluctant to have a second child, due to those experiences. They also found
that for women, gender inequity in the division of housework and childcare was
seen as a barrier to leading a fulfilling social life. In this way, the findings of
Freeman et al. 2018 would seem to explain why it is that women who initially
intend to have two children revise that intention downward after the first child,
as indicated by Basten and Verropoulou 2015. Returning to the WMFES data,
Cheng and Hsu 2020 use the 2016 wave of that survey to evaluate the impact of
the gendered distribution of housework and childcare on next birth intentions.
They find that childcare equity is a significant factor in determining next birth
intentions – and particularly for more highly educated women – but that there
is no observable impact of housework equity on intentions.
One of the limitations of the empirical studies discussed above is that they
all three restrict their analyses to married women of parity 1 or higher. This is
explained by the fact that the WMFES (used by the latter two studies) did not
ask unmarried women about their childbearing behaviour prior to 2016, partly
because very few births in Taiwan are had outside of marriage (see Section 2.2.4).
Nonetheless, we are unable to determine whether trends in the fertility ideals or
intentions of unmarried women. For married women, the two-child norm is well
characterised by the following quote from Gietel-Basten 2018 (p. 350): “Clearly,
then, two children is as much a ceiling as, perhaps, an aspirational ideal.”
2.3.3 Taiwanese fertility in the context of East Asia
Low fertility can be understood in terms of similar fertility patterns in other
East Asian societies, specifically South Korea, Japan, China, Hong Kong and
Singapore – for overviews, see Frejka et al. 2010; Gietel-Basten 2019; Jones 2007,
2019; Lin and Kamo 2015; Rindfuss and Choe 2016. These countries all share
a Confucian cultural heritage and experienced rapid socioeconomic development
in the post-war period, as well a rapid fertility decline from the 1950s (with the
exception of Japan, where fertility decline began slightly earlier (Frejka et al.
2010)). Indeed, much of the literature covering Taiwanese fertility does so in a
regional perspective. In this section we discuss regional trends and patterns in low
fertility and its determinants, in order to highlight commonalities and differences
between Taiwan and these other places.
As discussed in Section 2.3.1.1, TFR trends across economically advanced
countries have bifurcated into two distinct groups: a higher group with a mean
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TFR of about 1.9, and a lower group with a TFR of about 1.3 (Rindfuss et al.
2016). Singapore, South Korea, Japan and Taiwan all belong to the latter group,
as would Hong Kong if it were included in the study (Frejka et al. 2010).4 For
cohorts of women born in the late 1960s, Total Cohort Fertility Rates (TCFRs)
range between 1.2 and 2 across these five countries. Beyond fertility, marriage re-
mains an important gateway to childbearing across East Asia, and trends towards
later and less marriage have not been accompanied by concomitant increases in
extramarital childbearing (Esteve et al. 2020; Jones and Gubhaju 2009; Jones
2007; Raymo et al. 2015). In contrast with other regions of Asia, mean ideal
family sizes tend to be around 2 children or below (Casterline and Gietel-Basten
2018).
Many of the socioeconomic and institutional factors shaping Taiwanese fertil-
ity are also present across East Asia. In South Korea, Anderson and Kohler 2013
explain low fertility in terms of parental “education fever,” i.e. high investments
in children’s education; a similar explanation for Taiwan is found in Lee 2009.
As suggested by the importance of marriage for childbearing, traditional domes-
tic gender roles have persisted to a large extent across the region (Raymo et al.
2015). The work of Kan and Hertog (Kan and Hertog 2017; Kan et al. 2019)
demonstrates that unequal divisions of domestic labour between husbands and
wives have persisted across China, Taiwan, South Korea and Japan, and that this
reduces fertility preferences among women in all four countries. This echoes the
conclusion of Suzuki 2013 (quoted in Gietel-Basten 2018), that low fertility levels
in these latter three countries is explained by obstacles prohibiting childbearing,
rather than innately low fertility ideals.
In a recent reflection on low fertility and policy responses across the six coun-
tries listed at the beginning of this section, Gietel-Basten 2019 argues that the
problem of low fertility across the region is being badly conceptualised in the pub-
lic discourse and by government policy. Gietel-Basten argues that low fertility in
these countries – referred to collectively as “Low Fertility Pacific Asia” (LFPA)
– should be understood as the outcome of “upstream institutional malfunctions,”
rather than a problem in and of itself. Echoing the empirical work discussed in
Section 2.3.2.4, young people across the region still have ideals of childbearing,
but existing institutional arrangements prevent them from doing so: “Few people
in the region report at a young age an aspiration to be single and childless for
their whole lives, but high percentages of people are” (p. 3) (Gietel-Basten 2019).
4Comparisons with the TFR in China is difficult because official estimates are unreliable
(Gietel-Basten 2019; Guo et al. 2019). The UN estimated China’s TFR as 1.665 in 2015,
whereas Guo et al. 2019 estimated it as 1.047 based on a 1% sample census.
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2.4 Gaps in the literature
The literature reveals several empirical and theoretical gaps (both explicitly and
implicitly), as well as places where there is a clear scope for further research to
extend the discussion.
• While there are a number of empirical studies evaluating the impact of do-
mestic gender equity on fertility intentions in Taiwan (see Section 2.3.2.4),
there are currently no quantitative studies that assess the impact of domes-
tic gender equity on realised fertility. Therefore there is no direct evidence
confirming gender equity theory as an explanation for fertility behaviour in
Taiwan.
• The state of knowledge regarding the effect of pro-natal policies on fertility
is hazy. It is not known whether most pro-natal policies actually have a
positive impact on fertility.
• There is confusion in the literature on how to properly identify the effects
of policies on fertility. Having a child effects covariates and the use of pro-
natal policies, and so it is difficult to unpick the causes of childbearing from
the effects of childbearing, both conceptually and analytically.
• It is not known whether the various pro-natal policy efforts in Taiwan have
had any impact on the fertility rate. The TFR has stopped declining al-
though it has remained below 1.3.
2.5 Aims of the thesis
• To empirically confirm whether gender equity theory accurately explains
low fertility behaviour in Taiwan
• To develop a conceptual and methodological framework for understanding
how pro-natal policies impact fertility
• To thoroughly evaluate the evidence for whether leave affects fertility gen-
erally





Paper 1 – Declining Fertility in Taiwan:
The Long-Term Deterring Impact of
Housework Imbalance
Fertility in Taiwan has been persistently low since 2003, yet this pattern has
remained largely unexplained. We seek to assess the way in which the division
of housework influences the probability of having an additional child, and the
probability of desiring an additional child. We evaluate whether fertility is effected
in the short-term or the long-term, and develop a new argument to explain why
we expect fertility to be more effected in the long-term. We find a significant
association for long-term impacts, but no significant associations for short-term
impacts. Specifically, the odds of a couple with an equal division of housework
having a child within five years are 20.6% higher than that of a couple with the
mean division of housework. This finding is significant at the 1% level.
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3.1 Introduction
According to the UN (UN 2019), Taiwan has the third lowest Total Fertility Rate
(TFR) in the world, with a period TFR of 1.13 in 2018. The long-term social and
economic consequences of lowest-low fertility rates are potentially severe. As an
increasing share of the population survives to older ages, rises in the dependency
ratio are expected to erode the local human capital base, accelerating population
ageing and putting pressure on the health care and pension systems (Bloom et
al. 2011). Persistent low fertility also builds negative momentum into population
growth, reducing both the absolute number of women in future reproductive age
ranges and future workforce (Feeney 2003). Low fertility thus represents a major
global policy concern, with governments pursuing pro-natalist policies via cash
transfers, parental leave, and subsidised childcare (Lee 2009; Lin and Yang 2009).
To understand low fertility levels in developed countries, a body of literature
has emerged that emphasises the role of gender equity (Balbo et al. 2013; Gold-
scheider et al. 2015; McDonald 2013). Conceptually, incoherence in the role of
gender in social and domestic spheres is argued to result in low fertility levels.
While some social institutions such as the family still prescribe traditional gen-
der roles, contemporary social institutions such as education and employment are
considered to adopt an egalitarian view of gender, and thus a large proportion
of women are expected to forgo marriage or childbearing in favour of a career
(Goldscheider et al. 2015; McDonald 2000a). These ideas have conceptually been
used to explain low fertility in Taiwan, but yet there is a lack of empirical evi-
dence (Frejka et al. 2010; McDonald 2009; Raymo et al. 2015; Tu et al. 2017).
While there is some evidence for a domestic gender equality effect on fertility
desire, there is no evidence for an effect on realised fertility behaviour (Kan and
Hertog 2017). In particular, we do not know whether more equal distributions
of housework and childcare are associated with a greater probability of having
another child, and the ways in which fertility desire and behaviour change over
time based on concurrent and past experiences of housework and childcare.
Equal distributions of housework and childcare can impact fertility in the
short- and long-term. In the short-term, domestic gender inequality may lower
fertility through expectations about the near future. Based on current experi-
ences of unequal housework distribution, wives may feel that the responsibility
of taking care of children will not be shared equally, and they may judge this
situation as unfair and incompatible with their educational and career ambitions.
At the same time, domestic gender inequality may only affect fertility in the
long-term. Expectations are slow to adjust to year-on-year changes in domestic
labour distribution, as recent past experiences influence present human behaviour
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(Cheung and Kim 2018).
In this study, we seek to statistically assess the influence of the division of
housework on the probability of future birth occurrences, drawing on data from
the Taiwanese Panel Survey of Family Dynamics (PSFD), from 2010 to 2012 (an-
nually), 2014 and 2016. Specifically, we use panel data binary logistic regressions
to estimate the strength of associations between the share of household work and
the probability of having an additional child (i.e. realised fertility), and the in-
tention to have another child (i.e. desired fertility) in the short- and long-term.
We expect the division of housework to have a larger effect on the probability of
having another child in the long-term than in the short-term. We present a new
argument to explain why we expect the long-term effect to be larger than the
short-term effect. Our argument posits that the divisions of housework between
couples are autocorrelated over time, meaning that relatively gender equitable
young couples will become relatively gender equitable old couples, and that rela-
tively gender inequitable young couples will become relatively gender inequitable
old couples. We motivate this part of our argument with a discussion of the em-
pirical evidence on the interrelationships over time between housework, equity,
and marital satisfaction. We then argue that, over time, the autocorrelation of
divisions of housework between couples may cause gender equitable couples to
be cumulatively more likely to have another birth, relative to gender inequitable
couples. This argument implies that – after observing the divisions of housework
for a sample of couples – the longer the follow-up period, the larger the effect of
housework division on the probability of a birth.
The next section provides an exposition of gender equity theory and evaluates
the evidence for gender equity theory, before going on to consider some key social
changes impacting gender and family in Taiwan, including the expansion of higher
education for women. This section then argues that gender equity theory – as
originally formulated by (McDonald 2000a, 2013) – implies that the relationship
between gender equity and fertility is likely to change over time. The following
section explores how gender equity and fertility change as couples age over the life
course and develops a new argument, in which we expand gender equity theory
to incorporate the dynamic relationship between gender equity and fertility over
time. The data section describes our source of data, the Panel Survey of Family
Dynamics (PSFD), and discusses the restrictions we apply to obtain our analytical
sample. We then specify three sets of models, which concern short-term realised
fertility, fertility intentions, and long-term realised fertility. The penultimate
section discusses our model results and their policy implications, and a final
section presents our conclusions.
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3.2 Conceptual framework
3.2.1 Gender equity theory
The effects of gender equity have been studied in the wider fertility literature
through the lens of gender equity theory as developed by McDonald (2000, 2013).
This theory suggests that low fertility is caused by incoherence between the mod-
els of the family assumed by different family-oriented social institutions. The
male breadwinner model, in which the husband works and the wife takes care of
the children, is contrasted with the gender equity model, in which gender does
not determine which partner does which type of work (McDonald, 2000). Then,
if social institutions in education and the labour market, which presume a gender
equity model, coexist with traditional family values and expectations, which as-
sume a breadwinner model, women are likely to postpone or forgo having a child
given conflicting expectations on career and childbearing aspirations (McDonald
2013). Higher gender inequity will also cause women to be less likely to desire
having a child, since they know that the labour associated with having a child
(e.g. childcare, housework) will be shared inequitably.
Empirical evidence testing gender equity theory seems mixed. Prior work has
shown that more unequal distributions of household labour reduce the likelihood
of having an additional child across a number of Western societies and East Asian
countries (Brinton and Lee 2016; Matthews 1999; Nagase and Brinton 2017; Torr
and Short 2004). Torr and Short (2004) find that American couples in which
women do less than 54% of housework are 253% more likely to have another
birth within 5 years than couples in which women do 54-84% of the housework.
In Germany, Cooke (2004) finds that husband’s percentage share of housework
has no effect on the likelihood of a second birth, but that husband’s percentage
share of childcare increases the likelihood by one percent per percentage point
of childcare share (Cooke 2004). Similarly, Cooke (2009) finds that husband’s
percentage share of childcare increases the likelihood of a second birth by five
percent per percentage point of childcare share in Italy, but finds no association
in Spain (Cooke 2009). In Norway, Dommermuth et al. (2017) find no effect
of the division of childcare on subsequent fertility for couples at any parity, but
also that parity 2 couples with a semi-equal division of housework are 104% more
likely to have a third child than couples in which wives do most of the housework
(Dommermuth et al. 2017).
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3.2.2 The Taiwanese context
In Taiwan, low fertility has been conceptualised as and attributed to a tension
between family life and public life. In the family, traditionally gendered childcare
and housework roles have persisted, while roles in education, labour, and politics
have become much more gender equal (Frejka et al. 2010; McDonald 2009; Raymo
et al. 2015; Tu et al. 2017). A key change has been the expansion of female higher
education since the mid-1990s, reflecting a shift in women’s opportunities for ca-
reer progression (Cheng and Loichinger 2017), and a postponement of marriage
and childbearing (Chen and Chen 2014). The share of 18-21 year-old women en-
rolled in tertiary education increased from 40% in 1995 to over 85% in 2006, and
to 89% in 2017 (Chen et al. 2013; Chen 2016; MOE 2018). Evidence shows that
increasing female education represents an important factor in contemporary fer-
tility decline by encouraging career aspirations for a greater proportion of women
(Chen 2016). In contrast, traditional family values and expectations have been
slow in adapting to the changing aspirations of women in Taiwan (Raymo et al.
2015). Wives continue to bear most of the housework in Taiwan: estimates for
the proportion of housework done by wives ranges from 72% to 81% (Hu and
Kamo 2007; Kim 2013; Yu and Xie 2011). In a context of increasing career as-
pirations, the expectation of a heavy and unequal domestic workload seems to
have resulted in the postponement or renouncement of having children by many
Taiwanese women (Hori 2017; Qian and Sayer 2016).
Empirically, there is one study that assesses the effect of domestic labour
balance on fertility in Taiwan. It shows that women whose husbands do more
housework have a greater desire for more children (Kan and Hertog 2017). The
study focusses on the cross-sectional impact of housework division on realised
fertility. There are no empirical studies that assess the effect of domestic labour
balance on subsequent fertility behaviour, or the effect of unequal domestic work
balance on realised and desired fertility patterns over the life course.
Prior empirical analysis focuses on births of second order, i.e. on having an
additional child, which is justified for three key reasons. Firstly, second births
are qualitatively different from births of first order, since two-child families are
normative in modern societies, and so second births represent family building
rather than family formation (Torr and Short 2004; Yoon 2016). Secondly, the
number of second and higher order births have declined and this reduction is
identified as a main driver of low fertility in Taiwan (Gietel-Basten 2018), and
so transitions to second and higher order births merit analysis for understanding
trends in aggregate fertility (Cooke 2009; Goldscheider et al. 2013; Nagase and
Brinton 2017). Thirdly, having a child introduces new forms of required domestic
41
labour (e.g. childcare and child specific housework). The additional burden
means the division of household labour for those with one child is likely to have
a stronger effect on the likelihood of a next birth, compared to the division of
household labour for those with no children (Cooke 2009; Nagase and Brinton
2017).
In light of the preceding discussion, we hypothesise:
Hypothesis 1. For married couples1 at parity 1 or greater, husbands doing a
greater share of housework is positively associated with the likelihood of having an
additional child.
Hypothesis 2. For married couples at parity 1 or greater, husbands doing a
greater share of housework is positively associated with the likelihood of desiring
an additional child.
3.2.3 Extending the gender equity framework
Gender equity theory is static. It explains how gender equity affects fertility at a
single point in time. However, gender equity within a marriage evolves over time,
as spouses age, progress in their careers, acquire new responsibilities and have
children. The effect of temporal changes on the relationship between domestic
gender equity and fertility remains theoretically unspecified and empirically un-
explored. To address this gap, we firstly discuss some of the key ways in which
domestic gender equity and fertility change over time. Secondly, we theoretically
develop the links between domestic labour, equity and fertility and argue that
the impact of gender equity on fertility is likely to be stronger over the long-term.
Domestic labour equity varies over time. Evidence suggests that men’s share
of housework decreases over the life course, and particularly after childbirth (Bax-
ter et al. 2008; Grunow et al. 2012; Luo et al. 2018). Men’s decreasing housework
share after childbirth is partly explained by mothers taking maternal leave while
fathers remain at work, and partly explained by the new kinds of housework re-
quired in looking after an infant (Baxter et al. 2008). In terms of fairness, women
report higher perceptions of fairness in housework after the birth of a child, and
a declining perception of fairness thereafter (Perales et al. 2015). Theorists have
explained why women find housework balance fairer after childbirth in terms of
the extra time at home available to mothers taking leave (Perales et al. 2015). If
fathers maintain their working hours to support the family, then mothers tend to
find the new post-birth division of housework fairer, even if their share increases
(Perales et al. 2015).
1Childbearing in Taiwan still overwhelmingly occurs within marriages, which is why we
restrict our Hypotheses to married couples (Raymo et al., 2015).
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Domestic labour gender equity effects how happy partners are with their mar-
riage overall, reflecting marital satisfaction. In terms of housework, a widely-cited
article in the sociological literature states that “the link between the division
of household labour and marital quality is fairly well established” (Frisco and
Williams 2003), a finding which has been also established in East Asian contexts
(Qian and Sayer 2016). Specifically, couples with more equal arrangements have
higher marital satisfaction (Frisco and Williams 2003). As couples get older, mar-
ital satisfaction becomes less responsive to changes in housework (Cheung and
Kim 2018). Additionally, earlier marital satisfaction is a good predictor of later
marital satisfaction, although marital satisfaction for all couples decreases over
time (Lupri and Frideres 1981; Roberson et al. 2018; VanLaningham et al. 2001).
The autocorrelation of marital satisfaction over time implies that differences in
marital satisfaction between couples – as influenced by housework balance at a
younger age – is likely to persist through time. Since marital satisfaction is less
responsive to housework for older couples, these differences between couples may
persist regardless of changes in housework balance at older ages. In terms of
fertility, evidence suggests that marital satisfaction is a positive predictor of fer-
tility for both genders (Parr 2010). Moreover, women that are dissatisfied in how
their work and family lives are reconciled are less likely to have a second child
(Luppi 2016), and individuals that report higher levels of subjective well-being
(i.e. happiness) are more likely to have children (Cetre et al. 2016; Le Moglie
et al. 2015; Mencarini et al. 2018).
To summarise the key points so far: firstly, the division of household labour is
closely related to marital quality, although changes in the division of household
labour affects marital quality less over time; secondly, couples that had relatively
high marital satisfaction at younger ages will maintain relatively high marital
satisfaction at older ages, irrespective of changes in housework at older ages; and
thirdly, couples with higher marital satisfaction have higher fertility. Altogether,
these three points suggest that as couples get older, couples that had a more
gender equitable division of labour at younger ages will have a higher probability
of having another birth than couples that had a less gender equitable division.
Moreover, these relative probabilities between gender equitable couples and gen-
der inequitable couples should remain stable over time, ceteris paribus. Since the
probability of another birth would be higher for the gender equitable couple in
every time period as they age, this could lead to a cumulative effect in the relative
probabilities of another birth between these two groups of couples. Consequently,
couples that had a more equal housework balance when they were younger could
become increasingly likely to have another child as time passes, compared with
couples that had a less equal housework balance when they were younger.
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While the effect of housework balance on fertility can be tested both over
the short-term and the long-term, assessing the impact of housework on desired
fertility is less meaningful. The conceptual links between current housework re-
sponsibilities, perceived housework and desires for having a child in the long-term
are unclear and difficult to elaborate, as desires for children are more ephemeral
and vary over the life course (Hayford 2009). For this reason, we only evaluate
the long-term effect on fertility behaviour, and not on fertility desire.
Following the argument put forward in this section, we hypothesise that:
Hypothesis 3. For married couples at parity 1 or greater, husbands doing a
greater share of housework has a larger positive effect on the likelihood of having
another child in the long-term than in the short-term.
3.3 Data
We draw on data from the Taiwanese Panel Survey of Family Dynamics2 (PSFD
2019), a nationally representative, longitudinal survey gathering data on house-
hold relationships and behaviours, including information on respondents’ and
their partners’ age, housework, education, and income. Respondents are selected
by a stratified three-stage sampling procedure using household registration data.
The observational unit in the PSFD is individuals, and the PSFD gathers infor-
mation on partners and spouses (if the respondent has a partner or spouse) by
asking respondents, not by asking partners or spouses directly.
The PSFD comprises four cohorts, starting in 1999, 2001, 2003, and 2009, at
age ranges 34-46, 45-65, 26-39, and 25-32, respectively. While these age ranges
are for the respondent, the age of respondents’ spouses can be outside of these age
ranges. Respondents were annually followed up until 2012, and biennially after
this year. We focus on the 2003 and 2009 cohorts, since women in those cohorts
(either respondents or spouses of respondents) were mostly of childbearing age
in 2010. We were not able to use the data from the year 2009, because data on
fertility intentions were only collected in surveys after 2010. We therefore model
from 2010.
The 2003 and 2009 cohorts had an initial response rate of 47.33% and 49.86%
respectively, which is typical for longitudinal surveys in developed countries
(Rindfuss et al. 2015). Drawing on Rindfuss et al.’s review (2015), we assume
these low response rates do not significantly bias our inferences. In that review,
the authors evaluate the impact of response rates in a longitudinal survey of
Japanese families in the 2000s (with a response rate just over 50%). The au-
2https://psfd.sinica.edu.tw/web/plan_01en.htm
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thors find that, while response rates vary with demographic and socioeconomic
variables, there is no effect of non-response on the relationship between socioe-
conomic or demographic predictors and fertility. Because the PSFD data is also
longitudinal, has a comparable response rate to the Japanese study, is also from
East Asia, and covers the 2000s and 2010s, we assume that the relationships be-
tween predictors and fertility in the PSFD data are unaffected by their response
rates. Under this assumption, the response rates of the 2003 and 2009 surveys
do not risk biasing statistical associations between housework and fertility.
We further restricted the analysis to married heterosexual couples, with one
or more children, who remained married until 2016, took part in all five follow-up
surveys after 2009 (2010, 2011, 2012, 2014, and 2016), and in which the wife
was between the ages of 20 and 40 in 2010. This selected sample represents
a balanced panel of 544 couples (260 female respondent couples and 284 male
respondent couples) over the four waves from 2010 to 2014, producing a total
analytical sample of 2,176 person-years. Data from the 2016 wave was needed
because our models that predicted future childbearing have a lagged dependent
variable.
3.4 Methods
In this section, we first describe the modelling approach adopted, and then discuss
its empirical implementation.
3.4.1 Models
In the literature, panel data have been used to test the effect of household labour
on next births. Panel data enable the analysis of the impact of domestic labour
on fertility behaviour by assessing the influence of domestic labour at time t on
the probability of having an additional child at time t+1. Panel data also enable
controlling for unobserved heterogeneity of respondents, such as respondents’
gender role ideology. This mitigates estimation bias for outcome variables like
subsequent fertility, as the effects of unobserved variables are omitted.
Nine separate models are estimated. Six separate logistic regression models
are estimated to assess the short-term effect of housework balance (i.e. year-to-
year changes in housework balance) on fertility: three models focus on realised
fertility, and three models focus on desired fertility. Additionally, three models
are estimated to assess the long-term impact of fertility imbalance on realised
fertility outcomes. In all three sets of three models, one model uses data on all
couples, one model uses data for which the wife is the respondent, and one model
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uses data for which the husband is the respondent. We adopted this approach to
account for potential gender bias in the survey. Respondent’s gender may affect
the reported hours of housework for each spouse, given that wives and husbands
are likely to have different perceptions of their relative contributions to housework
(Kiger and Riley 1996).
Three models (Models (1)-(3)) on the short-term effects of housework on re-











In Equation 3.1, yi,t+1 is a binary variable that takes the value of 1 if the
couple had a child in year t + 1; αi refers to the time-invariant, couple specific
effect; and xit is a vector of time-varying independent variables in year t. The xit
vector includes the husband’s proportion of housework, as well as control variables
such as income and age. The zi term is a vector of time-invariant independent
variables, such as education. All variables are specified in the next sub-section.
Vector β contains coefficients for the time-varying independent variables, and γ
contains coefficients for the time-invariant independent variables. The vector β
contains our main coefficient of interest, husbands’ proportion of housework. We
expect our estimate of this coefficient to be positive, indicating that husbands’
proportion of housework has a positive short-term effect on realised fertility.
Generally, fixed-effects or random-effects methods are used to estimate panel
data models. Fixed-effects models use variation within the same observational
unit over time to estimate coefficients, meaning that fixed-effects models cannot
estimate the effects of time-invariant variables. Random-effects models use varia-
tion between all observations to estimate coefficients, but require that error terms
be uncorrelated with the independent variables. In our case, it is likely that the
requirement that error terms are uncorrelated with the independent variables is
not met, as gender equity is not directly observed (the division of housework is
a proxy for gender equity). Therefore some correlation is likely to exist between
the error term and other explanatory variables in our models (Goldscheider et al.
2013). As a result, this may bias random-effects estimates.
We therefore use a hybrid method, which combines fixed- and random-effects
approaches (Allison 2009; Schunck and Perales 2017; Wooldridge 2010). Hybrid
methods produce two sets of coefficients for time-varying variables: (1) within
estimates, which are derived from variation within individuals over time; and (2)
between estimates, which are derived from variation between different individuals
at the same point in time (Allison 2009). For time-invariant variables, only the
between estimates are produced (Schunck and Perales 2017). In this way, hybrid
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methods enable unbiased estimation of time-varying variables as in the fixed-
effects case, while also enabling unbiased estimation of time-invariant variables.
In this paper, within estimates indicate whether changes over time in individual
family or work commitment circumstances affect fertility behaviour, and between
estimates indicate whether differences between families affect fertility at a given
point in time.
The same hybrid method is used to estimate three models on the short-term












In Equation 3.2, yit is a binary variable that takes the value of 1 if the couple
desired a child in year t, and αi, xit, zi, β and γ have the same meanings as in
Equation 3.1. Note that in Equation 3.1, the dependent variable is taken from
year t+ 1, whereas in Equation 3.2, the dependent variable is taken from year t.
The long-term models are estimated using a model specification which does
not use the panel structure of the data. This specification intends to capture the
effect of housework on fertility over the longer term using independent variables
measured in 2010 to explain the birth of a child between 2011 and 2015. By
“long-term effect on fertility,” we mean whether or not a couple has a birth at
any time over the next five years; equivalently, whether or not a couple has had a
birth by 2015. In this way, the long-term effect does not refer to a lagged effect of
husband’s proportion of housework on fertility: we do not mean that husband’s
proportion of housework will have a bigger impact on the probability of a birth
in 2015, than in 2011.
The long-term models are required to test Hypothesis 3 – that housework di-
vision affects fertility more over the long-term than the short-term – by compari-
son with the short-term estimates from Models (1)-(3). Moreover, the long-term
model will provide an additional test of Hypothesis 1 – that is, that housework
division affects realised fertility – by estimating the long-term effect of husbands’
share of housework on fertility.
We use the proportion of husband’s housework in a given year to predict
the probability of a birth over subsequent years (Dommermuth et al. 2017). This
measure may have the drawback of representing domestic gender equity at a single
point in time. However, any alternative measure – such as the mean proportion
of husbands’ housework over 2010 to 2015 – produces problems of endogeneity.
We evaluate the robustness of our approach by repeating the analysis using data
from 2011 on husband’s proportion of housework, and data on fertility outcomes
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1− Pr(yi,2011−2015 = 1|xi,2010)
)
= x′i,2010β. (3.3)
In Equation 3.3, yi,2011−2015 is a binary variable that equals 1 if a couple had
one or more children from 2011 to 2015; xi,2010 is the vector of independent
variables from 2010; and β is its associated vector of coefficients. In vector β, the
main coefficient of interest is husbands’ proportion of housework. We expect our
estimate for this coefficient to be positive, indicating that husbands’ proportion
of housework has a positive effect on realised fertility in the long-term. We also
expect this estimate to be larger than the estimate for husbands’ proportion of
housework in Equation 3.1, which would indicate that husbands’ proportion of
housework has a greater effect on realised fertility in the long-term than in the
short-term.
3.4.2 Variables
Housework balance is measured by the total hours of housework dedicated per
week by each spouse. The PFSD questionnaires do not ask specific questions
about different forms of domestic work, such as cleaning and childcare. The
only questions about domestic labour concern the number of hours of housework
dedicated per week by the respondent, and the number of hours dedicated per
week by the respondent’s spouse. Broadly, “housework” here includes activities
such as cooking, cleaning, and laundry, but not childcare. We focus on the
share of housework done by each spouse, because domestic gender equity concerns
whether the balance of household labour is considered fair, rather than concerning
the absolute amount of housework. Changes in individual perceptions of fairness
tend to operate according to changes in personal circumstances (Perales et al.





where share gives the husband’s proportion of housework, hhw gives the
husband’s weekly hours of housework, and whw gives the wife’s weekly hours
of housework. Husband’s weekly hours of housework and wife’s weekly hours of
housework were also included as variables in our models, in order to control for
absolute number of hours of housework done by each couple.
We included a range of control variables for variations in husbands’ and wives’
income, education, work, age, and parity (i.e. birth order). In terms of parity,
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our analytical sample is restricted to couples at parity 1 or above. Since two-
child families are normative, we include a binary control variable to control for
families at parities of two and over. This is because families with one child are
likely to face an additional incentive to have another child (because of the two-
child norm), relative to families who already have two or more children. Table
3.1 lists and provides summary statistics for these variables. It indicates that
husbands do about 29.7% of housework on average. Of the 2,176 person-years in
the sample, there were 146 births in the four years 2011, 2012, 2013, and 2015.
The proportion of couples that had one or more births across all years from 2011
to 2015 was 0.296, a total of 544 ∗ 0.296 = 161 couples.
Table 3.1: Summary statistics for regression variables.
Variable Mean Standard
deviation
Birth in following year (binary) .0671 .250
One or more births in 2011-2015 (binary) .296 .457
Youngest child younger than five .518 .500
Wife or husband desires another child (binary) .186 .389
Tertiary education – wife (binary) .474 .499
Tertiary education – husband (binary) .468 .499
Proportion of housework done by husband .297 .207
Wife’s weekly hours of housework 16.6 13.4
Husband’s weekly hours of housework 7.20 8.43
Wife’s age in years 34.1 4.05
Wife works (binary) .734 .442
Any parents live with couple (binary) .483 .500
Log income 10.8 1.74
Parity two or more (binary) .704 .457
Pays for a nanny (binary) .150 .357
Year of the Dragon (binary) .25 .433
Notes: For all variables except “One or more births in 2011-2015,” the sample size is 2,176
person-years, covering 544 respondents over the survey years 2010, 2011, 2012, and 2014. For
“One or more births in 2011-2015,” the sample size is 544.
Source: PSFD 2018.
The 146 births from 2011 to 2015 are negatively distributed over time, with
56 births in 2011, 44 births in 2012, 34 births in 2013, and 12 births in 2015.
This pattern is to be expected since all individuals in the sample have at least
one child in 2010, and couples are not likely to have more than two children.
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3.5 Results and discussion
In this section, we first discuss our model results on realised births, before focusing
on our fertility desire models. Finally, we consider some policy implications of
our results.
3.5.1 Realised births
Table 3.2 presents the estimates of the hybrid logistic regression models based on
Equation 3.1. Table 3.3 displays the estimates of the cross-sectional model based
on Equation 3.3. Only key variables and significant variables are displayed in
Table 3.2 and Table 3.3. Tables displaying the full range of variables included in
the models are reported in the Appendix: hybrid model estimates are displayed
in Table A1, and cross-sectional estimates are displayed in Table A2.
3.5.1.1 Short-term effects
We firstly focus on Models (1)-(3) in Table 3.2. These models report the year-
on-year effects of covariates on the probability of couples having a child in the
following year. Unexpectedly, within or between coefficients for the proportion of
housework done by husbands are statistically insignificant across all three models.
The lack of statistical significance for within coefficients may indicate that if a
couple starts sharing housework more equally at some point in time, any effect on
the probability of another birth in the next year is modest. The lack of statistical
significance for between estimates, on the other hand, may indicate that couples
which share housework more equally (in a given year) are no more likely to have
a birth in the next year than couples that share housework less equally. In terms
of Hypothesis 1, our results indicate that greater housework balance has little or
no impact on the probability of future births.
These findings are inconsistent with prior work indicating that greater house-
work balance has a positive impact on realised fertility (Cooke 2009; Dommer-
muth et al. 2017; Nagase and Brinton 2017). These conflicting results may be
due to differences in contextual factors, but may also reflect the fact that prior
empirical analysis has conflated the effect of within and between variations in
housework balance. Once these effects are separated, they seem to exert little
influence on fertility, at least in the short-term.
It may be the case that the sample size is too small to detect a short-term
effect of husband’s proportion of housework on fertility, meaning that there are
too few birth events to detect an effect. However, we do have enough births
in the long-term models to detect an effect (see next section), and there are no
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Table 3.2: Selected hybrid panel data logistic regression estimates of births, by
survey respondent group.
(1) (2) (3)
Type of estimate Variable All Females Males
Log-odds Odds ratio Log-odds Odds ratio Log-odds Odds ratio
Within estimate
Proportion of housework done by husband 0.983 2.672 1.365 3.916 -0.160 0.852
(1.199) (1.806) (1.970)
Wife’s hours of housework -0.0183 0.982 -0.0353 0.965 -0.0137 0.986
(0.0256) (0.0430) (0.0390)
Husband’s hours of housework -0.0462 0.955 -0.0754 0.927 -0.00756 0.992
(0.0333) (0.0517) (0.0523)
Wife’s age 0.621*** 1.861 0.558* 1.747 0.951*** 2.588
(0.153) (0.239) (0.247)
Parity 2 or more -7.841*** 0.000 -8.555*** 0.000 -8.866*** 0.000
(0.707) (1.165) (1.116)
Desires more children -0.509 0.601 0.227 1.255 -1.669* 0.188
(0.511) (0.855) (0.763)
Between estimate
Proportion of housework done by husband 0.414 1.513 0.170 1.185 0.557 1.745
(1.523) (2.424) (2.491)
Wife’s hours of housework -0.00325 0.997 0.0269 1.027 -0.0526 0.948
(0.0280) (0.0427) (0.0443)
Husband’s hours of housework -0.0582 0.943 -0.0487 0.952 -0.0703 0.934
(0.0437) (0.0695) (0.0740)
Wife’s age -0.0540 0.947 -0.0829 0.920 -0.0618 0.932
(0.0456) (0.0973) (0.0592)
Parity 2 or more 0.165 1.179 0.0736 1.076 0.406 1.501
(0.436) (0.712) (0.646)
Desires more children 0.545 1.725 1.019 2.770 -0.387 0.679
(0.786) (1.261) (1.159)
Constant -3.308 -2.937 -6.995+
(2.199) (3.853) (3.987)
N 2176 1040 1136
Notes: Within estimates are derived using variation within individuals over time, and between
estimates use variation across different individuals. Estimates of the log-odds, standard errors
(in brackets), and odds ratios are reported to three decimal places. The odds ratios are the
exponents of the log-odds. +p < .10, ∗p < .05, ∗∗p < .01, ∗∗∗p < .001.
more births in the long-term models than there are in the short-term models;
this suggests that we do not have too few births in the short-term models. That
being said, we cannot be sure that we have enough births in the short-term
models, because the number of observations is larger, i.e. 2,176 rather than 544.
Since we cannot rule out the problem that there might be too few birth events,
we merely conclude that our short-term models do not provide any clear evidence
for or against gender equity theory.
In terms of control variables, the age of the wife and whether a couple has
two or more children return statistically significant coefficients for the within
estimates for all three Models (1)-(3). The mean wife’s age is 34.1 (Table 3.1),
reflecting the postponement of having children towards older childbearing ages.
The low probability of a third birth reflects our expectation that most couples will
have a maximum of two children, given the two-child family norm. By contrast,
between estimates for these variables are statistically insignificant, which may
reflect greater similarity in the structure of Taiwanese families in our sample, in
relation to wife’s age and parity.
Desiring more births is statistically significant in Model (3) for the within
estimate, and is negatively associated with realised fertility, but both within and
between estimates have insignificant p-values for Models (1) and (2). The Model
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(3) results indicate that if a couple’s desire to have a child increases, the likelihood
of having a child decreases. This contradicts previous evidence that desiring a
child is a strong predictor of fertility (Thomson et al. 1990). Since this result
is found in the model that uses only male respondents, this could be explained
in terms of husbands’ gender ideology: since husbands with a traditional gender
ideology tend to both desire more children and do less housework, the wives
of husbands who desire more children might be less inclined to have additional
children (Scanzoni 1976).
3.5.1.2 Long-term effects
Greater housework in the short-term seems to have no influence on realised fer-
tility, but housework division may have a cumulative effect on the probability of
a second birth over time. Thus, differences in housework balance may not lead
to having a child in the short-term but may do in the long run. Models (7)-(9) in
Table 3.3 report the estimates for the long-term effects of housework balance on
fertility. The estimates reveal a positive and significant effect of husband’s share
of housework on the probability of couples having another child for female respon-
dents, but not for male respondents or all respondents. Support for Hypothesis
1 is thus only found in the cross-sectional model containing only female respon-
dents. This suggests that perceptions of how much each partner contributes to
housework varies significantly by gender, with wives perceiving husbands to be
doing less housework than husbands perceive themselves to be doing (Cerrato
and Cifre 2018).
The husband’s housework proportion coefficient in Model (8) is the largest
across all three models in Table 3.3. The estimated effect of a husband doing
a greater share of housework on the probability of realised fertility reflects the
magnitude of its influence. The mean value for this variable is 29.7% (Table
3.1); were this to shift to 50% – i.e. if housework were shared equally – then
the odds of having another child would increase by exp(0.203 ∗ 3.560) = 2.060, a
20.6% increase. This suggests that increasing domestic gender equity could have
a large effect on transitions to 2nd and higher-order births. This result broadly
concurs with the existing evidence on the effect of household labour on fertility
behaviour, although the magnitude of the effect here seems to be much larger
than previously found (e.g. Dommermuth et al. 2017).
The results for wife’s and husband’s hours of housework are mixed, varying
with the gender of the respondent. In Model (9) (male respondents), the results
indicate that as husbands increase their hours of housework, and as wives de-
crease their hours of housework, the likelihood of having a child increases. These
results reflect a situation in which the husband takes on a greater proportion
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Table 3.3: Selected cross-sectional logistic regression estimates of births, by survey
respondent group.
(7) (8) (9)
Variable All Females Males
Log-odds Odds ratio Log-odds Odds ratio Log-odds Odds ratio
Proportion of housework done by husband 1.051 2.861 3.560** 35.163 -2.058 0.128
(1.040) (1.246) (1.556)
Wife’s hours of housework -0.0546* 0.947 -0.0452 0.956 -0.0784** 0.925
(0.0228) (0.0467) (0.0268)
Husband’s hours of housework -0.00846 0.992 -0.0601+ 0.942 0.0664+ 1.069
(0.0266) (0.0309) (0.0398)
Wife’s age -0.286*** 0.751 -0.397*** 0.672 -0.270*** 0.763
(0.0537) (0.0971) (0.0653)
Parity 2 or more -2.202*** 0.111 -2.035*** 0.131 -2.563*** 0.077
(0.294) (0.421) (0.464)




Constant 7.991*** 10.29** 8.810***
(1.887) (3.225) (2.471)
N 544 260 284
Notes: The dependent variable here is whether the couple went on to have one or more
children in 2011-2015. Estimates of the log-odds, standard errors (in brackets), and odds
ratios are reported to three decimal places. The odds ratios are the exponents of the log-odds.
+p < .10, ∗p < .05, ∗∗p < .01, ∗∗∗p < .001.
of housework, providing supporting evidence to Hypothesis 1 (that husbands’
housework proportion is a positive predictor of realised fertility) and Hypothesis
1 (that husbands’ housework proportion affects realised fertility more strongly
in the long-term than in the short-term). However, the coefficient for husbands’
proportion of housework is not statistically significant. Since the proportion of
husbands’ housework is a function of wives’ hours of housework and husbands’
hours of housework, if any two of these variables change then so must the third.
This makes disentangling the effects of these three variables more complicated,
although problems of multicollinearity are avoided by the fact that husbands’
housework proportion is a nonlinear function of wives’ hours of housework and
husbands’ hours of housework. In contrast to Model (9), Model (8) (female
respondents) returns a large and positive estimate for husbands’ proportion of
housework, but then a significant and negative result for husbands’ hours of
housework, and no significant result for wives’ hours of housework. The Model
(8) results also imply that increasing husbands’ hours of housework decrease the
likelihood of having another child, if the proportion of husbands’ housework re-
mains the same (i.e. if wives’ hours of housework increase proportionally).
Despite the strong effect found in Model (8), when the analysis was repeated
for data in 2011 (predicting one or more births from 2012 to 2015), no such effect
was found. This suggests that analysing the effect of domestic gender equality on
fertility over longer periods is likelier to find a significant result, and that such
effects may not be evident over time periods shorter than five years. It could
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also be the case that, as for the short-term models, there was an insufficient
proportion of couples having children at all over 2012 to 2015: while 29.7% of
couples had at least one additional child between 2011 and 2015, only 23.2% of
couples had at least one additional child between 2012 and 2015. In this way,
the failure to replicate the 2010 result with data from 2011 could be due to the
shorter time period, or could be due to an insufficient proportion of the sample
having children to ensure enough variability to identify an effect, or could be due
to a combination of these two factors.
In terms of control variables, the wife’s age and the couple being at a parity
of two or more were significant and negative across Models (7)-(9). The negative
coefficient for wife’s age reflects a high median wife’s age of 32 in 2010, with
half of the women in the sample being 37 by 2015. As 37 is towards the end of
most women’s childbearing years, these older women would have likely had less
children over 2011-2015 than women who were younger in 2010, reflecting wife’s
age as a negative predictor of fertility in our models. The coefficients for parity
of two or more are similar to those for the short-term within estimates, although
their magnitude is smaller. This difference could be due to the fact that in the
short-term models, parity 1 couples who had more children between 2011 and
2015 would subsequently have been counted as a parity 2 or more couple. In the
long-term models, these same couples were only counted as parity 1 couples, as
covariate data from only 2010 was used. Overall, these control variable coefficients
suggest that couples with older wives and with two or more children in 2010 were
less likely to have another child across 2011-2015. The desire for more children is
a positive predictor of the likelihood of having another child in all three models,
indicating that couples who desire more children go on to have more children, as
expected.
Our results suggest that domestic labour balance effects fertility in the long-
term, but not in the short-term. We have a positive and significant estimate
for the proportion of husbands’ housework in Model (8), but no such estimate
in the short-term models. This supports our earlier argument that perceptions
of gender equity in household roles may become less responsive to changes in
realised housework division over time. Even though a husband might actually
have been doing more housework in recent years, a wife might still regard her
expected role as being fundamentally the same as that established during their
early relationship and the early years of their first child. Moreover, those beliefs
could be largely unconscious – a general feeling about how things are done in
that particular family, rather than a conscious belief about how domestic labour
would be shared after a potential future birth.
These considerations suggest that future research in this area should inves-
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tigate the relationship between housework and fertility over different periods of
time. We have couched our argument here in terms of marital satisfaction – it
still needs to be shown whether domestic labour equity effects fertility in a similar
manner over time. Specifically, research is needed on how equity effects fertility
at different times in a couple’s life, and on how equity at a given point in time
affects fertility over the short-term and the long-term.
3.5.2 Desire for more births
Table 3.4 presents the estimates of the hybrid logistic regression models based on
Equation 3.2. As in the previous subsection, only a selection of all the explanatory
variables are displayed; the full range of variables included in the models are
reported in the Appendix, in Table A1.
The results reveal no significant effect for any of the six housework proportion
variables. These results suggest that more balanced housework arrangements do
not necessarily lead to a greater desire for having a child, providing evidence
against Hypothesis 2 (that husbands’ share of housework is positively associated
with the desire for more children). However, the within coefficients reveal a sig-
nificant positive effect for husbands’ hours of housework, when all respondents
are used (Model (4)) and when only female respondents are used (Model (6)).
This indicates that wives express a greater desire to have children as their hus-
bands start doing more housework. Moreover, our results for the effect of hours
of husbands’ housework are consistent with cross-sectional analyses for Taiwan,
which find that husbands’ increased share of housework positively impacts cou-
ples’ desire for another child (Kan and Hertog 2017). We therefore find partial
support for gender equity theory, since husbands doing more hours of housework
is associated with an increase in wives desiring more children.
In terms of control variables, there are significant negative coefficients for
wives’ age, for both within- and between-estimates. These results suggest that
younger wives have a greater desire for more children than older wives, and that
wives’ desire for children decrease as they age. Since the wives in our sample
have a mean age of 34.1 (Table 3.1), which is towards the older end of the child-
bearing ages, the negative effects of ageing on fertility desire are to be expected,
as wives start to exit their child-bearing period. Moreover, as wives age they
will be more likely to have the children they desire, and then not desire children
thereafter. Within estimates for parity 2 or more are not statistically significant
in any model, indicating that couples progressing from parity 1 to parity 2 do not
desire more children. Additionally, the between estimates for parity 2 or more
are statistically significant and negative, indicating that couples with 2 or more
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Table 3.4: Selected hybrid panel data logistic regression estimates of desire for
more births, by survey respondent group.
(4) (5) (6)
Type of estimate Variable All Females Males
Log-odds Odds ratio Log-odds Odds ratio Log-odds Odds ratio
Within estimate
Proportion of housework done by husband -0.685 0.504 -1.281 0.278 0.352 1.422
(0.833) (1.159) (1.264)
Wife’s hours of housework 0.00560 1.006 0.0163 1.016 0.00116 1.001
(0.0146) (0.0230) (0.0196)
Husband’s hours of housework 0.0307 1.031 0.0533+ 1.055 -0.0000332 1.000
(0.0206) (0.0279) (0.0319)
Wife’s age -0.616*** 0.540 -0.683*** 0.505 -0.576*** 0.562
(0.0949) (0.142) (0.137)
Parity 2 or more -0.502 0.605 -0.372 0.689 -0.793+ 0.452
(0.327) (0.492) (0.454)
Between estimate
Proportion of housework done by husband -0.110 0.896 1.502 4.491 -2.694 0.068
(1.377) (1.740) (2.290)
Wife’s hours of housework -0.00138 0.999 0.0289 1.029 -0.0137 0.986
(0.0234) (0.0344) (0.0332)
Husband’s hours of housework 0.0139 1.014 -0.0165 0.984 0.0909 1.095
(0.0389) (0.0506) (0.0645)
Wife’s age -0.135*** 0.874 -0.219** 0.803 -0.119* 0.888
(0.0403) (0.0746) (0.0500)
Parity 2 or more -3.012*** 0.049 -2.874*** 0.056 -3.391*** 0.034
(0.323) (0.437) (0.497)
Constant 1.141 4.250 -3.044
(1.846) (2.827) (3.063)
N 2176 1040 1136
Notes: Within estimates are derived using variation within individuals over time, and between
estimates use variation across different individuals. Estimates of the log-odds, standard errors
(in brackets), and odds ratios are reported to three decimal places. The odds ratios are the
exponents of the log-odds. +p < .10, ∗p < .05, ∗∗p < .01, ∗∗∗p < .001.
children are less likely to want more children than couples with 1 child. This is
expected, given the norm of 2 child families.
3.5.3 Policy implications
In policy terms, these results suggest that encouraging equalisation of household
labour could play a role in increasing fertility. The Taiwanese government first
introduced pro-natalist policies in 2006 and 2008, which focused on financial
support and childcare for couples with young children (Chen 2012; Frejka et
al. 2010; Lee 2009; Lee and Lin 2016). Parental leave of up to two years was
introduced slightly earlier, but only became paid (60% of the mother’s salary
during the first six months) from 2009 (Lee and Lin 2016; Tsai 2012). Fathers
are entitled to three days of leave on full pay, and can share in the two years of
leave, again paid at 60% of their salary during the first six months (Tsai 2012).3
Promoting domestic gender equity has not been a part of any pro-natalist policy
so far – for a recent overview, see Yip and Chen (2016).
In Scandinavian countries, paternity leave has long been regarded as a means
of promoting domestic gender equality (Cools et al. 2015; Kotsadam and Finser-
aas 2011). These countries are also characterised by stable and near-replacement
level fertility; however, causal links between policies and fertility are potentially
3https://www.bli.gov.tw/en/0013195.html
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confounded by gender equitable attitudes across these societies at large. Nonethe-
less, there is some evidence – both in Scandinavia and in other developed coun-
tries – that the availability and uptake of paternity leave has a positive effect
both on subsequent domestic gender equality, and on second births (Boll et al.
2014; Kotsadam and Finseraas 2011; Lappegård 2010). For Taiwan, long pe-
riods of paid paternity leave could potentially be a viable means of promoting
fertility. Providing longer periods of better-paid paternity leave could encourage
fathers to perform a larger share of housework and childcare, leading to more
gender-equitable outcomes at home and subsequent increases in fertility.
3.6 Conclusion
Taiwan has the third lowest TFR in the world and has remained persistently low
over the last two decades. Identifying the key factors underpinning these patterns
is important to develop effective ways to promote fertility. In this paper we sought
to establish whether the division of household labour exerts a significant influence
on shaping the probability of desiring another child, or on having another child.
Drawing on panel data from the PSFD, we examined the short- and long-term
effects of household work on fertility behaviour.
The evidence accumulated here shows no evidence of a short-term effect of
housework division on fertility behaviour or fertility desire. A greater share of
household labour taken up by husbands is not statistically associated with having
an additional child or wanting to have another child. Yet, men doing a greater
share of domestic labour results in a higher probability of having an additional
child in the long-term. Specifically, couples in which husbands consistently do a
greater share of housework are more likely to have an additional child in the next
five years than couples in which wives take a larger responsibility for domestic
work. Our results indicated that if a husband increases his share of housework
from a sample mean of 0.297 to 0.5, the odds of having another child increase by
20.6% over a five year period. This finding is indifferent to the absolute number
of hours dedicated to housework by either partner.
These results comprise the first empirical support for the validity of gender
equity theory as an explanation for fertility behaviour in Taiwan. Our conclusions
are consistent with existing evidence in Europe and North America, and elsewhere
in East Asia (Balbo et al. 2013; Kan and Hertog 2017; Oláh 2003). Yet, the
magnitude of the long-term effect found in this study is larger. Prior work tends
to focus on examining the short-term effects of housework on fertility behaviour.
Further research is needed to establish whether domestic gender equity acts more
strongly on fertility in the long-term than in the short-term, and whether the
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effects of domestic gender equity are greater in Taiwan – and more widely across
East Asia – than in Europe and North America.
Our findings suggest that governments seeking to raise fertility should focus on
policies aiming at promoting greater domestic gender equality, such as increased
paternity leave and child care provision. Existing evidence points to the effective
use of paternity leave policies seeking to increase fertility in Scandinavian coun-
tries. However, research is needed to assess if recent increases in parental and
paternity leave in East Asia are having such an effect.
Our findings also suggest policies aimed at promoting fertility should remain in
place for some years as the effects of greater housework balance are not immediate.
They may take up to five years to be realised. At the same time, policies should
also be targeted at teaching gender equality. Children could be taught at school
about the importance of sharing all forms of labour equally between the sexes.
Such policies are standard in many near-replacement fertility developed countries,
such as in Sweden, where pre-school gender equality teaching projects have been
implemented since the 1990s (Bayne 2009).
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Paper 2 – The Effect of Parental Leave
Policies on Increasing Fertility: A
Systematic Review
Low fertility is set to worsen economic problems in many developed countries,
and parental leave has emerged as a key pro-natal policy. However, the literature
contends that evidence for the effect of parental leave on fertility is mixed. We
conduct the first systematic review on this topic. By applying a rigorous search
protocol, we identify and review empirical studies that quantify the impact of
parental leave policies on fertility. We focus on experimental or quasi-experimental
studies that can identify causal effects. We identify 11 papers published between
2009 and 2019, evaluating 23 policy changes across Europe and North America
from 1977 to 2009. Results are a mixture of positive, negative, and null impacts on
fertility. To explain these apparent inconsistencies, we propose a new conceptual
framework which decomposes the total effect of parental leave on fertility into
the “current-child” and “future-child” effects. We decompose these into effects
on women at different birth orders, and specify types of study design to identify
each effect. We classify the 23 studies in terms of the type of effect identified,
revealing that all the negative or null studies identify the current-child effect,
and all the positive studies identify the future-child or total effect. Since the
future-child and total effects are more important for promoting aggregate fertility,
our findings show that parental leave does in fact increase fertility when benefit
increases are generous. Furthermore, our conceptual framework provides a new
way of understanding and classifying the effects of pro-natal policies on fertility.
Additionally, we propose ways to adapt the ROBINS-I tool for evaluating risk of
bias in pro-natal policy studies.
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4.1 Introduction
Persistent low fertility causes economic problems and is associated with parents
having fewer children than they want. Many countries in East Asia and Europe
have fertility levels significantly below the replacement level of 2.1 births per
woman, and countries across Asia and Latin America are projected to join them
in the coming decades (UN 2019). When low fertility rates persist, rising old-
age dependency ratios and reductions in the working-age population cause higher
consumption, lower investment, and economic stagnation or decline (Bloom et
al. 2010; Caldwell et al. 2002; McDonald 2008). On the individual level, low
fertility can be indicative of people having fewer children than they would ideally
like to have (Beaujouan and Berghammer 2019; Chen and Yip 2017; Spéder and
Kapitány 2014). The failure of individuals to fulfil their childbearing desires can
negatively impact emotional well-being (Casterline and Han 2017; Priebe 2020;
Ugur 2020).
Governments try to promote fertility through family policies (Gauthier 2007;
Raute 2019; Rindfuss and Choe 2016). Family policies aim to increase fertility
either through helping parents balance work and family, or through reducing
the costs of childbearing and childrearing (Gauthier 2007, 2008; Rindfuss and
Choe 2016). Family policies can be categorised as child-related cash transfers,
childcare subsidies, or financial support through the tax system (OECD 2019c).
Child-related cash transfers tend to take up the largest proportion of public ex-
penditure, amounting to 1.3% of GDP across OECD countries in 2015, a total
spend of over $0.75 trillion (OECD 2019a,b,c). Within child-related cash trans-
fers, parental, maternity and paternity leave policies (henceforth ‘leave’) refer
to state mandated arrangements for parents to take time off work during preg-
nancy or after childbirth. In 2015, average OECD public expenditure on leave
was $12,100 per infant (at purchasing power parity, 2010 USD) (OECD 2019d).
Understanding the extent of impacts of such policies on fertility is thus critical
to guide pro-natal policy efforts.
Low fertility is particularly acute in East Asia, in the advanced economies
of South Korea, Taiwan, Japan, and Singapore (UN 2019). In these societies,
which share a common Confucian heritage and similar development trajectories,
governments have aimed to increase fertility through a range of pro-natal policy
efforts (Suzuki 2013). These countries differ from low fertility countries in the
Europe, North America and Oceania in the set-up of their welfare systems and
orientations towards government intervention in the society and economy (Esping-
Andersen and Billari 2015). Therefore in order to evaluate the efficacy of pro-natal
policies in general, consideration of the experience of East Asian countries must
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be taken into account.
This paper focusses on parental leave – rather than other family policies –
because leave can uniquely increase domestic gender equity, and because domestic
gender inequity has been identified as a key cause of low fertility (Goldscheider et
al. 2015; McDonald 2006; Tamm 2019). Over the past two decades, researchers
have increasingly argued that the tension between increasing career ambitions
and persistently gendered domestic obligations has meant that women’s ability
to reconcile work with family life has become more restricted, which in turn seems
to have contributed to low fertility (e.g. Baizan et al. 2016; Duvander et al. 2019;
Meier and Rainer 2017). Leave can help equalise the division of domestic and
formal labour between men and women through enabling mother’s return to
work, and through encouraging fathers to do more housework and childcare 1
(Baum and Ruhm 2016; Pronzato 2009; Tamm 2019). Through equalising the
gender balance of labour, leave can reduce the cost of childrearing for women,
and thereby increase fertility (Baizan et al. 2016; Kotsadam and Finseraas 2011).
Although gender equity is our motivation for focussing on leave, we only seek to
establish whether leave has an impact on fertility.
Whether leave actually increases fertility remains a matter of debate (Balbo
et al. 2013; Hoem 2008; Olivetti and Petrongolo 2017). Gauthier’s (2007) review
of the effect of family policies on fertility found the evidence to be “mixed,” an
evaluation echoed across the empirical literature (e.g. Hong and Sullivan 2016;
Lappegård 2010; Matysiak and Szalma 2014). Similarly, the review by Bergsvik
et al. of the effect of family policies on fertility (2020) concludes that the effect of
leave on fertility is ambiguous. There are certainly cases in which governments
have provided generous leave policies and low fertility has persisted, such as in
Slovenia (Stropnik and Šircelj 2008). There are also cases in which generous new
leave policies have been accompanied by large increases in fertility (e.g. East
Germany), and cases in which generous leave policies have been accompanied by
stable and high fertility (e.g. Czechoslovakia and Sweden) (Buttner and Lutz
1990; Hoem 1990, 1993, 2005; Monnier 1990; Salles 2006). However, most empir-
ical studies use methods that prohibit identification of a causal effect of leave on
fertility. To date, there have been no peer-reviewed systematic reviews focussing
on leave and fertility which discriminate between studies that can identify causal
effects and studies that cannot. Whether leave does in fact cause higher fertility
therefore remains an open question. A peer-reviewed systematic review could
reliably answer this question by showing whether or not more generous parental
leave leads to higher fertility, thereby resolving existing academic debates and
1In some countries such as Sweden, gender equality is an explicit goal of leave policy (Du-
vander and Johansson 2012).
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giving governments a sounder footing for policy-making.
This paper provides the first peer-reviewed systematic review of the effect
of leave on fertility. We aim to find, evaluate, and synthesise all relevant, ex-
perimental or quasi-experimental studies, in a rigorous, transparent, and repro-
ducible fashion. We seek to answer the question: to what extent does leave
increase fertility? Since we are interested in informing pro-natal policies in low-
fertility countries, we restrict our search to countries and time periods where fer-
tility is persistently below 2 births per woman (broadly speaking, in high-income
countries from the 1950s onwards). Using a thorough search of all published
English-language material catalogued online, we identify 11 papers that match
our inclusion criteria, containing 23 different studies that can plausibly test for a
causal effect of leave on fertility.2
Our paper makes three contributions. Firstly, we develop a new conceptual
framework (Section 4.4.2), building on Lalive and Zweimüller’s (2009) definitions
of the “current-child effect” and the “future-child effect”. Our framework decom-
poses the impact of leave on individuals by type of effect and by parity, specifies
study designs that can be used to identify each impact, and can be applied to
assess the impact of other pro-natal policies on fertility. Secondly, we find that
leave reforms which provide generous increases in duration or remuneration con-
sistently increase fertility, implying that large increases in leave benefits are a
viable strategy for governments seeking to raise fertility (Section 4.4). Categoris-
ing the 23 studies in terms of our framework reveals that studies whose methods
identify a broader class of effects consistently find positive results, and that all
negative or null studies only address a narrow class of effects that are of marginal
interest to policy-makers. Thirdly, we propose ways to adapt the ROBINS-I tool
for the evaluation of studies of pro-natal policies (Section 4.4.3). ROBINS-I was
designed as a tool for assessing risk of bias (RoB) in non-randomised studies of
medical interventions (Sterne et al. 2016); we identify three key reasons why it is
not directly applicable to studies of public policy interventions. First, ROBINS-I
assumes the existence of placebo effects, which do not exist in a public policy con-
text. Second, the notion of an “intention-to-treat” (ITT) study is problematic in
the case of public policy because individuals can self-select into being (in)eligible
for a policy after their initial assignment (in medical studies, participants cannot
change their assignment status after being assigned or not assigned to treatment).
Third, ROBINS-I does not distinguish between policy eligibility and policy avail-
ability, which comprise critical dimensions of leave policies. As well as identifying
2By “different studies” we mean individual models (or sets of related models) that are
different either in terms of the specific policy being evaluated, or different in terms of the
analytical sample (e.g. a paper that has separate models for the effect of a policy on women at
parity 1 and parity 2 counts as having two different studies).
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these three considerations and proposing strategies to account for them, we also
identify the sources of bias inherent in each of the study designs in our conceptual
framework, providing future empirical researchers with a checklist of sources of
bias and strategies to minimise RoB.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 4.2 provides background
information on the economic mechanisms by which leave is theorised to affect
fertility, and introduces Lalive and Zweimüller’s (2009) definitions of the current-
child and future-child effects. Section 4.3 describes systematic review methods
and explains how we conducted this review. Section 4.4 presents the results
of our search and filtering process, and develops our conceptual framework to
classify and assess studies and the type of fertility effect they capture. Section
4.4 also assesses the RoB of included studies, and synthesises the study findings.
Section 4.5 discusses our analysis and findings, and Section 4.6 offers some final
concluding remarks.
4.2 Background
This section provides background information on two topics. Section 4.2.1 de-
scribes the economic channels by which leave is theorised to increase fertility, and
Section 4.2.2 provides an exposition of Lalive and Zweimüller’s (2009) theory of
the current-child effect and the future-child effect.
4.2.1 Economic theory of how leave increases fertility
Leave increases fertility by enabling parents to balance work and childcare, and
by lowering the net costs of childrearing (Gauthier 2008). In the absence of leave,
a parent broadly has two options after the birth of their child:
(1) Return to work soon after childbirth. Lose little to no job income, but
spend money on childcare after returning to work.
(2) Quit work in order to look after the child. Lose all job income, but save
money on childcare.
Leave presents a third option:
(3) Take some partially remunerated weeks or months off, and then return to
work. Lose some job income, but spend no money on childcare for the
duration of leave.
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By enabling parents to both take care of their child and return to their job,
leave represents a middle-ground between options (1) and (2). Prospective par-
ents may want to spend time with their new-born infant and save money on
childcare (prohibiting option (1)), but also want to keep their job and avoid neg-
ative impacts on their career (prohibiting option (2)) (Nagase and Brinton 2017;
Wood et al. 2016). Prospective parents with these preferences may be less likely
to have a child in the absence of leave, and so the availability of leave may cause
them to have a child they might not have had otherwise (Becker 1973; Ermisch
2003). Regardless of parental preferences, option (3) might have the lowest net
financial cost. If the rate of remuneration of leave is high and childcare is expen-
sive, then taking leave will be cheaper than either other option (Gauthier 2008).
Leave can therefore make childrearing less costly, facilitating childbearing.
4.2.2 Effects on fertility: current-child effect and future-
child effect
Leave can affect fertility behaviour in two key ways. In a seminal analysis in the
econometrics literature, Lalive and Zweimüller (2009) distinguish between the
“current-child effect” and the “future-child effect” of a leave policy on fertility.
This conceptual framework has become commonly used in other studies, in order
to elucidate which type of effect is being identified (e.g. Cygan-Rehm 2016; Dahl
et al. 2013; Raute 2019).
The current-child effect refers to the effect of being able to take more leave for
the child just born, on subsequent fertility. Women giving birth shortly before
and shortly after a reform receive different benefits for the child they just had.
However, both groups of women will receive equal benefits for any subsequent
children. Therefore if there is any long-term difference in fertility between the
two groups, it must be due to the different benefits they received for the child
born around the time of the reform.
The future-child effect refers to the effect of a greater amount of leave available
in the future. It is called the “future” child effect to distinguish it from the
current-child effect, and captures the idea that, if a woman knows she will receive
more generous leave entitlements if she has a child, she will probably be likelier
to have that child. Lalive and Zweimüller identify the future-child effect by
comparing the fertility of mothers in the years before the reform, with the fertility
of mothers in the years after the reform.
Lalive and Zweimüller go on to argue that the sum of the current-child effect
and the future-child effect gives the total effect of leave on fertility. However,
we note that their study design can only identify effects on women at parities of
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1 or higher, since the women in their samples all had at least one birth. This
means that their study design cannot identify the effect of leave on women with
no children, and therefore cannot identify the total effect of leave on fertility.3
While other studies have used Lalive and Zweimüller’s terminology, no study
has highlighted the role of parity in classifying effects. Separating the impact
of a leave policy on women at different parities can enable us to understand the
different processes by which individuals choose to build a family.
4.3 Methods
Our methods were guided by the policies and guidelines of The Campbell Collab-
oration for conducting systematic reviews (https://campbellcollaboration.org/)
(Campbell Collaboration 2019). Prior to conducting literature searches we pro-
duced a review protocol, which was registered and published online at the Inter-
national prospective register of systematic reviews (PROSPERO), on the 9th of
September 2019 (Thomas et al. 2019). Full details of our method are given in
the review protocol, a version of which is given in Appendix B.1. This report was
written according to the Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and
Meta-Analyses (PRISMA) checklist (Moher et al. 2009). All deviations from the
protocol are specified in Appendix B.2.
4.3.1 Criteria for inclusion of studies
Studies must be primary, empirical, quantitative studies that assess the effect of
a leave policy on fertility at the micro-level. We exclude macro-level studies since
they cannot identify the causal mechanisms by which policy affects fertility (Neyer
and Andersson 2008). We are interested in the effects of policy changes involving
one or more of maternity, paternity, and parental leave. Changes can either be in
increasing, decreasing, or restructuring leave. Since the state is the policy-maker
of interest, we are not interested in the effects of firm-specific policies on fertility.
Furthermore, since we aim to collect evidence to inform policy in low-fertility
countries, we are only interested in finding studies of policies implemented in
countries with a TFR below 2. We apply this restriction because we want the
included studies to have external validity in terms of taking place in settings
that are comparable to other countries with low fertility (Shadish et al. 2002).
Countries and time periods that are eligible for inclusion are specified in the
protocol. In terms of fertility, we are interested primarily in quantum effects
3Alternatively, Lalive and Zweimüller’s total effect (for women at parities of one or more)
can be regarded as an underestimate, or lower bound, on the total effect (for women at parities
of zero or more).
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rather than tempo effects. We exclude articles that purely consider policy effects
on birth timing or seasonality.
We only include studies with strong designs that can plausibly provide evi-
dence of a causal relationship between leave changes and fertility. These study de-
signs are: randomised control trials (RCTs), quasi-experimental designs, and nat-
ural experiments, which can all provide evidence of a causal relationship through
specifying appropriate means of estimating counterfactual situations. These de-
signs therefore have a higher degree of internal validity than purely correlational
or observational studies (Shadish et al. 2002). A key element in identifying a
cause is establishing that the cause occurred before the effect, and so we are in-
terested only in the effects of leave policy changes on fertility, rather than any
relationship between existing leave policies and fertility.
Finally, we only consider studies that evaluate the effect of leave availability
on fertility, rather than studies that evaluate the effects of leave uptake or use
on fertility. This decision is motivated by the Cochrane Collaboration’s advice
that evaluating “intention-to-treat” (ITT) effects tends to result in less biased
outcomes than “per-protocol” effects (Higgins and Green 2008). Since parents
self-select into using leave, parents who use leave are likely to differ systematically
from those who do not, meaning that the causal effect of leave on fertility cannot
be identified (Lappegård 2010). Moreover, the availability of leave can motivate
parents to conceive even if they do not take leave after childbirth. This means
that only examining leave use cannot capture the full effect of the policy on
fertility, which is of most interest to policy-makers looking to increase fertility.
4.3.2 Search strategy and filtering process
A flowchart illustrating our search and filtering process is given in Figure 4.1.
The search process was divided into searching academic databases, searching grey
literature sources, hand-searching relevant journals, and snowball searching using
the references and citations of included articles. Filtering of included articles was
done on the basis of titles, then abstracts, then full texts. Appendix B.3 details
the search procedure for one database, “Academic Search Complete.”
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Figure 4.1: The literature searching and filtering process.
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4.3.3 Assessing study quality
To assess study quality we used the ROBINS-I tool for assessing Risk of Bias
(RoB) in non-randomised studies (Sterne et al. 2016). ROBINS-I is applied sepa-
rately to each study in the review, and works by comparing the (non-randomised)
study to a hypothetical, idealised RCT, in which there would be no RoB. Using
ROBINS-I involves answering a series of signalling questions on characteristics
of each study, across seven domains of bias: confounding, selection bias, mis-
classification bias, performance bias, bias from missing data, detection bias, and
outcome reporting bias (these domains are explained more fully in Appendix B.4).
The answers to the signalling questions are used to generate an overall classifi-
cation of the study’s RoB, ranging from “low risk of bias” (where the study is
considered to be comparable to a well-performed RCT), to “critical risk of bias”
(where the study is too problematic to provide any useful evidence, and should
not be included in the synthesis). The signalling questions for each domain are
determined by whether the study aims to measure the effect of “assignment to
intervention,” or the effect of “assignment and adherence to intervention.”
4.3.4 Method of synthesis
Due to the many dimensions of difference between leave policies, it would be
inappropriate to attempt any kind of statistical meta-analysis of the study results.
Instead, we conducted a narrative review of included studies, using the Economic
and Social Research Council’s (ESRC) “Guidance on the Conduct of Narrative
Synthesis in Systematic Reviews” document (Popay et al. 2006).
4.4 Results
This section provides an overview of the 11 papers and 23 studies from our search,
and shows their results to be mixed. But, we reveal that there is a key underlying
reason for the apparently mixed evidence. To this end, we develop a new concep-
tual framework for understanding the different fertility effects identified by the
studies. We use this framework to classify the 23 studies, and then evaluate their
RoB. Finally we synthesise the results.
4.4.1 Overview
The search and filtering process – with the number of articles removed at each
stage – is summarised in Figure 4.1. We separately searched for articles in both
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the academic and grey literature. We first scanned the academic literature, re-
turning 5,470 results; after removing duplicates, 2,996 remained. Filtering based
on title and abstract reduced these to 51 papers. After careful reading of the full
text, this sample was further reduced to 7 papers. Secondly, we swept the grey
literature returning 528 results. Filtering based on title and abstract reduced
these to 3 results, and after reading the full texts 2 articles were preserved for
the final analysis. We also conduced hand searches of relevant journals, but this
returned no new results. We then conducted a snowball search of references and
citations, which returned 2 further results. Thus 11 was the final number of arti-
cles included for analysis. The articles were: Ang 2015; Cannonier 2014; Carneiro
et al. 2015; Cools et al. 2015; Cygan-Rehm 2016; Dahl et al. 2013; Duvander et
al. 2016; Farré and González 2019; Hart et al. 2019; Lalive and Zweimüller 2009;
Raute 2019.
Table 4.1 summarises key information on the 11 papers and 23 studies, includ-
ing author names and publication year, year of the reform, country, type of leave,
sample size, dependent variable, and effect found. The focus of the studies varies
slightly. Two studies evaluated maternity leave; one study evaluated paternity
leave; and 19 studies evaluated parental leave –although these policy changes dif-
fered in whether they affected mothers or fathers in practice. One study evaluates
a reform that included all three of parental, paternity and maternity leave. The
studies cover 7 countries across Western Europe and North America. The vast
majority of studies evaluate reforms implemented in the 1990s and 2000s, with
only three studies evaluating reforms before 1990. The length of follow-up varies
widely, from 2 years to 30 years.
Eight studies found a positive effect of leave on fertility, one found a negative
effect, and 14 found no evidence of an effect. It therefore would seem like the
evidence on the effect of leave on fertility is mixed. However, Table 4.1 does not
indicate which type of effect –current-child or future-child –each study identified.
The reason for this is that some of the included studies measure effects that











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































4.4.2 Effects of leave on fertility: conceptualisation and
identification
We now develop a formal conceptual framework to assess the effect of leave on
fertility, building on Lalive and Zweimüller (2009). Section 4.4.2.1 extends their
terminology to include effects on individuals at all parities, Section 4.4.2.2 ex-
plains the empirical strategies used to identify each effect, and Section 4.4.2.3
classifies the 23 studies in terms of our framework.
4.4.2.1 Types of effects of leave on fertility
As discussed in Section 4.2, Lalive and Zweimüller argue that the total effect of
the leave policy on fertility is the sum of the current-child effect and the future-
child effect. However, since their analytical sample only consisted of women who
have already had at least one child, they could not identify the effect of the policy
on women at parity 0. For the purposes of this review, we use the term “future-
child effect (parity 1+)” in the sense that Lalive and Zweimüller use “future-child
effect,” to mean an effect on women at parities of 1 or higher. In order to explain
studies that evaluate the effect on women at parity 0, we introduce the term
“future-child effect (parity 0)” to mean the effect of the policy on women who
have not had any children. We use the term “total effect (parity 1+)” to mean
the total effect identified by Lalive and Zweimüller, and “total effect” to mean the
sum of all these effects across the population, as displayed in Figure 4.2 below.
We contend that pro-natal policy-makers are more interested in the future-
child effect and the total effect, than they are in the current-child effect. In the
language of experimental design, the future-child effect and the total effect have
high “construct validity,” and the current-child effect has low construct validity
(Shadish et al. 2002). “Construct validity” refers to whether the specific features
of an experiment validly capture the underlying concepts, or “target constructs”
(ibid.). When designing a leave policy for pro-natal purposes, policy-makers have
some concept of “the effect of leave on fertility.” We contend that policy-makers
have one of two conceptualisations of this concept: either “the effect of the avail-
ability of leave – for a yet unborn child – on the decision of an individual to have
that child,” or “the overall effect of leave on the fertility of women across the popu-
lation.” These two conceptualisations clearly correspond to the future-child effect
and the total effect. We therefore judge studies identifying the future-child effect
or the total effect to have high construct validity, because these studies validly
represent the target construct of “the effect of leave on fertility.” By contrast,
the current-child effect would correspond to the conceptualisation, “the effect of
leave on someone who has just had a child, on their subsequent childbearing.” We
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Figure 4.2: Types of effect of a leave policy on fertility, by parity.
Notes: The two columns correspond to the current-child effect and the future-child effect.
The rows correspond to the parity of the parent. The blue, red, and green oblongs represent
the current-child effect (parity 1+), the total effect (parity 1), and the total effect respectively.
contend that this conceptualisation is not what pro-natal policy-makers mean by
“the effect of leave on fertility,” and so we judge the current-child effect to have
low construct validity. For the remainder of this review, we will divide studies
into two categories: current-child effect, and future-child and total effect. Since
our objective is to inform pro-natal policy-making, we will give greater weight to
future-child and total effect studies.
4.4.2.2 Study designs and identification strategies
The current-child effect can be identified by comparing those giving birth in the
weeks or months before the reform, with those giving birth in the weeks or months
after the reform. Since these two groups differ in terms of their leave entitlements
for the child they just had –and will have the same entitlements for any future
child –the current-child effect can be identified by comparing their subsequent
fertility over the next several years. Such a study design attempts to approxi-
mate a randomised study by arguing that women giving birth shortly before and
after the reform are likely to be otherwise similar, meaning that other variables
are controlled for. Such a study design is a type of regression discontinuity de-
sign (RDD). We define this study design as the “short before-after” design, and
illustrate how it works in Figure 4.3(a).
The short before-after design typically requires large administrative datasets,
since survey data typically will only have very few women giving birth in the
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Figure 4.3: Study designs for evaluating the effects of leave on fertility.
Notes: Long check marks on the horizontal axis indicate years, and short check marks indicate
half-years. Solid horizontal lines indicate data on births being collected at that time, and dashed
horizontal lines indicate that data on births occurring at that time will be collected later.
short periods before and after the reform. Since both groups have access to the
new policy after the reform, the short before-after design cannot identify the
future-child effect (parity 1+). Furthermore, the short before-after design cannot
identify the future-child effect (parity 0), since the analytical sample is restricted
to women who have had at least one child.
To identify the future-child effect (for any parity), an alternative study design
is required. Lalive and Zweimüller aim to identify the future-child effect (parity
1+) by comparing women who gave birth a month before the reform, with women
who gave birth in the same month 3 years before. Both cohorts are therefore
entitled to the old policy for the child they have just had, but will have different
entitlements if they have another child within the next 3 years. The future-child
effect (parity 1+) can then be identified by comparing the fertility of the two
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cohorts at the end of their respective three year periods. We define this design
as the “long before” study design, and illustrate it in Figure 4.3(b). A major
problem with the long before identification strategy is that it assumes there are no
systematic differences (that are important for fertility) between the two cohorts.
This is a strong assumption: in order for it to be valid, there would have to be
no effect of long-term trends in childbearing behaviour. Consequently, estimates
for the future-child effect (parity 1+) under this strategy are at risk of bias.
The long before design cannot identify the future-child effect (parity 0) for
the same reason that it cannot be identified in the short before-after design:
in order to be included in the analytical sample, individuals must have had at
least one child. Consequently, neither design can estimate the total effect. In
order to estimate the total effect, a case-control study design is required. This
means that the new leave policy only becomes available to some women (the case
group, who receive the “treatment” of the policy) and not others (the control
group, who do not receive treatment). The total effect can then be estimated
by comparing the post-reform fertility of the case group and the control group.
In a randomised study, individuals would be assigned to treatment randomly;
however, this is rarely the case with policy changes, and not the case for any of the
studies in this review. In the three case-control studies included in this review,
individuals are allocated to treatment by either region, employment status, or
income. These studies are problematic in the sense that there are usually pre-
existing systematic differences between the case group and the control group,
differences which are correlated with either region, employment status, or income.
However, a difference-in-differences (DID) approach enables one to approximately
control for these differences. We therefore use the term “case-control DID” to refer
to this type of study design. A possible implementation of the case-control DID
design is illustrated in Figure 4.3(c), using panel data.
While it is possible to identify the total effect using a case-control DID design,
the precise effect identified in any given model depend on the sample restrictions
imposed by the analyst. For example, in one of the case-control DID models
used by Cannonier (2014), the analytical sample is restricted to women who
had never given birth at time t0–4. The outcome variable is a binary indicator,
indicating whether the individual had at least one birth between t0–4 and t0+17.
This method therefore identifies the future-child effect (parity 0). By contrast, in
Cannonier’s second model, the analytical sample is restricted to women who had
had exactly one birth at time t0–4. The outcome variable is a binary indicator,
indicating whether the individual had at least one more birth between t0–4 and
t0 + 17, and so this model identifies the total effect (parity 1).
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4.4.2.3 Categorisation of the studies in the review
Table 4.2 categorises the 23 studies in terms of their study design and the policy
effects they identify, and also indicates the sign of the relationship between leave
and fertility (final column). Table 4.2 shows that all 6 studies identifying either
the future-child effect or a total effect report positive results, whereas the 17
studies that identify the current-child effect report a mixture of negative, null, and














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































We applied the ROBINS-I questionnaire to assess risk of bias (RoB) for all 23
studies. We present our results separately for the current-child effect studies, and
for the total effect and future-child effect studies. Before we present our results
in Sections 4.4.3.2 and 4.4.3.3, Section 4.4.3.1 explains ROBINS-I in detail, and
discusses three considerations that were important for how we adapted ROBINS-
I.
4.4.3.1 Application of ROBINS-I
ROBINS-I is a tool developed by medical researchers, intended to be used to
evaluate RoB in non-randomised studies of medical interventions (Sterne et al.
2016). This review evaluates the effects of a public policy rather than the effects
of a medical intervention, and so special considerations needed to be addressed
in order to ensure that ROBINS-I can be applied meaningfully. Public policies
differ from medical interventions in terms of their coverage (groups rather than
individuals), their causal channels (social rather than biological), and their de-
livery (administered by state administrators rather than medical professionals).
We adapted ROBINS-I by accounting for three special considerations specific to
studies of the effect of leave on fertility. We show that ROBINS-I cannot be
meaningfully applied without taking these considerations into account, and de-
scribe how we account for them. We account for these considerations by altering
the meaning and interpretation of the existing bias domains in ROBINS-I.
The first consideration concerns detection bias, and applies to all 23 studies
in this review. Detection bias concerns whether a patient in a medical trial is
aware that they are receiving the treatment of interest (as opposed to a placebo).
Detection bias cannot be controlled for in the studies of the effect of leave on fer-
tility, since everyone receiving parental leave is fully aware that they are receiving
parental leave (there is no way of having a placebo for parental leave). We con-
tend that it is inappropriate to compare a non-randomised study of the effect of
leave on fertility to a hypothetical, well-conducted RCT in which participants are
unaware of their treatment status (as instructed by ROBINS-I). This comparison
would be inappropriate since detection bias in studies of leave on fertility cannot
realistically be controlled for. Instead, we compare the studies in this review to a
hypothetical RCT in which participants are aware of their treatment status, and
classify all studies as being at low risk of detection bias.
The second consideration concerns the classification of studies as either “as-
signment to treatment” studies or “assignment and adherence to treatment” stud-
ies, which is done before evaluating the seven domains of bias. This consideration
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applies to the four case-control DID studies in this review. As indicated in Sec-
tion 4.3.1 our review focusses on the effect of leave availability on fertility, rather
than the effect of leave use on fertility, and classifies studies of leave availability
as “intention to treat” (ITT) (or “assignment to treatment”) studies. The prob-
lem is that ROBINS-I does not ask questions about time-varying confounding for
ITT studies. Time-varying confounding occurs when an intervention can change
after the beginning of the study, which risks biasing effects since participants may
transition between case and control groups. ROBINS-I does not ask questions
about time-varying confounding because individuals in medical ITT studies can-
not change their assignment status: assignment is determined by whether or not
the doctor prescribes the treatment, and cannot change after the experiment has
begun. In the case of parental leave policies however, individuals in the control
group can change their assignment status by moving into locations or occupations
with more generous entitlements under a new policy (Hong and Sullivan 2016;
Nakajima and Tanaka 2014). Such self-selection would risk biasing effect sizes
upward, because individuals who might have had children anyway would be sort-
ing themselves into the treatment group. To address this problem, we classified
all studies as ITT, but including the potential for time-varying confounding in
the list of baseline confounding factors (Domain 1).4
The third consideration arises from the distinction between policy “availabil-
ity” and policy “eligibility”. We define an individual as “eligible” for a leave
policy if they meet all the criteria necessary to claim entitlements under that
policy. We define an individual as having a policy “available” to them if they are
either eligible, or if they could become eligible by moving to a different region or
entering the workforce. We contend that the effect of policy eligibility is of more
interest to policy-makers than the effect of policy availability, since those who are
eligible for the policy are the most likely to be affected. In our review, 2 studies
evaluated policy availability and 21 studies evaluated policy eligibility. For the
application of ROBINS-I, studies of policy availability were assumed to be seek-
ing to estimate the effect of policy eligibility on fertility and therefore to have an
additional source of RoB. This additional RoB arises from including individuals
who are not eligible for the policy in the “treated” group. Since individuals who
are not eligible for the policy are less likely to be affected by the policy than in-
dividuals who are eligible, we expect this additional source of RoB to risk biasing
study findings towards null. We thus expect studies of leave availability to be
4Short before-after studies and long before studies are not at risk of time-varying confound-
ing. In the short before-after design, participants cannot change the fact that they had a birth
shortly before or after the reform, so they cannot transition between treatment groups. In the
long before design, the case and control groups do not overlap in time, so participants cannot
transition between treatment groups.
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biased towards not finding any effect, compared with studies of leave eligibility.
We accounted for this RoB in Domain 5 (missing data).
4.4.3.2 Current-child effect studies
We identified four major potential sources of RoB in the current-child effect stud-
ies. Three are specific to the short before-after study design, and are accounted
for by ROBINS-I in Domain 1 (confounding). The fourth is common to all three
study designs, and is accounted for in Domain 4 (selection bias).
The first confounding factor is “strategic conception,” arising from the fact
that if couples know the date of the policy implementation, they can potentially
time their conception (and their birth) so that they are eligible for a more generous
leave policy. The second confounding factor is “strategic delivery,” arising from
couples altering the specific day of birth of their child by either bringing forward
delivery (e.g. through a caesarean section) or delaying delivery (e.g. through
postponing a caesarean section). Strategic conceptions and strategic deliveries
may confound study findings because those who are aware of the additional bene-
fits may differ in systematic ways from those who are not aware (e.g. being more
educated or having higher incomes). The third confounding factor arises from
potential systematic differences between the treatment and control group due to
the distribution of births across the seasons. For example, higher-earning couples
could time their births around the start of the school year in September, since
that would mean their child would have had an extra year of cognitive develop-
ment compared with their year-group peers that were born in August. We term
this confounding factor “birth seasonality.”
The fourth potential source of RoB, labelled “other policies,” is found in all
three study designs. It arises from the simultaneous implementation of additional
family policies influencing fertility, benefitting only the treated group. That is, if
those giving birth after the reform are eligible for new leave benefits and also for
benefits from another new policy (e.g. subsidised childcare), then identification
of the effect of the leave policy on fertility will be threatened. This is because
there will be two ways in which the case and control groups differ. We account
for this RoB in Domain 4 (selection bias).
Figure 4.4 reports the results of running ROBINS-I on the 17 current-child
effect studies. All studies were at a low risk of bias in Domains 2-4, 6 and 7, but
had higher risks of bias in Domain 1 (confounds) and Domain 5 (missing data).
Domain 1 accounts for strategic conceptions, strategic deliveries and birth sea-
sonality. Studies with lower RoB were able to demonstrate that each confound
either was not a problem, or was controlled for. Two studies (Farre 2007 CC1+
and Lalive 1996 CC1) were evaluated at critical RoB in Domain 1, because the
82
studies did not address the risk of strategic conceptions, birth seasonality, or co-
variate imbalance. All studies were at low RoB in Domain 2 (selection bias), Do-
main 3 (misclassification bias), and Domain 4 (selection bias), because all studies
demonstrated: that their analytical samples were representative of the population
exposed to the policy; that study participants were correctly classified; and, that
there was no simultaneous introduction of additional family policies. For Do-
main 5, 14 studies did not directly observe policy eligibility, and instead imputed
eligibility from observed variables such as employment history (e.g. Cools 1993
CC1+). Stronger studies mitigated the fact that eligibility was unobserved by
demonstrating that their findings were robust to alternative strategies for imput-
ing eligibility. One study (Farre 2007 CC1+) focussed on policy availability, and
so was evaluated as being at serious RoB in Domain 5. All studies were evalu-
ated as being at low RoB in Domain 6 because all individuals eligible for a policy
are aware that they are eligible, as discussed in the previous section. Lastly,
all studies were at low RoB in Domain 7 (outcome reporting bias), because all
studies demonstrated their findings to be robust across a range of different model
specifications.
Overall, three studies were at low RoB, one study was at moderate RoB, 11
studies were at serious RoB, and two studies were at critical RoB. As recom-
mended by ROBINS-I, we omit the two studies at critical RoB from our synthe-
sis. We thus include 15 studies in our synthesis, giving greater weight to studies
displaying low and moderate RoB studies.
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Figure 4.4: ROBINS-I evaluations of included studies.
Notes: Study references are the same as those in the “Study key” column of Table 4.2. Figure
adapted from visualisations produced by the R package “robvis” (McGuinness and Higgins
2020).
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4.4.3.3 Future-child effect and total effect studies
We identified two potential sources of bias for the future-child effect and total
effect studies, one of which applies to the case-control DID study design, and
one of which applies to the long before study design. The case-control DID
study design is at risk of time-varying confounding, due to the potential for
study participants to transition between treatment and control groups after the
policy is implemented. We accounted for time-varying confounding in Domain 1
(confounding). The long before study design is also at RoB due to potential long-
term trends in fertility and the socioeconomic predictors of fertility. Individuals
in the control and treatment groups will have lived through periods of different
aggregate fertility, macroeconomic circumstances, and historical events, which
may have influenced their fertility choices. This source of RoB is included in
Domain 1 (confounding). Both the case-control DID study design and the long
before study design are also at RoB due to “other policies.”
Of the six studies, four used a case-control DID design and two used a long
before design. One of the case-control DID studies (Ang 2006 T0+) evaluated
the effect of policy availability, and the five other studies evaluated the effect of
policy eligibility. As for the current-child effect studies, Domains 1 and 5 were
problematic (see Figure 4.4), with all studies reporting moderate or serious RoB
in Domain 1 and four studies reporting moderate RoB in Domain 5.
In Domain 1, the two long before studies (Lalive 1990 FC1 and Lalive 1996
FC1) did not offer evidence that findings were unaffected by long-term trends,
and were therefore judged as being at serious risk of bias. The case-control DID
study Ang 2006 T0+ was judged to be at serious RoB as it did not control for
couples migrating into the region where the new leave policy was introduced.
The two case-control DID studies in Cannonier (2014) were evaluated as being
at moderate RoB in Domain 1, because while individuals may have self-selected
into eligible jobs after the reform, the author provides some evidence to suggest
that such self-selection was unlikely to have occurred. In Raute 2007 T0+, the
author did not control for self-sorting of individuals who wanted children into the
higher-income category. However, since individuals would want to attain higher
incomes anyway – and the new policy entitlements may not have provided enough
of an extra incentive for individuals to try and increase their income – we judged
the RoB in Domain 1 to be moderate, rather than serious. In Domains 2 to 4
all studies were at low RoB, because they demonstrated that their samples were
representative, that participants were correctly classified, and that there were no
other family policies introduced at the same time.
In Domain 5, the studies in Lalive and Zweimuller (2009) and Cannonier
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(2014) were evaluated as being at moderate RoB because eligibility was not di-
rectly observed, and was imputed instead. However, study findings were robust
to alternative imputation strategies for eligibility, and so these four studies were
judged to be at moderate RoB. Ang 2006 T0+ was judged to be at serious RoB
in Domain 5 because the study evaluated leave availability rather than eligibility.
Raute 2007 T0+ was judged to be at low RoB in Domain 5 because eligibility
was directly observed. All studies were classified as being at low RoB in Domain
6 because all participants were aware of whether they were or were not eligible
for the policy. All studies were classified as being at low RoB in Domain 7, since
a range of alternative models with comparable results were reported. Overall,
three studies were at serious RoB, and three studies were at moderate RoB. We
therefore include all six studies in our synthesis, giving greater weight to the
studies at moderate RoB.
4.4.4 Synthesis of results
4.4.4.1 Current-child effect studies
Almost none of the current-child effect studies found a significant impact of leave
on fertility. Out of the 17 current-child effect studies that were evaluated for RoB,
two were judged to be at critical RoB overall and are therefore excluded from
the synthesis. Two of the 15 remaining studies reported a positive relationship
between leave and fertility, and 13 reported no significant relationship. The two
studies that found positive results were Dahl 1992 CC1+ and Lalive 1990 CC1,
both of which were judged to be at serious overall RoB. Of the 13 studies reporting
no significant relationship, three were at low RoB, one was at moderate RoB, and
nine were at serious RoB. Dahl 1992 CC1+ found that post-reform mothers had
0.042 more children after 14 years, a finding that was significant at the 10% level.
In contrast, Lalive 1990 CC1 found that post-reform mothers were 3.5 percentage
points likelier to have a birth up to ten years after the reform, a finding that was
significant at the 1% level. In this way, the finding of Dahl 1992 CC1+ is very
small and possibly only significant due to sampling error, whereas the finding of
Lalive 1990 CC1 is much larger and more clearly significant. All of the current-
child effect studies are from Northern and Western Europe: 11 are from Norway,
two are from Sweden, one is from Germany, and one is from Austria. Case
studies from Norway might appear to dominate our findings; however, excluding
the Norwegian studies does not affect our conclusions, since three of the four
non-Norwegian studies report null results.
Increases in entitlements under a new leave policy can be conceptualised in
terms of whether the policy provides a lot more money or length of leave (i.e.
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absolute generosity), and in terms of whether the entitlement increases are large
relative to the pre-reform entitlements (i.e. relative generosity). The reform of
Lalive 1990 CC1 was both absolutely and relatively generous, doubling the length
of leave from 12 months to 24 months and remaining at a flat rate of 340 Euros a
month. Moreover, the reform entitled women to automatically renew their leave
period if they had another birth within 27.5 months of the previous birth (rather
than 15.5 months for pre-reform mothers). The renewal entitlement created a
strong incentive for post-reform mothers to have another birth quickly relative to
pre-reform mothers (a “speed premium”), since it is biologically feasible to have a
birth within 27.5 months of a previous birth, but not feasible within 15.5 months.
In contrast, the reform of Dahl 1992 CC1+ was neither absolutely generous nor
relative generous. The duration of leave only increased by 3 weeks, from 32 weeks
to 35 weeks, and the weekly remuneration rate remained the same.
For 12 of the studies that reported no significant relationship between leave
and fertility, increases in leave tended to be between 2-8 weeks with no increase
in the rate of remuneration, so the absolute generosity was low. The relative
generosity of the reforms in these studies was also low, since all the pre-reform
leave duration was at least 18 weeks. The 13th study with null findings evaluated
a moderately generous reform (Carneiro 1977 CC1+), in which maternity leave
increased from 12 weeks unpaid to 18 weeks at 100% income replacement, plus
1 year unpaid. None of the null effect studies evaluated reforms that introduced
speed premiums as in Lalive 1990 CC1. Overall, it seems that generous new
entitlements and speed premiums are preconditions for a leave policy having a
current-child effect on fertility. However, there is only one study that meets these
preconditions, and so we cannot conclude that generous entitlement increases and
speed premiums are sufficient for the current-child effect to operate.
4.4.4.2 Future-child effect and total effect studies
All six studies that evaluate either the future-child effect or the total effect find a
positive causal impact of leave on fertility. However, we omit one of these studies
from the synthesis – Lalive 1996 FC1 – since the authors do not report numerical
results for that study.5 Of the five remaining studies, Ang 2006 T0+, Cannonier
1993 T1 and Raute 2007 T0+ use a case-control DID design to evaluate a total
effect; Cannonier 1993 FC0 uses a case-control design to evaluate a future-child
effect; and Lalive 1990 FC1 uses a long before design to evaluate a future-child
effect. Ang 2006 T0+ and Lalive 1996 FC1 were judged to be at serious RoB,
and the other three studies were judged to be at moderate RoB. In terms of effect
5The only mention of the results of Lalive 1996 FC1 in Lalive and Zweimüller (2009) is in
footnote 32, page 1399.
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sizes, Ang 2006 T0+ finds that women benefitting from the reform were 23.53%
likelier to have a birth, a finding which is significant at the 1% level. Similarly,
Raute 2007 T0+ finds that women benefitting from the reform are 16% likelier
to have a birth, a finding which is also significant at the 1% level. Ang 2006 T0+
and Raute 2007 T0+ are the only studies that evaluate the total effect of a leave
policy on women at all parities, and therefore provide the best evidence of the
impact of leave policies on the aggregate fertility of beneficiaries. The two studies
in Cannonier (2014) find the 1993 FMLA reform in the US to make women 5.19
percentage points likelier to have a first birth, and 2.96 percentage points likelier
to have a second birth, which are significant at the 5% and 10% level respectively.
Similarly, Lalive 1990 FC1 finds women 6.8 percentage points likelier to have a
second birth, which is significant at the 5% level. The effect sizes found in these
five studies are all quite large, suggesting that leave policies can potentially have
a large impact on increasing fertility. In terms of their geographical coverage, 2
studies are from the US, 1 study is from Canada, 1 from Germany, and 1 from
Austria.
All five of the future-child effect or total effect studies evaluate reforms that
were either absolutely generous or relatively generous. For both of the two total
effect parity 0+ studies, the increase in maximum total benefits over the leave
period was roughly $20,000 USD. As discussed in the previous section, the 1990
Austrian parental leave reform in Lalive 1990 FC1 doubled the duration of leave
from 12 months to 24 months, and kept the same rate of remuneration. The
1993 FMLA reform evaluated by Cannonier (2014) was not absolutely generous,
in that it only granted eligible women 12 weeks of unpaid leave. However, prior
to the FMLA women did not have any statutory leave entitlements, and so the
FMLA represented a large relative increase. Since all five studies evaluate reforms
that provided generous increases in benefits, we cannot establish whether an
ungenerous policy would also impact fertility through the future-child or total
effect. Generosity may be sufficient but not necessary for a policy to impact
fertility; alternatively, generosity may be both sufficient and necessary. However,
we can conclude that – at a minimum – generosity is sufficient for a new leave
policy to increase fertility.
4.5 Discussion
In this section we discuss the implications of our findings for policy and the aca-
demic literature and the contribution of our conceptual, methodological and RoB
analyses for future research, before identifying some limitations of our review.
Our findings suggest that leave policies are a viable strategy for governments
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seeking to increase fertility in low-fertility settings. Moreover, leave policies can
be a cost-effective strategy for increasing fertility, compared with other pro-natal
policies. When policy-makers discuss the effect of leave on fertility, generally they
are referring to either the future-child effect or the total effect – i.e. the extra
incentive given to individuals to choose to have a child. The current-child effect is
of marginal interest, and it seems that it is overrepresented in the literature since
it may be easier to identify empirically. In terms of the academic literature, our
analysis and findings might explain why commentators have heretofore evaluated
the evidence as “mixed.” When treated as an undifferentiated whole, it does
seem that the evidence is indeed mixed. However by filtering out studies of the
current-child effect from studies of the future-child effect or total effect – and
by arguing that the future-child and total effects are the effects important for
policy-makers wanting to increase aggregate fertility – we have demonstrated that
the evidence for the effect of leave on fertility is entirely supportive. However,
a central limitation of this core empirical finding is that our results cannot be
generalised to East Asian settings. Since our study only included empirical studies
from countries in Europe and North America, it would be problematic to try and
transport those findings to settings with very different welfare systems (Esping-
Andersen and Billari 2015).
The conceptual, methodological, and RoB sections of this review provide a
clear and logical framework for conducting, classifying, and evaluating studies
of the effect of leave on fertility. The bifurcation of studies as identifying either
the current-child or future-child effect separates studies into two fundamentally
different types, meaning that studies evaluating different types of effects cannot
be directly compared. Furthermore, our framework classifies studies in terms of
the parity of the individuals they analyse. For future empirical research, this
framework will enable researchers to better conceptualise and understand the
precise effects identified by their studies. This conceptual framework has been
developed in order to categorise studies of the effect of leave on fertility, but
it could be used to analyse the effects of other pro-natal policies on fertility.
Moreover, the study designs associated with evaluating these effects – the short
before-after design, the long before design, and the case-control DID design –
could also be used for to evaluate the effects of other pro-natal policies.
In terms of RoB, we hope that our analysis in Section 4.4.3 could provide the
foundations for a custom-built tool for assessing RoB in studies of public policy
evaluations. Historically, systematic review methods in social science have been
adapted from pre-existing methods in medical research, and we hope that our
analysis will be used in this tradition. Our application of ROBINS-I also shows
that case-control DID studies of eligibility are generally at lower RoB than long
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before studies or studies of leave availability, suggesting that researchers should
choose to use case-control DID evaluations of eligibility where possible.
There are three considerations that may limit the applicability of our findings
to other settings. Firstly, the number of studies of the future-child effect or the
total effect are quite small, meaning that it is difficult to establish the relative
importance of leave generosity. Specifically, all five studies evaluate generous
reforms, and so we cannot know whether ungenerous entitlement increases would
affect fertility. Secondly, two of the future-child and total effect studies evaluate
reforms that were implemented in the recent past (2006 and 2007), and so whether
these reforms will have an impact on completed fertility remains to be seen.
Lastly, the geographical coverage of these studies is limited to Northern and
Western Europe, and North America. This means that generalising these findings
to other low-fertility settings (such as Southern Europe, Eastern Europe, and East
Asia) may not be appropriate.
4.6 Conclusion
In this review, we sought to examine what the best available evidence showed
about the effect of leave on fertility. Our motivation was that fertility is very
low in many countries and declining in many more, that national governments
devote large resources to increase fertility through family policies, and that most
academic commentators argue that the evidence for the effect of leave on fertility
is mixed. In conducting the review, we followed a review protocol written prior
to searching the literature, focussed only on primary empirical studies with ex-
perimental and quasi-experimental designs, and evaluated the quality of studies
using the ROBINS-I framework.
We identified 23 studies which examined the impact of leave policies on fertil-
ity. In order to understand the seemingly contradictory findings of these studies,
we developed a new conceptual framework that enabled us to categorise the stud-
ies based on the effects identified, the parity of study participants, and the study
designs used to identify effects. This categorisation demonstrated that all of the
studies with null or negative findings were only identifying a narrow type of ef-
fect of leave on fertility (the current-child effect), an effect which accounts for
only a small part of the total effect and is not of interest to policy-makers. Our
categorisation also demonstrated that studies identifying a more complete effect
(either the future-child effect or the total effect) all had positive and significant
findings. Moreover, the effect sizes found in these studies were large, with the
probability of a next birth increased by as much as 24%. We therefore reject the
contention that the evidence for the effect of leave on fertility is mixed. Rather,
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we find that the apparently mixed evidence is simply an artefact of sub-optimal
study design. Our results contribute to our understanding of the effect of leave
on fertility by showing that different study designs can only identify certain types
of effects, and by showing leave can significantly increase fertility when increases
in benefits are generous. However, these conclusions must only be limited to





Paper 3 – Limited Impact of the
Parental Leave Allowance on Fertility in
Taiwan
Taiwan has experienced lowest-low fertility since 2003. The 2009 Parental Leave
Allowance (PLA) has been the most generous pro-natal policy, dispersing $2.5 bil-
lion USD since its inception to women working in the public and private sectors.
Whether the PLA affected childbearing remains an open question. Our objec-
tive is to empirically assess the causal impact of the PLA on fertility. We use
difference-in-differences (DID) multilevel logistic regression models on repeated
cross-sectional data from 2003 to 2016. We identify the likelihood of our treat-
ment group of PLA-eligible women before and after 2009 transitioning to a next
birth, compared with a control group of PLA-ineligible women before and after
2009. The PLA had no effect on the fertility of women that were always working,
but may have increased transitions from first to second births for women who had
been in and out of work since marriage. However, this latter result is not robust
to alternative specifications. This evidence suggests that parental leave may not
be a cost-effective means for increasing fertility in Taiwan or other low fertility
countries in East Asia. This study is the first to evaluate the causal effects of
pro-natal policies on fertility in East Asian countries.
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5.1 Introduction
Low fertility is a major problem in many contemporary developed societies. At
the level of the society, long-term low fertility leads to population ageing, a smaller
workforce, negative population momentum, and ultimately population decline
(Bloom et al. 2010; Caldwell et al. 2002; McDonald 2008). At the individual level
low fertility often indicates individuals having fewer children than they desire, and
so presents a problem for life satisfaction and emotional well-being (Beaujouan
and Berghammer 2019; Casterline and Han 2017; Chen and Yip 2017). Low
fertility is particularly acute in Taiwan, which has experienced a Total Fertility
Rate (TFR) less than the “lowest-low” level of 1.3 births per woman since 2003
(HFD 2020). In 2010 Taiwan reported a record low TFR of 0.895, the lowest of
any major country in history.
Since the mid-2000s, the Taiwanese government has attempted to increase
fertility through pro-natal policies, both at the national and local levels (Chen
2012; Hsueh 2018). These policies have included parental leave, childcare sub-
sidies, and tax breaks for parents (ibid.). Coincidentally the Taiwanese TFR
increased from 0.895 in 2010 to 1.159 by 2014. Professor Hseuh Cherng-Tay1 (薛
承泰) attributed this increase to the pro-natal policies of the administration in
place at that time (HFD 2020; Hsueh 2018). However, to our knowledge there
has been no peer-reviewed empirical evidence assessing the effect of these poli-
cies on fertility.2 In their investigation of the impact of housework division on
fertility, Cheng and Hsu 2020 argue that pro-natal policies are likely to be most
effective when combined with financial aid packages, and when varied by the
education of recipients. This is because childbirth intentions were most sensitive
to childcare sharing for highly educated women, suggesting that the fertility of
these women would be more responsive to fathers taking more responsibility for
childcare – something which could be promoted by fathers taking leave. Con-
sequently it is difficult to establish what further pro-natal measures might help
increase Taiwanese fertility to sustainable levels.
The Parental Leave Allowance (PLA) – introduced in 2009 – has been the
most significant pro-natal policy, both in terms of cost and coverage (Yang 2019).
The PLA entitles workers to 6 months of parental leave at 60% of their pay, and
roughly $2.5 billion USD has been dispersed through the PLA, to 624k recipients.3
1Minister for population policy under the KMT administration of 2008-2012.
2There exists a blog post discussing the effect of pro-natal policies on fertility in Taiwan, by
Professor Wen-Shan Yang (楊文山) (Professor of Sociology, National Taipei University), but
there are no formal scientific studies (Yang 2019).
3Statistics on uptake of the PLA can be found on the Bureau of Labor Insurance website,
https://www.bli.gov.tw/.
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A recent systematic review by the present authors found that parental leave has
a consistently positive impact on fertility in Western European and North Amer-
ican countries; however, there currently exists no studies of the causal impact
of national parental leave policies on fertility in East Asia (Thomas et al. 2019).
It is therefore not known whether leave affects fertility in the same way in East
Asia, as in western countries.
In this study we aim to evaluate whether the PLA increased fertility in Tai-
wan, and explore any differences in effects on women at different parities. Our
systematic review found that a difference-in-differences (DID) study design is
best able to identify causal effects of a leave policy on fertility, among all quasi-
experimental study designs (Shadish et al. 2002; Thomas et al. 2019). Using
detailed survey data on Taiwanese women’s employment and fertility histories
from the Women’s Marriage, Fertility and Employment Survey (WMFES), we
apply a DID study design and identify the causal effect of the PLA on the fer-
tility of working wives. We compare fertility outcomes of working women (who
were eligible for the policy) with non-working women (who were not eligible),
before and after 2009.
This paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we discuss details of
the PLA programme before reviewing relevant theories and empirical evidence
of the effect of parental leave on fertility. Section 5.3 discusses the data source
used in our analysis before Section 5.4 describes the methods used to evaluate
the effect of the PLA. Section 5.5 presents the results. Section 5.6 discusses the




The PLA was created through an amendment to the Employment Insurance Act
(就業保險法) on the 31st of March 2009, and came into effect on the 1st of May
2009.4 The PLA entitles all workers participating in Employment Insurance (i.e.
private-sector workers) to receive 6 months of pay, at 60% of their average monthly
insurance salary for 6 months of leave. While Employment Insurance only applies
to private-sector workers, the PLA was also introduced for government workers at
the same time. Prior to 2009, parents had been entitled to 2 years leave without
4The legislative history of the Employment Insurance Act, the full text of the Act, and
associated legislation, can be found online on the “Legislative Yuan legal system” website (https:
//lis.ly.gov.tw/lglawc/lglawkm).
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pay. The PLA entitled workers to be paid for 6 months of that 2-year period.
The PLA can be taken by both parents at any time while a child is below the age
of 3. However, parents cannot take the PLA simultaneously. From 2009-2019,
$68.5 billion NTD has been disbursed through the PLA, about $2.5 billion USD.
There have been roughly 624k recipients, receiving an average of $4,000 USD over
a 6 month period.
5.2.2 Leave use versus leave eligibility
A key distinction is the use of parental leave versus being eligible for parental
leave. Here, we are interested in the effect of leave eligibility on fertility, rather
than the effect of leave use on fertility. Conceptually, this is because evaluating
the effect of leave use is problematic. Leave is only used after a women has a
child. Leave is used after giving birth, and leave use does not lead to a birth. It
is knowing that leave will be available after giving birth which may result in an
individual or family decision to give birth.
In experimental design terminology, we are evaluating an “intention to treat”
(ITT) effect. That means that we are interested in the effect of a policy being
available to an individual, regardless of whether they actually decide to take leave
and receive payment if they have a birth. We choose to evaluate the ITT effect
rather than the “per protocol” effect (i.e. the effect of using leave on fertility)
because there is less risk of bias in evaluating ITT effects (Higgins and Green
2008). Individuals may choose to have a child because they know the PLA is
available if they need it, but then not actually use it (and instead return to work)
after giving birth. This effect would be captured by an ITT study design, but
not by a per-protocol design.
5.2.3 The effect of leave on fertility
Parental leave can increase fertility by altering the economics of childbearing and
childrearing, by enabling mothers to remain in employment, and by altering the
gendered distribution of domestic labour (Becker 1973; Ermisch 2003; McDonald
2008). In economic terms, parental leave pays parents to care for their children,
labour which would have been unpaid of the absence of leave. For women who
want to remain in work, leave enables them to take time off work without losing
their job. Parental leave can also make childbearing more attractive for women if
their male partners will also take leave, and increase their participation in domes-
tic labour (Baum and Ruhm 2016; Pronzato 2009; Tamm 2019). The gendered
distribution of domestic labour has become a particularly salient contextual fea-
ture of childbearing in Taiwan (Raymo et al. 2015). Since 2016, the WMFES has
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started asking husbands (as well as wives) about their participation in domestic
labour.
In order to statistically identify effects of parental leave policies in a way that
is useful for policy-makers, it is important to adopt an appropriate study design.
The authors of this study conducted a systematic review into the effect of parental
leave on fertility, focusing only on quasi-experimental studies that could reliably
identify causal effects. We constructed a novel conceptual framework, which
classified studies in terms of whether they identified a “current-child effect,” a
“future-child effect,” or a total effect of a leave policy on fertility. The future-
child effect refers to the effect of a leave policy on couples’ decisions to have
a child, whereas the current-child effect refers to the effect of taking leave for
a child just born, on couples’ decisions to have another child. The total effect
is the sum of these two effects. The current-child effect is however of marginal
policy interest, but often the focus of empirical studies as it is easier to design
experiment for its statistical identification. By contrast, future-child effect studies
have a greater potential to inform pro-natal policy development, since they can
more accurately capture “the actual effect of leave on fertility.” When all the
findings from quasi-experimental studies based future-child effect and total effect
studies, the existing evidence consistently showed that leave increases fertility.
Yet, the number of final studies is small and focused on leave policies in Western
Europe and North America. Whether or not leave policies increase fertility in
other low-fertility regions – including East Asia – remains an open question.
5.3 Data
Next we first introduce our data source, and describe the employment information
used to identify the group of PLA-eligible women.
5.3.1 The WMFES
Our data source is the Women’s Marriage, Fertility and Employment Survey
(WMFES). The WMFES is a repeated cross-sectional survey, with each survey
comprising of a completely new set of individuals (i.e. the same individuals are not
followed over time). TheWMFES is conducted by the Taiwanese government, and
about 20,000 women aged 15 and over are interviewed in each survey. In this study
we use the last 5 surveys of the WMFES, conducted in 2003, 2006, 2010, 2013, and
2016. Key information for our purposes includes birth month and birth year for
up to 4 births (the first three births and the most recent birth), wife’s age at first
marriage, and details of employment before and after marriage and childbearing.
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The WMFES enables us to re-construct the respondent’s marriage, childbearing,
and employment histories. The WMFES does not include information on whether
the respondent has even taken parental leave. The use of the PLA is not observed.
We restrict our analytical sample to married women, because over 95% births in
Taiwan occur within marriages: only 3-4% of births are had by unmarried women
(Hsueh 2018). More specifically, we restricted our analysis to births had by women
who were married at the time of birth, i.e. ignoring pre-marital births had by
women who were married by the time of the survey. We further restrict our
analytical sample to women in the childbearing ages of 15-49, who were married
at least 4 years before the survey year and were still married at the time of the
survey. We also restricted the sample to women who had had no more than 3
births, 4 years before the survey year. We did this because the WMFES only
records birth data for 4 births, and because our outcome of interest is whether
the respondent had a child in the 3 years preceding the survey year (we explain
the rationale of this decision in Section 5.4.4). Our final sample included 34,551
women from an initial sample of 143,377.
5.3.2 Employment histories and leave eligibility
Individuals are only eligible for the PLA if they are in work, and so it is important
to establish the employment histories of women in the WMFES. The WMFES
asks married women about their employment history up to the time of the survey.
The ten possible responses are listed in Table 5.1, along with the proportion of
married women giving each response. This information is useful for our purposes,
because we are interested in whether eligibility for the PLA caused women to be
more likely to have a child in the three years preceding the survey, which we
refer to as the “focal period” (our reasons for selecting this outcome variable are
explained in Section 5.4.4). An important variable for predicting childbearing in
the focal period is the respondent’s parity in the year before the focal period –
henceforth when we refer to a respondent’s “parity,” we mean their parity in the
year before the focal period, not their parity in the survey year.
The ten employment history categories in Table 5.1 enable us to infer which
respondents were or were not working during the focal period. For example,
we can infer that Group (1) (wives who have always been working) must have
been working, and that Groups (4) and (10) (wives who have not worked at
least since marriage) must not have been working. Having determined which
respondents were working in the focal period, we can then apply the restriction
that those respondents were also employed either in the public sector or private
sector (i.e. not self-employed, an employer, or an unpaid family worker), and
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thereby determine who was eligible for the PLA in the focal period.
Table 5.1: Employment history categories.





(1) Always working 0.340 Working
(2) Quit work at marriage and have
a job now
0.107 Likely working
(3) Quit work at marriage, had a job
after but don’t have a job now
0.016 Likely working
(4) Quit work at marriage, have not
had a job after until now
0.140 Not working
(5) Quit work at birth and have a job
now
0.074 Parity 0: work-
ing; Parity 1+:
likely working




(7) Quit work for other reasons and
have a job now
0.039 Unclear
(8) Quit work for other reasons 0.049 Unclear
(9) No job before marriage, but had
a job after marriage until now
0.073 Unclear
(10) Never had a job 0.074 Not working
Notes: The ‘Proportion of wives’ column gives the proportion of all married women (aged
15-49) in each group across all the surveys. In the “Employment status in focal period” column,
women within a given group may have different employment statuses depending on their parity
in the year before the focal period. N=34,551.
While we can infer that women in Groups (1), (4) and (10) were working
in the focal period, determining the employment status (in the focal period) of
women in the other groups is more difficult. For example, Group (2) women quit
work at marriage and have a job in the survey year; this information alone is
insufficient to determine whether they were working or not in the focal period.
However, we can use information from other questions in the survey to estimate
the employment status of these other women. The fourth column in Table 5.1
classifies each group as working in the focal period, likely working, not working,
likely not working, or whether their work status during the focal period is unclear.
Where appropriate, we also specify any within-group differences in focal period
employment status due to parity in the year before the focal period. For example,
Group (6) women (quit work at birth) who were parity 0 in the year before the
focal period had not yet had any children, and so they could not yet have quit
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due to a birth. Appendix C.1 discusses how we estimate the employment status
in the focal period for each group.
We are interested in the effect of the PLA on women who would have been
eligible in the focal period (Group (1) and parity 0 Group (6)), but we are also in-
terested in the effect of the PLA on women who may have been eligible (Groups
(2), (3), (5), (7), (8), and (9)). Women who may have been eligible represent
a class of women who were neither purely in work or purely out of work since
marriage, and so their childbearing may be more responsive to the PLA, which
enables them to balance work and childbearing. We therefore combine the ten
groups in Table 5.1 into the three groups in Table 5.2, representing women who
were always working at least since marriage (Group (A)), women who were occa-
sionally working since marriage (Group (B)), and women who were not working
since marriage (Group (C)). We also create these three groups in order to increase
statistical power and enable robust estimation of our models.
Table 5.2: Combined employment history groups.
Combined group Groups Description Proportion
of wives
















Notes: For definitions of Groups (1)-(10) see Table 5.1. The ‘Proportion of wives’ column
gives the proportion of all married women (aged 15-49) in each group across all the surveys. We
do not include Group (6) parity 1+ women in Group (B) because they were likely not working
during the focal period (see Appendix C.1). N=34,551.
To estimate the effect of the PLA, we will compare women in Group (A) with
women in Group (C), and we will also compare women in Group (B) with Group
(C). Because Group (B) is a highly heterogeneous group, we will also separately
estimate models on each of its sub-groups (i.e. (2), (3) etc.), as well as other





To evaluate the causal impact of the PLA on fertility, we use a difference-in-
differences (DID) estimation strategy and regression models, a standard approach
for causal inference in econometrics (Angrist and Pischke 2009). Our systematic
review found DID to be an established approach for evaluating the causal im-
pact of leave policies on fertility (e.g. Ang 2015; Cannonier 2014; Raute 2019).
Moreover, DID is able to identify both the future-child and total effects, and to
identify the effect of a parental leave policy on individuals of all parities.
DID is applied to quasi-experimental studies, in which one group receives
“treatment” and is compared to a control group which does not receive treatment.
In quasi-experimental studies, we are interested in the effect of a treatment on
a particular outcome. If individuals are allocated to the treatment and control
groups randomly, then the two groups will be roughly comparable in terms of
other predictors of the outcome. With random allocation, the effect of the treat-
ment can be estimated by directly comparing outcomes in the treatment and
control groups. However, if individuals are allocated to the treatment and con-
trol groups non-randomly, then a direct comparison of outcomes will give a biased
estimate of the treatment effect. This is because the two groups may be system-
atically different in terms of other factors which may also affect the outcome.
DID enables us to capture treatment effects in non-randomised studies.
DID aims to identify treatment effects by comparing trends in the outcome
for the treatment and control groups over time. In the simplest case, there is
one ‘before’ period t0 (i.e. before the treatment is applied) and one ‘after’ period
t1. Based on these categories, four sub-groups can be identified: treated before,
treated after, non-treated before, and non-treated after. The ‘treated before’ sub-
group does not receive treatment – the individuals in this group are just people
who are similar in some way to those who do receive treatment at time t1.
In our case, DID involves evaluating whether the difference in fertility between
(occasionally) working women and non-working women changed after the PLA
was implemented in 2009. Specifically, we want to evaluate the effect of the PLA
on wives who have always been working since marriage (Group (A) in Table 5.2),
and the effect of the PLA on wives who have been occasionally working since
marriage (Group (B)). To estimate the average treatment effect of the PLA, we
compare the “treated” Groups (A) and (B), against the “control” Group (C) (i.e.
women who have not worked at all since marriage). Separate DID models are
estimated comparing: (1) Group (A) with Group (C), and (2) Group (B) and
Group (C). Any deviation in average fertility trends of these groups after 2009
can be attributed to a causal impact of the PLA, assuming that differences in
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fertility between (occasionally) working women and non-working women would
have remained the same without the PLA as discussed below.
5.4.2 DID assumptions
There are two key assumptions required for DID to be valid: the common trends
assumption (CT), and the common support assumption (COSU) (Angrist and
Pischke 2009; Keng and Sheu 2011; Lechner 2010). CT requires that time trends
for the treatment and control groups are parallel prior to the introduction of the
policy. In our case, CT states that the difference in fertility between (occasionally)
working wives and non-working wives would have remained constant over time
if the PLA did not have an impact on fertility. Graphically this means that the
fertility time-trends of these two groups should be parallel to each other, prior to
2009. CT cannot be tested directly, since the fertility of (occasionally) working
wives in the absence of the PLA after 2009 is not observed. However, CT can be
graphically evaluated by looking at whether trends in fertility between the treated
and non-treated groups were roughly parallel prior to 2009 (Wing et al. 2018). CT
can also be evaluated by estimating two regression modes: a base model and an
extended model; that is, the base model including an additive interaction term
between group membership (either working or non-working) and a time index
(ibid.). If the model results are robust to changing the specification, then CT is
valid.
COSU concerns the distributions (the “support”) of other predictors (i.e.
other than the DID variables) of the outcome variable in the treatment and
control groups. COSU states that these distributions within groups must remain
stable over time. The distribution of covariates in the treated-before and treated-
after subgroups must be similar. Similarly the distribution of covariates in the
control before and control after subgroups must be similar (Lechner 2010). In
our case, this means that the distributions of variables such as age and educa-
tion must be similar within the treatment and control groups. For example, if
it was the case that the post-2009 working women in our data were on average
much older than the pre-2009 working women, then it would not be possible for
the DID model to separate the effect of the PLA on fertility from the effect of
age on fertility. If COSU is violated, then this violation can be controlled for
by including other predictors of fertility in the DID model specification (Stuart




To control for pro-natal policy variation in the 20 local government areas, we use
multilevel regression modelling. In multilevel models the parameter(s) of interest
are modelled as random variables rather than constants (Gelman and Hill 2007).
In our case, we allow the intercept term in the regression model to vary by local
government area, meaning that we control for any potential effect of unobserved
variation in local government policies. Multilevel models have the advantage that
they can estimate models with small numbers of individuals in each group. For
example, it may be the case that there are very few observations of working
women in the 2013 survey, at parity 0, and who live in Taiwan. In this case,
it would not be possible to estimate a classical regression model with dummy
variables for county residence.
5.4.4 Variables
Our outcome variable is a binary variable indicating whether the respondent had
one or more births in the three full years prior to the survey year. For example,
the outcome variable for women from the 2016 survey indicates whether they had
one or more births from 2013-2015 inclusive. We refer to this period as the “focal
period.” We selected this measure of fertility for three reasons. Firstly, it captures
fertility behaviour in every year from 2000-2015 inclusive (except 2006). Secondly,
it averages out birth fluctuations due to the Chinese calendar (numbers of births
drop in the Year of the Tiger and spike in the Year of the Dragon). Thirdly, it
omits childbearing information from years in which a given survey was conducted
(i.e. any information in the 2016 survey on childbearing in 2016 is omitted)
because some respondents may have had births later in the year, after the survey
was conducted.
Data for covariates of fertility is taken from four years prior to the survey year,
i.e. one year before the 3 year focal period. For example, for women in the 2016
survey, we record covariates in 2012. We do this because in order for there to be
a causal impact of a covariate on fertility, that covariate needs to be measured
before fertility: the cause has to happen before the effect (Shadish et al. 2002).
Our covariates are: wife’s parity, wife’s age, binary indicators for wife’s highest
level of education, and binary indicators for husband’s highest level of education.
We assume that respondents’ highest level of education in the survey year is
unchanged from four years previously. This is a reasonable assumption as most
respondents will have completed their education. Unfortunately, we are unable
to register key variables of interest that may be important for prior childbearing.
Specifically, we are unable to measure potentially relevant covariates of fertility
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such as income and parental co-residence.
Table 5.3: Descriptive statistics.
Variable Group (A) Group (B) Group (C)
t0 t1 t0 t1 t0 t1
Birth in focal period 0.144 0.127 0.098 0.127 0.151 0.152
Parity before focal pe-
riod
– Parity 0 0.095 0.127 0.045 0.065 0.077 0.106
– Parity 1 0.207 0.244 0.156 0.218 0.177 0.233
– Parity 2 0.450 0.472 0.458 0.494 0.416 0.438
– Parity 3 0.212 0.141 0.285 0.197 0.270 0.193
Mean age of wife 35.1 36.1 36.3 37.1 34.9 36.0
Wife’s education
– Below senior high
school
0.255 0.144 0.355 0.185 0.452 0.283
– Senior high school 0.571 0.558 0.574 0.637 0.505 0.601
– Tertiary education 0.174 0.298 0.071 0.178 0.043 0.116
Husband’s education
– Below senior high
school
0.310 0.228 0.376 0.251 0.457 0.327
– Senior high school 0.508 0.510 0.518 0.542 0.467 0.533
– Tertiary education 0.182 0.262 0.106 0.207 0.076 0.140
n 5,147 9,759 9,331 4,044 5,433 2,228
Notes: For each of the three groups, observations are split between t0 (before the PLA) and t1
(after the PLA). Proportions of respondents at different parities is measured in the year before
the 3 year focal period, as is the mean age of the wife.
5.4.5 Model specifications
Our outcome variable yi is a binary indicator for whether the respondent gave
birth to one or more children in the three years prior to the survey, and so we
use logistic regression. We run separate sets of regression models for Group (A)
(always working women) and Group (B) (occasionally working women). Our







= αj,k[i] + timeiβ1 + treatiβ2 +DIDiβ3 + ϵi. (5.1)
Equation 5.1 is a non-nested, varying-intercept multilevel model, meaning
that the intercept αj,k[i] is a random variable, depending on the county j and the
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parity k, which is determined by the respondent i (Gelman and Hill 2007). The
variables time and treat are binary indicators, corresponding to whether the 3
year focal period is after 2009 and whether the respondent is in the treatment
group. The DID variable is a interaction term between time and treat, and the
value of the parameter β3 is what we are primarily interested in finding. Similar
varying-intercept logistic DID model specifications can be found in Masiano et al.
(2019) and Tang et al. (2017).
Assuming that other covariates of fertility are stable over time (i.e. assuming
COSU), β3 will validly capture the effect of the PLA on (occasionally) working
women. We test the validity of COSU by estimating the same models with
covariates, and seeing whether results change. The DID model with covariates
acts as a control for the violation of COSU, enabling unbiased estimation of β3.






= αk[i] + timeiβ1 + treatiβ2 +DIDiβ3+
+ ageiβ4 + edu_shsiβ5 + edu_uniβ6
+ h_edu_shsiβ7 + h_edu_uniβ8 + ϵi. (5.2)
In Equation 5.2, agei is the wife’s age in the survey year, and the variables
containing ‘edu’ comprise binary indicators for whether the wife or husband have
at most a senior high school or higher education. In Equation 5.2 the parameter
αk[i] only varies by parity and not county, because with varying counties there
are too many coefficients for the model to be estimated.
Equations 5.1 and 5.2 enable identification of the effect of the PLA on fertility,
controlling for differences in intercept due to parity or county. However, we
are also interested in whether the PLA impacted women of different parities
differently, i.e. whether the β3 variable has different values for women at different
parities. We therefore run separate models corresponding to Equations 5.1 and
5.2 for women at parities of 0, 1, 2 and 3. In the parity-specific version of Equation
5.1, the intercept is αj[i] and only varies by county. In the parity-specific version
of Equation 5.2, the intercept is α and does not vary.
5.5 Results
5.5.1 Graphical evidence
Figure 5.1 Panel (a) shows the proportions of women in Groups (A), (B) and (C)
over time, and Figure 5.1 Panel (b) shows the proportions of women having a
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birth in the 3 year focal period over time. Trends for all 10 subgroups are shown in
Figure C1 of Appendix C.2. Panel (a) indicates that the proportions in each group
remained roughly stable, apart from in the 2013 survey where the proportion in
Group (A) increased sharply and the proportion in Group (B) dipped. Panel (b)
indicates that fertility trends across groups were roughly parallel from 2003-2010,
and especially between Groups (B) and (C). Panel (b) therefore provides support
for the validity of the Common Trends assumption. After 2010, the trend in
Group (A) does not change relative to the trend in Group (C), suggesting that
there was no effect of the PLA on women that were always working. By contrast,
the time trend for Group (B) after 2010 curves upward relative to Group (C),
suggesting a positive impact of the PLA on the fertility of occasionally working
women.
Figure 5.2 breaks down the graphs in Figure 5.1 by parity. Panel (a) indicates
that the proportion of women in Group (C) remained relatively stable across all
surveys for all parities, and that changes in Group (A) were mirrored by changes
in Group (B). Panel (b) suggests that the Common Trends assumption is valid for
parities 0, 1 and 2, but not for parity 3. In terms of post-reform trends, Panel (b)
indicates that fertility in Group (A) not only did not increase relative to Group
(C), but possibly even declined for parities 0 and 2. The fertility trend for Group
(B) appears to roughly follow the Group (C) trend for parities 0 and 2 after 2010,
suggesting no impact of the PLA on women of these parities. However, the Panel
(b) graph for parity 1 women indicates a post-reform fertility increase for Group
(B) relative to Group (C), suggesting that the PLA had a positive impact on the
second births of occasionally working women.
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Figure 5.1: Proportions and fertility of wives in three employment history groups.
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Figure 5.2: Proportions and fertility of wives in three employment history groups,
by parity.
Notes: Parity in this case refers to the number of births had by the respondent 4 years before
the survey year, i.e. 1 year before the 3 year focal period. Note that the vertical axes in panel
(b) all have different ranges.
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5.5.2 Always working women
The results for models corresponding to Equations 5.1 and 5.2 are shown in Table
5.4 in Panels (a) and (b), respectively. Specifically, Table 5.4 reports the value
of the coefficient of the DIDi variable (β3) in Equations 5.1 and 5.2, as well
as the exponent of β3. Full model results are reported in Tables C1 and C2 in
Appendix C.3. exp(β3) is the odds ratio of β3, and can be understood as the
causal impact of the PLA on the likelihood of having a birth. A value of exp(β3)
below 1 indicates a negative impact, a value of 1 indicates no impact, and a value
above 1 indicates a positive impact on fertility.
Table 5.4: Always working women (Group (A)) model results.
All Parity 0 Parity 1 Parity 2 Parity 3
(a) Without covariates
β3 0.04 −0.12 0.11 −0.03 −1.61
(0.10) (0.19) (0.14) (0.22) (1.10)
exp(β3) 1.05 0.87 1.12 0.97 0.20
(b) With covariates
β3 −0.05 0.22 0.07 −0.07 −1.78
(0.11) (0.15) (0.17) (0.23) (1.11)
exp(β3) 0.95 1.25 1.07 0.93 0.17
n 19, 518 2, 325 4, 243 8, 855 4, 095
∗∗∗p < 0.001; ∗∗p < 0.01; ∗p < 0.05; +p < 0.1.
Notes: β3 is the coefficient of the DIDi variable in Equations 5.1 and 5.2. exp(β3) is the
natural exponent of β3.
None of the values of β3 in Table 5.4 are statistically significant, even at
the 10% level. Moreover, most of the coefficient estimates are smaller than the
corresponding standard errors. This indicates that there was no causal impact of
the PLA on the fertility of working women. This finding is also true of women at
specific parities. Running the same models again, but restricting treated women
to those that were working in the public or private sectors, does not substantially
change the results.
5.5.3 Occasionally working women
The results for all occasionally working combined (i.e. Group (B)) are shown in
Table 5.5, and full model results are shown in Tables C3 and C4 in Appendix
C.3. The structure of Table 5.5 is the same as Table 5.4. Similar to Group
(A), the results for Group (B) indicate that there was no impact of the PLA on
occasionally working women overall. The results are substantially unchanged by
109
restricting the treatment group to those who were working in the public sector or
private sector. To test the Common Trends assumption, we run the same models
but include an interaction term between survey year and the treatment group
binary indicator. The results are substantially unchanged, indicating that the
CT assumption is valid.
Table 5.5: Occasionally working women (Group (B)) model results.
All Parity 0 Parity 1 Parity 2 Parity 3
(a) Without covariates
β3 0.07 −0.09 0.12 −0.04 0.49
(0.11) (0.25) (0.16) (0.23) (0.52)
exp(β3) 1.07 0.91 1.13 0.96 1.63
(b) With covariates
β3 0.00 −0.08 0.08 −0.12 0.24
(0.13) (0.30) (0.18) (0.24) (0.55)
exp(β3) 1.00 0.92 1.08 0.89 1.27
n 19, 439 1, 250 3, 676 9, 265 5, 248
∗∗∗p < 0.001; ∗∗p < 0.01; ∗p < 0.05; +p < 0.1.
Notes: β3 is the coefficient of the DIDi variable in Equations 5.1 and 5.2. exp(β3) is the
natural exponent of β3.
We tested the robustness of the results for Group (B) by running similar
regressions on each of the subgroups of Group (B), both individually and in
various combinations. None of the subgroups individually reported significant
results for any parity-specific models with covariates. Of the combined groups,
some combinations gave statistically significant and positive values for β3, for all
women and women at parity 1. Generally, the inclusion of covariates reduced the
magnitude and statistical significance of the results for all women and parity 1
women, indicating that the Common Support assumption may not be justified.
We therefore prioritise the results from models that include covariates.
Group combination models that reported significant results all excluded Group
(9) women (always working since marriage), but included most of the other groups
in Group (B). For all women, values of β3 in the models with covariates ranged
between 0.25-0.29, and were significant either at the 10% or 5% level. For parity
1 women, the values ranged between 0.31-0.36, again significant at either the 10%
or 5% level. The odds ratios of the mid-points of these ranges (0.27 and 0.34) are
1.31 and 1.40 respectively. To understand the meaning of these numbers, suppose
that the pre-reform probability of an occasionally working woman having a birth
was 0.10 (i.e. the proportion of pre-reform occasionally working women who had
a birth). The probability of 0.10 implies an odds ratio of 0.1/(1 − 0.1) = 0.11
110
For a similar woman after 2009, the variable time had no effect (see Table C4),
and so no adjustment has to be made for the time trend. The PLA increased
the odds ratio by a factor of 1.31, meaning a post-reform odds ratio of 0.15
(= (0.1/0.9) · 1.31). This implies that the PLA may have increased the probabil-
ity of occasionally working women having a birth to 0.13 (= 0.15/(1 + 0.15)), a
30% increase (equivalently, a 3 percentage point increase). Similar calculations
for parity 1 women imply that the PLA increased the probability of a birth from
0.32 to 0.40, a 25% increase (equivalently, an 8 percentage point increase).
5.6 Discussion
We now unpack the meaning of our results, explore the implications of our findings
for policy and research, and note some limitations of our study.
Our results suggest that the PLA had no impact on the fertility of women
who remained in work. This implies that the PLA did not make childbearing
more attractive for women who did not intend to quit their job at any point.
This finding is counter-intuitive in the sense that the PLA should facilitate child-
bearing for working women, by entitling them to a remunerated period of time
off work at the birth of a child. Working women in Taiwan are also entitled to
maternity leave. Taken together this indicates that pre-existing maternity leave
entitlements are sufficient to facilitate childbearing for always working women.
Working women in Taiwan may only want to take time off work at the birth
of their child, and find that maternity leave is sufficient for this. Therefore the
additional entitlements provided by the PLA – i.e. a longer period of leave at
the birth of the child, or a period of leave taken at some other time before the
child is 3 – may not be needed for working women to have children.
For occasionally working women, our results suggest that the PLA may have
led to an increase in fertility, but this finding is not robust to alternative def-
initions of occasionally working women. We can therefore only conclude that
evidence for the effect of the PLA on the fertility of occasionally working women
is mixed. Any effect on occasionally working women could be because occasion-
ally working women are less driven to work than always working women (either
due to economic necessity or career ambition), and arguably they might be more
eager to claim additional benefits that childbearing may entitle them to. Conse-
quently the knowledge that an extra child would entitle someone to an additional
6 months off work at any time before that child is 3, could be an attractive
proposition for such women.
Taken together, our findings suggest that expanding parental leave entitle-
ments is not a cost-effective strategy for increasing aggregate fertility in Taiwan.
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The PLA is perhaps the most expensive pro-natal policy implemented in Taiwan
– although its purpose is by no means only pro-natal – and so one would hope for
fertility impacts on a broader range of women. Our study is the first empirical
assessment to capture the causal effect of a leave policy on fertility at the micro-
level, and presents evidence which runs contrary to similar studies conducted in
Europe and North America. Researchers have cautioned against understanding
low fertility in East Asia in terms of historical experiences in Europe and North
America, and our findings seem to reinforce this contention (Basten 2013). In
terms of gender roles, our findings would seem to suggest that the fertility of
highly educated women was no more responsive to the PLA than the fertility of
less well educated women. This runs contrary to the argument of (Cheng and
Hsu 2020), which suggests that better educated women will be more responsive to
the provision of parental leave policies. Further research needs to establish what
differences are important for the different fertility responses to leave in East Asia
and Europe and North America – whether they are due to economic conditions,
institutional arrangements or societal values.
We identify three limitations in our study due to data availability. The first
limitation is that we cannot observe some covariates over the 3 year focal period
that may have been important for fertility, such as income or grandparental co-
residence. This is because the data is in the form of repeated cross-sections.
However, the strength of our study design, as well the inclusion of some key
covariates, still enables us to identify causal effects. The second limitation is
that we cannot observe whether there was any self-selection of women into jobs
that offered the PLA. This would be problematic for identification if women
who were going to have children anyway deliberately started working to access
the PLA. However, if there were such a phenomenon, it would tend to bias our
findings upward, i.e. it would increase the likelihood of a (spurious) effect being
measured. The fact that no effect was found indicates that even if there was
self-selection of women who wanted children into jobs offering the PLA, it was
insufficient to impact fertility. The third limitation is that we do not directly
observe whether an individual was eligible for the PLA during the three year
focal period. However, given the wide coverage of the PLA (i.e. all public and
private sector workers), and the fact that we are able to observe respondent’s
employment sector if they are working, the assumption that respondents were
eligible should not be overly restrictive.
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5.7 Conclusion
The PLA has been a major and costly pro-natal policy, but there is limited ev-
idence that it had an impact on fertility. By comparing time trends for those
eligible and not eligible for the PLA, we find that the PLA had no effect on the
fertility of women who were always working, but may have had some positive
impact on the second births of women who were in and out of work since mar-
riage. Our DID method – as part of a quasi-experimental design – enables the
identification of causal effects, and so we can reliably claim that the PLA had no
causal impact on the childbearing of always working women, and may have had
a causal impact on the childbearing of occasionally working women. This study
is the first to evaluate a causal impact of a national leave policy in East Asia.
Contrary to the evidence from Western countries, we do not find there to be a
large positive effect of leave policy on fertility. Consequently, there needs to be
more research to establish whether and how parental leave increases aggregate






The TFR in Taiwan is about 1 birth per woman, meaning that successive cohorts
of childbearing-age men and women are halving in size. The persistence of lowest-
low fertility for most of the past two decades mean that Taiwan’s age structure
now has negative momentum built into it: in 30 years there will be half the
number of childbearing-age individuals that there are today, and so the population
will inevitably decline to some extent. In the long run, the persistence of low
fertility will have severe consequences for the Taiwanese economy and society.
Rising old-age dependency ratios, higher consumption and lower investment will
hamper economic growth, as will the decline in the absolute number of working-
age adults. At the level of individuals and families, data on ideal family sizes –
coupled with lowest-low fertility – implies that people are not having as many
children as they would ideally like to have. This is problematic because failure
to fulfil childbearing desires can negatively impact life satisfaction and emotional
well-being.
In this thesis we had four specific research aims, relating to the effects of
gender equity and leave on fertility. In this concluding chapter, we summarise
the main findings of our three papers in terms of those aims. We then discuss
the contributions and implications of our findings for policy and research. Next
we discuss some of the limitations of our study. Finally we indicate avenues for
further research
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6.2 Summary of the main findings
6.2.1 The effect of housework on realised fertility in Tai-
wan
In Paper 1, we evaluated whether more equal divisions of housework within mar-
ried couples were associated with higher probabilities of having children. We also
theorised that housework division should impact fertility more in the long-term
than in the short-term. This is because marital satisfaction is more responsive
to housework division at younger ages, and that marital satisfaction is a key pre-
dictor of fertility. Using hybrid and classical logistic regression models on panel
data, we found that there was an impact of housework balance on fertility in the
long-term but not in the short-term. In the long-term models, we found the effect
to be large: couples with an equal division of housework were 20.6% more likely
to have another birth than couples with the mean division of housework.
6.2.2 Conceptualising the effects of pro-natal policies on
fertility
Paper 2 developed a new conceptual and methodological framework, extend-
ing the analysis of (Lalive and Zweimüller 2009). The framework of Lalive and
Zweimüller decomposes the effects of a parental leave policy on fertility in terms
of the current-child effect, future-child effect, and total effect. We extended this
framework in two ways. Firstly, we further decomposed each effect to women at
different parities. Such a decomposition is conceptually necessary since parity 0
and parity 1+ women are categorically dissimilar. Secondly, we specified three
study designs that are able to statistically capture each of these types of effects,
and discussed which designs are at lower risk of bias. The study designs we speci-
fied are the short before-after design, the long before design, and the case-control
DID design. On top of this framework, we argued that the future-child effect and
total effect are of more interest to pro-natal policy-makers than the current-child
effect, since the former effects concern the parental leave incentives a woman has
for a child not yet born. We argued that the future-child effect and total effect
are better reflections of what policy-makers mean when they refer to “the effect
of a leave policy on fertility,” and therefore have higher construct validity than
the current-child effect.
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6.2.3 The effect of parental leave policies on fertility
Having established an appropriate conceptual and methodological framework in
Paper 2, we were then able to categorise and synthesise the evidence for the
effect of leave on fertility. We found that the current-child effect studies mostly
reported null effects, but that findings in the future-child effect and total effect
studies were all supportive. In terms of effect sizes, we found that the introduction
of new parental leave entitlements could increase the probability of next births
by between 3-24%, with the effect size depending on the generosity of the reform.
There were two limitations of our findings. Firstly, there were a comparatively
small number of studies that identified the future-child effect and total effects.
Secondly, almost all studies evaluated reforms in Northern and Western Europe,
and Canada. This limits the generality of our findings to other settings.
6.2.4 The effect of the Parental Leave Allowance on fer-
tility in Taiwan
In Paper 3 our focus returns to Taiwan, where we investigate whether the PLA
had a causal impact on the fertility of women who were eligible for it. Following
on from our conceptual framework and argument in Paper 2, we sought to statis-
tically identify the future-child effect on women at all parities. In order to do this,
we used a case-control DID study design. We evaluated two sets of models: in the
first set, the ‘case’ group comprised of women who had always been working at
least since marriage, and in the second set, the ‘case’ group comprised of women
who had been in and out of employment since marriage. To evaluate the effect of
the PLA on both sets, we compared them with the ‘control’ group of women who
had not worked at least since marriage. In line with our findings from Paper 2,
we expected those who were always working – and therefore eligible for the PLA
– to have had their childbearing causally impacted by the policy. Contrary to our
expectations, there was no evidence of an impact on this first set. By contrast,
there was some evidence of an impact of the PLA on women who had been in and
out of work since marriage, despite the fact that they were less reliably eligible
for the PLA. However, our findings for the second set of women were not robust
to alternative model specifications, and so cannot place too much weight on our
positive findings. Overall, our findings indicate that parental leave in Taiwan
may only change incentives for women who are not particularly career driven.
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6.3 Contributions to policy and research
Our findings make a substantive contribution to research on low fertility, gender
equity and leave policies. Here we discuss those contributions under three head-
ings: evidence and knowledge; theory, methodology, and conceptual frameworks;
and policy.
All three of our papers aim to evaluate causal impacts on realised fertility, and
reliably uncover new evidence of effects or non-effects. In Paper 1, we are unable
to use a strict quasi-experimental study design and therefore cannot directly test
for causality. However, we are able to evaluate whether the division of housework
is associated with subsequent childbearing, thereby establishing that the puta-
tive cause occurred before the putative effect. Our finding that more equitable
divisions of housework are associated with higher probabilities of childbearing
provides the first empirical support for gender equity theory as an explanation of
low fertility in Taiwan. In Paper 2, our review of all available quasi-experimental
studies demonstrates that parental leave does increase fertility in Western coun-
tries. This finding contributes to the debate on the efficacy of parental leave
as a pro-natal policy, and will hopefully dispel the popular contention that the
evidence is mixed. Paper 3 focusses on reliably establishing whether the PLA
had a causal impact on fertility, and shows definitively that it had no effect on
the fertility of women who were always working. This confounds our expecta-
tions from Paper 2, though is not inconsistent with our Paper 2 findings since
Paper 3 is the first quasi-experimental evaluation of a leave policy on fertility in
East Asia. We also make a contribution to the evidence of the effect of leave on
fertility, by finding some indication that women who were occasionally working
may have been impacted by the policy to some extent.
Papers 1 and 2 make substantive theoretical, conceptual and methodological
contributions to our understanding of the effect of gender equity on fertility, and
how to properly decompose and test for different types of effects of leave policies.
Paper 1 posits a new theoretical argument, arguing that domestic gender inequity
is likelier to have more of an impact on fertility over a longer period of time. Until
now gender equity theory has been couched in static terms, and does not account
for potential changes in the relationship between equity and fertility over time.
By using evidence of the effect of gender equity on marital satisfaction, and of
marital satisfaction on fertility, we link gender equity with fertility in such a way
as to explain how this relationship might change over time. In Paper 2, we posit
a conceptual and methodological framework to understand the effect of leave on
fertility, specify study designs to identify each effect, and argue that certain effects
are more relevant than others to pro-natal policy-makers. The purpose of this
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framework is to clarify that many of the available studies of the effect of leave on
fertility – while having strong study designs – are in fact only capturing a type of
effect for which there is not strong theoretical reason to believe impacts fertility.
The current-child effect is the effect of having leave available for a child just
born, on the decision to have another child in the future. In the absence of speed
premiums, the experience of having leave for a previous child seems unlikely to be
a significant incentive for mothers to decide to have another child years down the
line. As research interest in leave and fertility intensifies due to more countries
entering low fertility regimes, these conceptual distinctions will be important for
pro-natal policy evaluations. A recent quasi-experimental study – “Impact of a
Reform Towards Shared Parental Leave on Continued Fertility in Norway and
Sweden” (Duvander et al. 2020) – repeats the same analysis as the other current-
child effect studies, and similarly finds limited evidence of an impact. With our
conceptual apparatus, these researchers would have been able to understand that
it would have been unlikely that they would find any effect. Lastly, our adaptation
of ROBINS-I for evaluating the idiosyncrasies of pro-natal policy evaluations
could be useful for systematic reviews of other pro-natal policies, and maybe
reviews of other types of social policy.
In policy terms Papers 2 and 3 both concern the evaluation of parental leave
policies, so insofar as those papers have generalisable results, they should con-
tribute to analyses of parental leave policies. For other low fertility countries in
East Asia, our results in Paper 3 indicate that leave entitlements of 6 months are
not sufficient to impact fertility. For Taiwan specifically, Paper 3 indicates that
other pro-natal policies may be more cost-effective. For Western countries, our
findings in Paper 2 indicate that parental leave is a reliable method for increasing
fertility.
6.4 Limitations
The research conducted over the course of the PhD was limited in a few ways,
mostly relating to data availability and sample surveys not asking questions about
certain outcomes of interest. Here we discuss some limitations imposed by data
availability and the exclusion of unmarried women from the study, consider spe-
cific limitations of each of the three papers, and conclude with a discussion of the
limitations imposed by language barriers.
In terms of data availability, there was a trade-off between survey sample
size and survey detail. On the one hand, the Women’s Marriage, Fertility and
Employment Surveys (WMFES) provided very large cross-sectional data, with
about 20,000 respondents in each wave. However, there are no detailed ques-
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tions on key variables relating to gender equity theory – such as housework and
childcare – in the WMFES. In contrast, the Panel Survey of Family Dynamics
(PSFD) and the Taiwan Social Change Survey (TSCS) ask much more detailed
questions about domestic labour and childbearing behaviours, but have much
smaller sample sizes. Unlike many other high-income countries, Taiwan lacks a
large, longitudinal dataset covering family behaviours. Consequently this limited
our ability to investigate a range of different factors relating the effects of do-
mestic and formal labour on childbearing, and the small size of the PSFD made
subgroup analysis difficult. In terms of administrative data, we did not have ac-
cess to administrative datasets on eligibility for the PLA or on fertility, meaning
that eligibility for the PLA had to be estimated.
The analysis throughout Papers 1 and 3 were restricted to married heterosex-
ual couples, and therefore represents a bias in our results towards married women.
Consequently, this means that we cannot shed light on the fertility behaviour of
unmarried women, divorced women, or same-sex couples. To a large extent this
restriction was unavoidable, since the WMFES did not ask unmarried women
about their childbearing behaviour until 2016. We were therefore not able to use
the WMFES to study the fertility of unmarried women. Additionally, restricting
our analysis to only married heterosexual couples was motivated by the fact that
much of gender equity theory is specified for heterosexual couples. Gender equity
theory is largely silent on the intergenerational balance of housework between
genders, and its impact (if any) on fertility. Consequently, our scope was lim-
ited by data availability, theory, and the fact that marriage remains a de facto
prerequisite for childbearing in Taiwan.
In Paper 1, we investigate the impact of domestic gender equity on fertility.
Ideally, it would have been possible to evaluate a range of different domestic
labour tasks, and specifically both childcare and housework. Unfortunately the
PSFD does not ask the required questions on childcare, meaning that we were
limited to using housework alone. We were further limited by the fact that the
PSFD asks individuals to retrospectively report the hours of housework done that
week by them and their spouse. This is not an ideal measurement of housework,
as time-use diaries have shown to be more accurate. Another central limitation
was imposed by the relatively small size of the PSFD dataset, meaning that it
was difficult to investigate any important subgroup differences. Furthermore, this
meant there were likely too few births from 2012-2015 to establish any impact of
domestic labour balance on fertility over that period. Lastly, we were limited by
the fact that the coverage of the data was only over a five year period, meaning
that we were limited in the extent to which we could investigate how housework
sharing might impact fertility differently over different time scales.
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In Paper 2, we investigate the impact of parental leave policies on fertility.
Our studies were drawn entirely from Europe and North America, meaning that
we could not reasonably generalise those findings to Taiwan or other East Asian
countries. Essentially, this limitation was imposed by there being no existing
quasi-experimental evaluations of pro-natal policies in the English-language lit-
erature. This could partly be due to the shorter time frames that East Asian
countries have had post-transitional fertility rates. Nonetheless, the paper is
still useful for studies evaluating the impact of policies on fertility, due to the
conceptual framework it develops.
Paper 3 evaluates the impact of the Parental Leave Allowance (PLA) on
fertility. We use the WMFES data to evaluate this effect. Though we were
able to estimate respondents’ career histories, the fact that the WMFES is a
cross-sectional dataset meant that those histories could not be directly observed.
Consequently, there will inevitably have been some error in determining precise
employment histories. Beyond employment histories, eligibility for the PLA was
also not directly observed, and had to be estimated by evaluating current and
previous employment sectors. As mentioned previously, if we had had access to
PLA registration data – as well as administrative vital data – then this would
have improved the study.
Beyond limitations in terms of data and scope, I was also hindered by lan-
guage. I cannot speak Chinese, and so that may have limited my ability to engage
with literature written in Chinese, particularly research published in Chinese-
language journals. However, many Chinese-language journals provide titles or
abstracts in English, and so I was able to browse that literature for articles that
may have been potentially relevant to the focus of my thesis. For legal documents
on pro-natal policies and documentation for surveys used in the research, a com-
bination of Google Translate and asking colleagues for assistance was sufficient
to cover most issues.
6.5 Further research
Our findings indicate several avenues for future research. The conceptual frame-
work established in Paper 2 could be applied to systematic reviews of other pro-
natal policies such as baby bonuses and childcare, which are only made available
to parents after the birth of a child. Our framework could also be used for fram-
ing individual studies of parental leave in other settings, providing a rubric for
which effects are being identified, what study design is being adopted to identify
those effects, and whether the common sources of RoB have been controlled for or
mitigated. Our finding in Paper 3 – that the PLA did not impact fertility – is the
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first quasi-experimental study of a national parental leave policy on fertility in
East Asia. It therefore needs to be established whether our findings generalise to
other East Asian countries, and if so, why there is a systematic difference in the
effect of leave policies on fertility in East Asia, and in Europe and North Amer-
ica. Lastly, our findings in Paper 3 indicate that the PLA may have impacted
the fertility of occasionally working women but not always working women. This








A.1 Full hybrid model results
(Table on next page)
125
Table A1: Full range of hybrid panel data logistic regression estimates of births
and desire for more births, by survey respondent group.
Births Desire for more births
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)




Wife’s tertiary education -0.175 0.151
(0.705) (0.468)
Within estimate
Youngest child younger than five -1.108* -1.268 -0.999 -0.966** -1.408** -0.514
(0.559) (0.930) (0.805) (0.365) (0.525) (0.530)
Wife’s tertiary education 0.360 1.399+ 0.150 0.204
(0.630) (0.775) (0.405) (0.493)
Husband’s tertiary education 1.280* 1.663+ -5.143* -0.0419 -0.214 1.194
(0.630) (0.913) (2.358) (0.416) (0.504) (1.405)
Proportion of housework done by husband 0.983 1.365 -0.160 -0.685 -1.281 0.352
(1.199) (1.806) (1.970) (0.833) (1.159) (1.264)
Wife’s hours of housework -0.0183 -0.0353 -0.0137 0.00560 0.0163 0.00116
(0.0256) (0.0430) (0.0390) (0.0146) (0.0230) (0.0196)
Husband’s hours of housework -0.0462 -0.0754 -0.00756 0.0307 0.0533+ -0.0000332
(0.0333) (0.0517) (0.0523) (0.0206) (0.0279) (0.0319)
Wife’s age 0.621*** 0.558* 0.951*** -0.616*** -0.683*** -0.576***
(0.153) (0.239) (0.247) (0.0949) (0.142) (0.137)
Wife works 0.467 0.133 1.284 1.040* 1.685* 0.538
(0.687) (1.251) (0.913) (0.442) (0.702) (0.589)
Parents co-reside 0.744 -0.238 1.950* -0.134 0.181 -0.412
(0.599) (0.993) (0.886) (0.389) (0.536) (0.585)
Log income 0.137 0.129 0.239 0.0169 0.0121 -0.00472
(0.108) (0.141) (0.315) (0.0597) (0.0727) (0.118)
Parity 2 or more -7.841*** -8.555*** -8.866*** -0.502 -0.372 -0.793+
(0.707) (1.165) (1.116) (0.327) (0.492) (0.454)
Pays for nanny 0.758 -0.599 1.646* -0.250 0.809 -1.056*
(0.538) (0.987) (0.772) (0.372) (0.577) (0.516)
Year of the Dragon 0.542+ 0.755 0.595
(0.292) (0.483) (0.410)
Desires more children -0.509 0.227 -1.669*
(0.511) (0.855) (0.763)
Parents co-reside * pays for nanny -1.540+ -1.194 -1.689 -0.108 -0.737 0.270
(0.844) (1.468) (1.261) (0.556) (0.830) (0.766)
Wife works * wife’s hours of housework -0.00251 0.0373 -0.0699+ -0.0319+ -0.0564* -0.00949
(0.0245) (0.0407) (0.0388) (0.0164) (0.0250) (0.0233)
Desires more children * wife’s hours of housework 0.0734** 0.101** 0.0818*
(0.0231) (0.0381) (0.0358)
Between estimate
Youngest child younger than five 3.549*** 2.984** 4.145*** 4.154*** 3.340*** 5.016***
(0.771) (1.126) (1.201) (0.458) (0.615) (0.722)
Wife’s tertiary education -0.0434 0.874 -0.175 -0.592
(0.410) (0.693) (0.358) (0.598)
Husband’s tertiary education 0.554 -0.162 0.804+ 0.230 0.563 0.0183
(0.377) (0.931) (0.476) (0.340) (0.605) (0.436)
Proportion of housework done by husband 0.414 0.170 0.557 -0.110 1.502 -2.694
(1.523) (2.424) (2.491) (1.377) (1.740) (2.290)
Wife’s hours of housework -0.00325 0.0269 -0.0526 -0.00138 0.0289 -0.0137
(0.0280) (0.0427) (0.0443) (0.0234) (0.0344) (0.0332)
Husband’s hours of housework -0.0582 -0.0487 -0.0703 0.0139 -0.0165 0.0909
(0.0437) (0.0695) (0.0740) (0.0389) (0.0506) (0.0645)
Wife’s age -0.0540 -0.0829 -0.0618 -0.135*** -0.219** -0.119*
(0.0456) (0.0973) (0.0592) (0.0403) (0.0746) (0.0500)
Wife works -0.508 -0.702 -0.837 0.228 -0.300 1.311
(0.737) (1.215) (1.214) (0.676) (0.876) (1.096)
Parents co-reside 0.497 0.808 0.208 -0.378 -0.218 -0.363
(0.370) (0.684) (0.524) (0.320) (0.464) (0.459)
Log income -0.133 -0.119 0.134 0.0368 -0.0145 0.315
(0.139) (0.184) (0.346) (0.120) (0.135) (0.260)
Parity 2 or more 0.165 0.0736 0.406 -3.012*** -2.874*** -3.391***
(0.436) (0.712) (0.646) (0.323) (0.437) (0.497)
Pays for nanny 0.841 3.042** -0.480 -0.868 -1.086 -0.975
(0.597) (0.986) (0.862) (0.575) (0.904) (0.783)
Year of the Dragon 0 0 0
(.) (.) (.)
Desires more children 0.545 1.019 -0.387
(0.786) (1.261) (1.159)
Parents co-reside * pays for nanny -0.325 -1.870 0.470 1.242 1.218 1.495
(0.854) (1.462) (1.213) (0.865) (1.280) (1.222)
Wife works * wife’s hours of housework 0.0283 -0.00368 0.0582 0.00530 -0.0144 -0.0176
(0.0337) (0.0542) (0.0559) (0.0308) (0.0422) (0.0488)
Desires more children * wife’s hours of housework -0.0237 -0.0371 0.0107
(0.0375) (0.0563) (0.0598)
Constant -3.308 -2.937 -6.995+ 1.141 4.250 -3.044
(2.199) (3.853) (3.987) (1.846) (2.827) (3.063)
N 2176 1040 1136 2176 1040 1136
Notes: Within estimates are derived using variation within individuals over time, and between
estimates use variation across different individuals. Estimates of the log-odds, standard errors
(in brackets), and odds ratios are reported to three decimal places. The odds ratios are the
exponents of the log-odds. +p < .10, ∗p < .05, ∗∗p < .01, ∗∗∗p < .001.
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A.2 Full cross-sectional model results
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Table A2: Full range of cross-sectional logistic regression estimates of births, by
survey respondent group.
(7) (8) (9)
Variable All Females Males
Youngest child younger than five 0.631+ 0.917 0.311
(0.377) (0.574) (0.546)
Wife’s tertiary education 0.854* 0.518 1.180*
(0.366) (0.536) (0.543)
Husband’s tertiary education 0.156 0.363 0.0881
(0.333) (0.484) (0.519)
Proportion of housework done by husband 1.051 3.560** -2.058
(1.040) (1.246) (1.556)
Wife’s hours of housework -0.0546* -0.0452 -0.0784**
(0.0228) (0.0467) (0.0268)
Husband’s hours of housework -0.00846 -0.0601+ 0.0664+
(0.0266) (0.0309) (0.0398)
Wife’s age -0.286*** -0.397*** -0.270***
(0.0537) (0.0971) (0.0653)
Wife works -1.381* -2.002* -0.674
(0.561) (0.963) (0.681)
Parents co-reside -0.0291 0.0695 -0.113
(0.302) (0.443) (0.423)
Log income 0.0648 0.128 -0.0149
(0.0672) (0.0834) (0.108)
Parity 2 or more -2.202*** -2.035*** -2.563***
(0.294) (0.421) (0.464)
Pays for nanny 0.573 0.346 0.938
(0.419) (0.632) (0.642)
Desires more children 0.627 0.252 0.979+
(0.400) (0.621) (0.580)
Parents co-reside * pays for nanny -0.220 -0.278 -0.240
(0.615) (0.831) (1.018)
Wife works * wife’s hours of housework 0.0596* 0.0788 0.0226
(0.0264) (0.0511) (0.0305)




Constant 7.991*** 10.29** 8.810***
(1.887) (3.225) (2.471)
N 544 260 284
Notes: The dependent variable here is whether the couple went on to have one or more children
in 2011-2015. Estimates and standard errors (in brackets) are reported to three decimal places.




B.1 PROSPERO systematic review protocol
The review protocol is available online at PROSPERO, at https://www.crd.york.
ac.uk/prospero/display_record.php?RecordID=128493. The protocol was regis-
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The effect of parental leave policies on increasing fertility: a systematic review
Jac Thomas, Francisco Rowe, Eric Lin
 
Citation
Jac Thomas, Francisco Rowe, Eric Lin. The effect of parental leave policies on increasing fertility:




What does the evidence show for how changes in leave entitlements affect fertility? By 'leave,' we mean
parental leave, maternity leave, and paternity leave. Do changes in leave entitlements affect fertility
quantum, fertility tempo, or both? How do different types of changes in leave entitlement affect fertility? How
do heterogeneous incentive changes affect fertility in different groups?
 
Searches
The following bibliographic databases will be used to search for relevant studies and reviews. Since the
breadth of eligible countries and time periods is large, we will not restrict the search on the basis of time
periods and countries; this filtering will be done later, if needed. Our search is restricted to material available
in English. The full search strategy is linked to below.
Academic sources:
PopLine
Academic Search Premier (multi-disciplinary)
ProQuest dissertation & theses A&I
PubCentral (medical, full-text)
PubMed (medical science)
Science Citation Index (science and technology journals)
Social Science Citation Index (social science journals)
The Cochrane Library (Cochrane Database for Systematic Reviews, other reviews with a medical focus)










Social Science Research Network (https://www.ssrn.com/en/)
WorldWideScience (https://worldwidescience.org/)
International Network on Leave Policies & Research (https://www.leavenetwork.org/)
UN World Population Policies Database (https://esa.un.org/poppolicy/about_database.aspx)
Office of Economic Coordination and Development (OECD) (http://www.oecd.org)
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Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) (https://esrc.ukri.org/)
Centre for Economic Policy and Research (CEPR) (https://cepr.org/)
 
Types of study to be included
All studies that aim to quantify the effect of a parental leave policy change, using micro-level data.
 
Condition or domain being studied
We are interested in fertility: the number of births had by women. We are interested in how changes in leave
entitlements affect the number of births had by women.
 
Participants/population




Parental, maternity, and paternity leave: time off from work given to parents, mothers, and fathers,
respectively, under the condition that the individual taking the leave can return to their job after the period of
leave is completed. It may be paid or unpaid.
 
Comparator(s)/control




Fertility - the number of children had by women. We are interested in both tempo and quantum effects. We
are interested at fertility at any time period after the leave policy change.
* Measures of effect




* Measures of effect
Not applicable.
 
Data extraction (selection and coding)
1. Search results from the academic databases and other sources will be combined, and duplicates will be
removed. Each duplicate found by the reference management software will be considered manually – we
won’t automatically remove duplicates.
2. Screen the search results based on titles and abstracts. For each included article, the title will be read – if
it’s clearly irrelevant, it will be excluded. If it may be relevant, the abstract will be read. If the abstract shows
it to be clearly irrelevant, it will be excluded. If the abstract makes shows the article to be clearly relevant, or
if it’s not clear whether it’s relevant or irrelevant, the article will be included for the next stage.
3. The full text of each article included will be retrieved.
4. Screen those articles. The reasons for excluding any seemingly relevant articles will be specified in an
appendix to the final report.
5. The resulting articles will then be coded, according to the coding form below. The coding form will be
adjusted if deemed necessary.
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Participant characteristics (age, gender, parity, employment, marital status, socioeconomic criteria, region,
ethnicity)
Time period covered (date of policy change, length of follow-up)
Details of initial policy (payment, time length, timing and other incentives)
Details of new policy (payment, time length, timing and other incentives)
Statistical difference generated (e.g. case-control before-after, case-control regional, heterogeneous
incentives)
Type of data used (e.g. panel, cross-section, repeated cross-section)
Source of data (e.g. administrative, questionnaire)
Level of aggregation (e.g. mother, family)




Risk of bias (quality) assessment
In order to assess the risk of bias in studies included in the review, we will use the ROBINS-I tool for the
assessment of risk of bias in non-randomised studies (Sterne et al. 2016). ROBINS-I builds on the Cochrane
Collaboration’s guidelines for assessing the risk of bias in randomised studies, and specifies seven domains
of possible bias. A series of questions are provided for each of the seven domains, to be asked of every
study included in the review. Based on the responses to these questions, each study is then given an overall
score for risk of bias.
A single researcher (Jac Thomas) will conduct the risk of bias analysis. Since no quantitative synthesis of the
studies will be conducted, assessment of risk of bias for included studies is not expected to influence the
synthesis of the studies.
 
Strategy for data synthesis
A narrative (descriptive) synthesis will be conducted. A quantitative synthesis or meta-analysis won't be
possible, due to heterogeneity in study designs, populations and interventions. Individual-level participant
data from included studies will not be sought out or used. Only aggregate data presented in the published
form of included studies will be included.
The narrative synthesis will be conducted using guidance summarised in:
 Ryan R; Cochrane Consumers and Communication Review Group. ‘Cochrane Consumers and
Communication Review Group: data synthesis and analysis’. http://cccrg.cochrane.org, 13 March 2019
(accessed 03/09/2019).
Specifically, we will synthesise the results using a four step approach:
1. Developing a theory about how the intervention works, why and for whom (using included studies)
2. Conducting an initial synthesis that summarises the results of included studies, using information extracted
from coding. This will include commenting on any differences in the results of studies using different designs,
and using vote counting
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3. Discussing how differences of effects found within and between studies may be explained by study
heterogeneity
4. Assessing the robustness of the synthesis, given the amount and quality of the evidence, and the methods
used for synthesising the evidence.
 
Analysis of subgroups or subsets
No separate analysis of subgroups is planned.
 








Review team members and their organisational affiliations
Mr Jac Thomas. University of Liverpool
Dr Francisco Rowe. University of Liverpool
Professor Eric Lin. National Tsing-Hua University, Taiwan
 
Collaborators
Ms Lisa Hawksworth. University of Liverpool
 
Type and method of review
Intervention, Narrative synthesis, Systematic review
 




















Subject index terms status
Subject indexing assigned by CRD
 
Subject index terms
Fertility; Humans; Parental Leave; Policy
 
Date of registration in PROSPERO
09 September 2019
                               Page: 4 / 5
PROSPERO
International prospective register of systematic reviews
 
Date of first submission
03 June 2019
 
Stage of review at time of this submission
 
Stage Started Completed
Preliminary searches Yes No
Piloting of the study selection process No No
Formal screening of search results against eligibility criteria No No
Data extraction No No
Risk of bias (quality) assessment No No
Data analysis No No
The record owner confirms that the information they have supplied for this submission is accurate and
complete and they understand that deliberate provision of inaccurate information or omission of data may be
construed as scientific misconduct.
The record owner confirms that they will update the status of the review when it is completed and will add





This information has been provided by the named contact for this review. CRD has accepted this information in good
faith and registered the review in PROSPERO. The registrant confirms that the information supplied for this submission
is accurate and complete. CRD bears no responsibility or liability for the content of this registration record, any
associated files or external websites.
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B.2 Deviations from the review protocol
Academic database searches
• POPLINE was not searched because it no longer exists
• Social Science Research Network (SSRN) was not searched because it does
not support the use of wildcards or Booleans in searching
• Social Care Online was not searched because it does not support advanced
searching
• The study design terms were removed because they led to articles we knew
to be relevant being omitted
• Some of the search terms were removed from the fertility group, as they
were deemed unnecessary
Grey literature searches
• Social Science Research Network (SSRN) was not searched because it does
not support the use of wildcards or Booleans in searching
• WorldWideScience was not searched, because it cannot limit searches based
on title and/or abstract
• Only the first 200 results from the Google Scholar search were looked
through, because the search returned thousands of results
• The INLPR country reports were retrieved, and the “recent research” sec-
tions were browsed for any mention of empirical articles investigating the
effect of leave on fertility
• Additional UN sources were searched, including the Department of Eco-
nomic and Social Affairs, the World Health Organisation, and the United
Nations Development Programme
B.3 Search strategy for Academic Search Com-
plete
Searched Academic Search Complete through EBSCOhost. Searched on 12/10/2019,
returned 376 results.
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Language: English. Search mode: Boolean/Phrase. After search, Limited by
Type: Academic Journals (omitting Magazines, Newspaper articles, and Trade
publications).
Title OR Subject Terms OR Abstract or Author-Supplied Abstract OR Author-
Supplied Keywords.
((fertility OR birth* OR child#birth OR child#bearing OR natal*) AND (“parental
leave” OR “maternity leave” OR “paternity leave” OR “family policy” OR “fam-
ily policies”))
B.4 Domains of bias in ROBINS-I
1. Confounding occurs when a variable that predicts the outcome also predicts
the intervention.
2. Selection bias refers to bias arising from exclusion of eligible participants,
when the exclusion criteria are related to both the intervention and the
outcome.
3. Misclassification bias occurs when study participants are erroneously recorded
as having received or not received the intervention.
4. Performance bias refers to bias arising from deviations from intended inter-
ventions between the treatment and control group. If there are important
co-interventions given to either the treatment or control group – such as
the simultaneous introduction of another pro-natal policy – then the study
will be at risk of performance bias.
5. Bias due to missing data could arise due to survey participant attrition, or
from key variables (such as employment status) not being directly observed.
6. Detection bias concerns whether study participants are aware of whether
or not they receive the intervention. Detection bias is not applicable to
studies of public policy effects, since all participants are aware of whether
they are eligible for a policy or not.
7. Outcome reporting bias could arise if only the results from models that have




C.1 Employment status in the focal period
Table 5.1 presents information on the 10 employment history categories in the
WMFES. For Groups (1), (4), and (10), we can immediately determine whether
respondents were working or not working during the focal period. However, it
is not immediately clear whether respondents in the other groups were working
during the focal period. For most of these other groups, we can use data from
other questions in the PLA to estimate whether respondents were likely to be
working or not working. In what follows, we discuss why we classified each of
these other groups as “likely working,” “likely not working,” or “unclear.” Our
analysis here uses data from the WMFES 2016 questionnaire only.
Group (2): Quit work at marriage and have a job now
For Group (2) women, we can use the variable b1_a to find out when they
got married, and variable b9a to find out how long before they returned to work.
Using this information, we find that 88% of Group (2) women had returned to
work before the focal period, and 95% had returned to work by the end of the
focal period. However, these women may have quit at some point after returning
to work after marriage, and so we cannot be certain that they were within work
during the focal period. Nevertheless, the high percentages of 88% and 95% sug-
gest that the majority of them will have been in work during the focal period,
and so we classify Group (2) women as being “likely working” during the focal
period.
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Group (3): Quit work at marriage, had a job after but don’t have a job now
The analysis for Group (3) women is similar to the Group (2) women, i.e. us-
ing information on their year of marriage and length of time before returning to
work to calculate what percentage of women had returned to work at least once
before the focal period. We calculate that 90% of Group (3) women had returned
to work at least once before the focal period, and that 100% of Group (3) women
had returned to work at least once by the end of the focal period. However, we
do know that all women in Group (3) were out of work in 2016, meaning that
some of them were likely to be out of work during the focal period. We therefore
classify Group (3) women as being “likely working” during the focal period.
Group (5): Quit work at birth and have a job now
We estimate that parity 0 women in Group (5) were working in the focal pe-
riod. We know that these women must have had at least one birth by the survey
year, and will have quit work at one of those births, so prior to that they would
have been working. Typically then, a parity 0 Group (5) woman would have been
working at the start of the focal period (because they did not quit work at mar-
riage), would have had a child, and then quit their job. For parity 1+ Group (5)
women, we can use data from variable b13a to find out which birth they first quit
their job at (i.e. first birth, second birth etc.), and data from variables b2a1_a to
b2a1_d to find out the dates of birth of their children. We can then use variable
b12a to find out how long they were out of work after the first time they quit
due to a birth, and thereby determine the year in which they returned to work.
From this analysis, we can see that 79% of Group (5) had returned to work at
least once before the focal period, and 87% had returned to work at least once
by the end of the focal period. We therefore classify Group (5) women as being
“likely working” during the focal period.
Group (6): Quit work at birth
Group (6) women quit work at birth and were not working in 2016, though
they might have re-entered employment between quitting at birth and 2016. We
estimate that parity 0 women in Group (6) were working in the focal period, for
the same reason that parity 0 Group (5) women were working in the focal period.
For women at parities 1-3, we can cross-tabulate parity with variable b10, which
specifies whether they ever returned to work after quitting at birth. 91% of parity
1 women never returned to work, meaning that they wouldn’t have been working
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during the focal period. The percentages for parity 2 and parity 3 women are
84% and 85% respectively. We can also use data from variable b13a, which asks
respondents at which birth did they quit birth. This reveals that 87% of parity
1+ respondents quit work at their first birth. Together, these percentages indi-
cate that the vast majority (9̃0%) of parity 1+ Group (6) women typically quit
work at their first birth and never returned to work, meaning that we can classify
parity 1+ Group (6) women as likely not working during the focal period.
Group (7): Quit work for other reasons and have a job now
Unlike for women who quit work due to marriage or childbearing, there are no
questions of the form, ‘how long did it take for you to become re-employed after
quitting?” Data from variable b15c – the main reason for quitting – shows a wide
variety of reasons, like childcare, low pay, and redundancy. Most of these women
returned to work to help the family finances or to get an independent income
(b15c1_a. We therefore cannot estimate whether Group (7) were working in the
focal period, and so we classify their focal period employment status as “unclear.”
Group (8): Quit work for other reasons
Similar to Group (7) women, there is no data on how long Group (8) women
were out of work (or if they ever returned to work). Therefore it is not possible
to estimate whether they were in work or not during the focal period. We there-
fore classify the focal period employment status of Group (8) women as “unclear.”
Group (9): No job before marriage, but had a job after marriage until now
For women in Group (9), what we need to know is how soon these women
entered work after marriage – specifically, whether they were working while they
were having children, and whether they were working during the focal period. It
could be the case that these women – who had never worked before marriage –
got married, then remained out of work for a few years while they had children,
and then returned to work at the end. Alternatively, it could be the case that
these women got married, immediately started working, and then had children
while they were working. Unfortunately, there are not any questions that could
shed light on whether either of these situations were true. Consequently, it is not
possible for us to evaluate whether these women were likely to be working or not
working during the focal period. This means that this group should be treated
with caution – we just cannot know whether they were working or not during the
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focal period. However, what we do know is that they are working at the time
of the survey. We therefore classify the focal period employment status of these
women as “unclear.”
C.2 Trends in all employment history groups
(Figure on next page)
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Figure C1: Proportions and fertility of wives by employment history.
Notes: The numbers of respondents in each of the five surveys from 2003 to 2016 are as
follows: 9329, 8199, 7234, 6146, and 5357.
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C.3 Full model results
Table C1: Always working women (Group (A)) – models without covariates.
All women Parity 0 Parity 1 Parity 2 Parity 3
(Intercept) −1.65 0.16 −0.28∗∗∗ −2.54∗∗∗ −3.83∗∗∗
(0.89) (0.11) (0.08) (0.11) (0.18)
Time −0.40∗∗∗ −0.47∗∗ −0.44∗∗∗ −0.19 −0.01
(0.08) (0.17) (0.12) (0.16) (0.38)
Treat −0.30∗∗∗ −0.01 −0.26∗∗ −0.60∗∗∗ −0.85∗∗
(0.06) (0.12) (0.08) (0.11) (0.29)
DID −0.05 −0.20 0.00 −0.04 −1.20
(0.10) (0.20) (0.14) (0.21) (0.84)
Parity effects
– Parity 0 2.06
(0.96)
– Parity 1 1.47
(0.95)
– Parity 2 −0.93
(0.95)
– Parity 3 −2.32
(0.96)
N 21, 741 2, 236 4, 756 10, 060 4, 689
∗∗∗p < 0.001; ∗∗p < 0.01; ∗p < 0.05.
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Table C2: Always working women (Group (A)) – models with covariates.
All women Parity 0 Parity 1 Parity 2 Parity 3
(Intercept) 5.25∗∗∗ 7.05∗∗∗ 5.91∗∗∗ 4.74∗∗∗ 4.27∗∗∗
(0.71) (0.41) (0.26) (0.34) (0.82)
Time −0.03 0.01 −0.10 0.12 0.38
(0.09) (0.20) (0.14) (0.17) (0.40)
Treat −0.32∗∗∗ −0.10 −0.31∗∗ −0.47∗∗∗ −0.72∗
(0.07) (0.15) (0.10) (0.12) (0.31)
DID −0.15 −0.30 −0.06 −0.12 −1.46
(0.11) (0.24) (0.16) (0.22) (0.85)
Wife’s age −0.21∗∗∗ −0.23∗∗∗ −0.21∗∗∗ −0.21∗∗∗ −0.22∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Wife’s education: senior high school 0.57∗∗∗ 0.82∗∗∗ 0.65∗∗∗ 0.32∗ 0.29
(0.08) (0.17) (0.11) (0.14) (0.31)
Wife’s education: university 0.90∗∗∗ 1.06∗∗∗ 1.03∗∗∗ 0.57∗∗ 0.44
(0.10) (0.19) (0.14) (0.21) (0.69)
Husband’s education: senior high school 0.24∗∗∗ 0.30∗ 0.32∗∗∗ 0.11 −0.18
(0.07) (0.13) (0.10) (0.13) (0.31)
Husband’s education: university 0.49∗∗∗ 0.26 0.64∗∗∗ 0.46∗ 0.58
(0.08) (0.15) (0.12) (0.19) (0.61)
Parity effects
– Parity 0 1.56
(0.67)
– Parity 1 1.09
(0.67)
– Parity 2 −0.90
(0.67)
– Parity 3 −1.69
(0.70)
N 21, 741 2, 236 4, 756 10, 060 4, 689
∗∗∗p < 0.001; ∗∗p < 0.01; ∗p < 0.05
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Table C3: Occasionally working women (Group (B)) – models without covariates.
All women Parity 0 Parity 1 Parity 2 Parity 3
(Intercept) −1.60 0.13 −0.28∗∗ −2.56∗∗∗ −3.85∗∗∗
(0.86) (0.10) (0.09) (0.11) (0.19)
Time −0.40∗∗∗ −0.46∗∗ −0.44∗∗∗ −0.17 −0.00
(0.08) (0.17) (0.12) (0.16) (0.38)
Treat −0.34∗∗∗ 0.27 −0.41∗∗∗ −0.57∗∗∗ −0.71∗∗
(0.06) (0.14) (0.09) (0.11) (0.26)
Did 0.35∗∗∗ 0.24 0.41∗∗ 0.03 0.72
(0.11) (0.23) (0.15) (0.21) (0.49)
Parity effects
– Parity 0 2.06
(0.82)
– Parity 1 1.29
(0.81)
– Parity 2 −1.07
(0.81)
– Parity 3 −2.25
(0.82)
N 20, 018 1, 339 3, 816 9, 503 5, 360
∗∗∗p < 0.001; ∗∗p < 0.01; ∗p < 0.05
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Table C4: Occasionally working women (Group (B)) – models with covariates.
All women Parity 0 Parity 1 Parity 2 Parity 3
(Intercept) 5.73∗∗∗ 7.44∗∗∗ 6.29∗∗∗ 4.94∗∗∗ 5.27∗∗∗
(0.68) (0.52) (0.29) (0.34) (0.74)
Time 0.01 0.02 −0.09 0.16 0.48
(0.09) (0.21) (0.14) (0.17) (0.41)
Treat −0.20∗∗ 0.21 −0.32∗∗ −0.27∗ −0.36
(0.07) (0.17) (0.10) (0.12) (0.28)
DID 0.28∗ 0.27 0.36∗ −0.02 0.64
(0.12) (0.28) (0.17) (0.22) (0.51)
Wife’s age −0.22∗∗∗ −0.23∗∗∗ −0.21∗∗∗ −0.22∗∗∗ −0.24∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Wife’s education: senior high school 0.44∗∗∗ 0.61∗∗ 0.56∗∗∗ 0.24 0.41
(0.08) (0.20) (0.12) (0.13) (0.27)
Wife’s education: university 0.86∗∗∗ 0.87∗∗∗ 1.11∗∗∗ 0.59∗ −0.31
(0.11) (0.25) (0.16) (0.23) (0.71)
Husband’s education: senior high school 0.11 0.14 0.27∗∗ −0.05 −0.44
(0.07) (0.17) (0.10) (0.12) (0.26)
Husband’s education: university 0.39∗∗∗ 0.27 0.56∗∗∗ 0.10 0.79
(0.10) (0.22) (0.14) (0.20) (0.46)
Parity effects
– Parity 0 1.62
(0.69)
– Parity 1 0.96
(0.69)
– Parity 2 −1.02
(0.69)
– Parity 3 −1.56
(0.69)
N 20, 018 1, 339 3, 816 9, 503 5, 360
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